Essays in applied microeconomics by Winter, Christoph
Essays in Applied
Microeconomics
Christoph Winter
Munich 2020
empty
Essays in Applied
Microeconomics
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2020
vorgelegt von
Christoph Winter
Referent:
Korreferent:
Mündliche Prüfung:
Berichterstatter:
Promotionsabschlussberatung:
Prof. Dr. Joachim Winter
Prof. Davide Cantoni, PhD
24. Januar 2020
Prof. Dr. Joachim Winter
Prof. Davide Cantoni, PhD
Prof. Dean Yang, PhD
5. Februar 2020
empty
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Joachim Winter. I am deeply
grateful for his continuous guidance and support. Joachim provided me with every
possible resource needed and I enjoyed working at the Chair of Empirical Economic
Research. I am especially grateful to him for giving me the opportunity to spend
several months at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.
I also want to thank my second supervisor Davide Cantoni. The joint Cantoni-
Winter seminars were always very insightful and his feedback highly informative. I also
benefited a lot from Davide’s encouraging comments regarding one of my projects. Fur-
thermore, I extend warm gratitude to Dean Yang, who hosted me during my research
visit in Ann Arbor and who agreed to be a member of my dissertation committee. My
time there was a great experience and my single-authored paper would not have been
the same without his guidance.
I owe special thanks to my junior faculty mentor and co-author Andreas Stein-
mayr. I learned a great deal from him on how to conduct economic research and his
honest feedback pushed me to achieve as much as I could. Furthermore, I want to
thank him for the opportunity to spend two months in the Philippines to collect data
for our projects.
All my co-authors deserve special credit for this dissertation. I learned a lot from
Navid Sabet and his inspiring way of thinking about research questions as well as his
incredible writing and presentation skills. I also benefited highly from cooperation with
Felix Montag. It was very fortunate that we realized at some point that we have worked
on a similar topic and combined his theoretical and my empirical work. Moreover, I
want to thank Toman Barsbai for the great collaboration despite the long distance
between us. Toman brought in many great ideas and it was always inspiring to think
about the big picture. It was a great joy working with all of you!
Furthermore, I am grateful to the Elite Network of Bavaria (ENB), for the sup-
port during my doctoral studies through the International Doctoral Program Evidence-
Based Economics. Also, I would like to thank all the people at the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas in Manila for their hospitality. The time there was a great experience
ii
and the collected data became the basis for several research projects.
I would also like to thank all the other PhD candidates who were part of this
journey. In particular the Lehrstuhl-Team Brendan, Corinna, Fabian, Nadine, Raphael,
Pavel and Tobias and of course the EBE/MGSE Lunch-Team Benni, Felix and Marvin.
It was a lot of fun!
My greatest gratitude goes to my family. I thank my parents, my sister and my
grandparents for their constant guidance and their support. Without my wife, Theresa,
and her invaluable support none of this would have been possible. I owe it to all of
you!
Christoph Winter
Munich, September 2019
Contents
Preface 1
1 Natural Disasters, Networks, and Migration 5
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1 Philippine Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.2 Typhoon Climate in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Migration and Census Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Storm Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.3 Additional Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.2 Providing Legal Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.3 Providing Economic Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.4 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2 Immigrating into a Recession 57
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
iv Contents
2.2 Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 The System of Family-sponsored Immigration to the US . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5 Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6.1 The Long-term Effects of Initial Conditions on Labor Market
Outcomes of Family Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6.2 Coping Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.6.3 Alternative Strategies for Identifying Family Migrants . . . . . . 85
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3 The Political Economy of Immigrant Legalization 105
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2.1 The Immigration Reform and Control Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Legalized . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.3 Incumbent Politicians: A Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.1 Politician Pay-off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 Data and Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4.2 Inter-Governmental Revenue and the Budget-Making Process . . 117
3.5 Immigrant Legalization and Inter-Governmental Revenue . . . . . . . . 120
3.5.1 The Evolution of IGR: Raw Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.5.2 Baseline Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.5.3 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5.4 Instrumental Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5.5 Population Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.5.6 SUTVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6 Political Economy Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.6.1 Political Party Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.6.2 Term Limits and Election Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.6.3 Electoral Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.6.4 Veto Power and State Legislatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3.6.5 Re-election Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.7 Capturing the Vote of the Newly Legalized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.7.1 Attitudes Towards Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.7.2 The IRCA, Local Expenditure and Hispanic Outcomes . . . . . . 143
Contents v
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.1 Analysis of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.2 Additional Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
C.3 Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4 Price Transparency Against Market Power 173
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.3 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.3.2 Static Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.3.3 Dynamic Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.3.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.3.5 Theoretical Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.4.1 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics . . . . . . . . 188
4.4.2 Exogenous Information Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.4.3 Consumer Search and Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.5.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.5.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.6 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.6.1 Effect of a Follow-on Shock to Consumer Transparency . . . . . 199
4.6.2 The Role of Ex Ante Consumer Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . 202
4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
D.1 Static Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
D.2 Proof of Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
D.3 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics in Germany . 217
D.4 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics in France . . . 223
D.5 Local Radio Reports of Petrol Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
D.6 Consumer Search and Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
D.7 Donut Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
D.8 Austria as a Control Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
D.9 Local Monopolists as a Control Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
D.10 Triple Difference Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
vi Contents
D.11 Sub-group Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
D.12 Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
D.13 Dropping September 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Bibliography 236
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Effect of typhoon Haiyan on migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 1.2 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 1.3 Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics . . . . . . . 24
Figure 1.4 The role of migration networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure A.1 Typhoon activity in the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure A.2 Typhoon Haiyan striking the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure A.3 Distribution of migration rate and network size . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure A.4 Map of migration rate by municipality, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure A.5 Best-track typhoon data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure A.6 Standardized storm index 1990-2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure A.7 Occurrences of typhoons in the Philippines, EM-DAT data . . . 40
Figure A.8 Map of typhoon exposure by municipality, 1990-2015 . . . . . . 41
Figure A.9 Average GDP per capita growth of networks, 2001 to 2015 . . . 42
Figure A.10 Effect of storms on migration rate by network quantiles . . . . . 46
Figure 2.1 Waiting times for family migrants by admission category . . . . 66
Figure 2.2 Countries by dominant mode of migration to the United States 69
Figure 2.3 Persistent effects of unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes for family migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Figure 2.4 Decomposition of the effect of the unemployment rate at im-
migration on annual wage income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 2.5 Comparison of the effects of the unemployment rate at immig-
ration for family migrants, employment migrants and college
graduates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Figure 2.6 Effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on receiving
welfare assistance and support from the family . . . . . . . . . . 84
Figure 2.7 Labor market effects of the unemployment rate at immigration
for immigrants from the Philippines with and without weights . 87
viii Contents
Figure 2.8 Labor market effects of the unemployment rate at immigration
for spouses of legal permanent residents (F2A) . . . . . . . . . . 88
Figure B.1 Waiting times for family migrants from countries where per-
country ceiling is binding by admission category . . . . . . . . . 93
Figure B.2 State-level unemployment rate for most important migrant-receiving
US states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Figure B.3 Share of individuals that moved between US states within the
last year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Figure B.4 Cohort size by years since immigration (individual years) . . . . 96
Figure B.5 Cohort size by years since immigration (aggregated) . . . . . . 96
Figure B.6 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
labor market outcomes for family migrants by sex . . . . . . . . 97
Figure B.7 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
labor market outcomes for family migrants by education . . . . 98
Figure B.8 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
labor market outcomes for family migrants by education (cond.
on age at immigration larger than 30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Figure B.9 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
labor market outcomes controlling for contemporaneous condi-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Figure B.10 Persistent effects of the average unemployment rate in the first
three years since immigration on labor market outcomes . . . . 101
Figure B.11 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
self employment, business and farm income, and total earnings 102
Figure B.12 Effect of the unemployment rate at immigration on geographic
mobility in the first five years after immigration . . . . . . . . . 103
Figure 3.1 Stock of IRCA applicants at the county level per 1,000 capita . 111
Figure 3.2 Number of legalized migrants per 1,000 county inhabitants in
1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Figure 3.3 Distribution of legalized migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Figure 3.4 Socio-economic characteristics of the IRCA applicants . . . . . 114
Figure 3.5 Evolution of IGR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Figure 3.6 Treatment effect interacted with year dummies . . . . . . . . . 122
Figure 3.7 Transfers in Zell Miller’s Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Figure 3.8 Event study estimates of local expenditure on legalization . . . 144
Figure 3.9 Event study estimates of high school completion on legalization 146
Contents ix
Figure C.1 Functional form of Ω(φ), its first and second derivative and their
sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Figure C.2 Sources of local government revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Figure C.3 Evolution of inter-governmental revenues in matched sample . 152
Figure C.4 Trends in county socio-economic characteristics . . . . . . . . . 153
Figure C.5 First-difference coefficient estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Figure C.6 Instrumental variables regression coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Figure C.7 The IRCA and the Democratic vote share . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Figure C.8 Presidential and gubernatorial election results . . . . . . . . . . 157
Figure C.9 Governor veto power index over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Figure C.10 Naturalization and legalization at the state level . . . . . . . . 159
Figure C.11 Share of local expenditure on... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Figure C.12 Marginal effect of the IRCA on the propensity to vote . . . . . 161
Figure 4.1 Effect of transparency on the critical discount factor . . . . . . 187
Figure 4.2 Evolution of retail margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Figure 4.3 Treatment effect of the MTU by share of commuters . . . . . . 206
Figure D.1 Distribution of petrol stations across Germany . . . . . . . . . . 218
Figure D.2 Number of petrol stations with positive price reports at 5pm . . 219
Figure D.3 Number of daily price changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Figure D.4 Notification patterns over the day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
Figure D.5 Daily fuelling patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Figure D.6 Daily price patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Figure D.7 Monthly page impressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Figure D.8 Distribution of petrol stations across France . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Figure D.9 Radio reception areas and petrol stations in Bavaria . . . . . . 224
Figure D.10 Distribution of ex ante informed consumer share across stations 226
Figure D.11 Petrol stations 20 to 40 kilometers from the Franco-German
border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Figure D.12 Control: Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

List of Tables
Table 1.1 Correlation between typhoons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Table 1.2 The role of policy restrictiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 1.3 The role of economic success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Table A.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table A.2 Summary statistics for selected policy restrictiveness indices . . 40
Table A.3 Description of categories in the IMPIC database . . . . . . . . . 42
Table A.4 Data sources for alternative network measures . . . . . . . . . . 43
Table A.5 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, average and by gender 44
Table A.6 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by age . . . . . . . . . 45
Table A.7 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by education . . . . . 45
Table A.8 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by category . . . . . . 47
Table A.9 Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics . . . . . . . 48
Table A.10 Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics (linear) . . 49
Table A.11 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, robustness . . . . . . 50
Table A.12 Effect of heavy typhoons on migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Table A.13 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, spillovers . . . . . . . 51
Table A.14 Correlation between different network measures . . . . . . . . . 52
Table A.15 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, alternative network
measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Table A.16 Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, destination country
specific analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Table A.17 The role of policy restrictiveness, mean policy restrictiveness
index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table A.18 The role of policy restrictiveness, policy restrictiveness index in
2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table A.19 Effect of past GDP per capita growth on employment and wage
income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
xii Contents
Table 2.1 Family-sponsored admission categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Table 2.2 Balancing of characteristics by state unemployment rate at arrival 72
Table 2.3 Effect of a one pp increase in initial unemployment rates by
network strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Table B.1 Admission categories of migrants by country type . . . . . . . . 90
Table B.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Table B.3 Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on
labor market outcomes for family migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Table B.4 Correlation between official waiting time and difference in im-
migration year between spouses (F2As) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Table B.5 Effect of a one pp increase in initial unemployment rates by
network strength for migrants from India . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Table 3.1 Balance table: Treated v. untreated counties in 1984 . . . . . . 118
Table 3.2 Inter-governmental revenue on IRCA legalizations . . . . . . . 124
Table 3.3 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Table 3.4 IRCA and SUTVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Table 3.5 State revenues and IRCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Table 3.6 Legalization and political heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Table 3.7 Legalization and tightness-of-the-race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Table 3.8 Veto, state legislatures and re-election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Table 3.9 IRCA and anti-migrant sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Table 3.10 IRCA and attitudes towards migration (GSS survey) . . . . . . 142
Table C.1 Congressional vote record on the IRCA bill . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Table C.2 Inter-governmental revenue from state to local governments:
Categories of revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Table C.3 Baseline results with alternative clustering and inference . . . . 164
Table C.4 Baseline results using linear legalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Table C.5 Democratic vote share on IRCA legalizations . . . . . . . . . . 166
Table C.6 Legalization and dynamics of the 99th congress . . . . . . . . . 167
Table C.7 Legalization and term limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table C.8 Local spending and IRCA legalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Table C.9 IRCA, citizenship and voter turnout using CPS . . . . . . . . . 169
Table C.10 Transfers on IRCA legalizations net of SLIAG funds . . . . . . 171
Table 4.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Table 4.2 The effect of the MTU on retail margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Table 4.3 The effect of radio reports on retail margins . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Contents xiii
Table 4.4 The effect of the MTU on retail margins by commuter share . 205
Table D.1 Share of stations in percent by brand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Table D.2 The effect of the MTU on retail margins using alternative donuts 228
Table D.3 The effect of the MTU on retail margins using local monopolies 230
Table D.4 The effect of the MTU on retail margins using a triple difference
strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Table D.5 The effect of the MTU on retail margins by sub-group . . . . . 233
Table D.6 The effect of the MTU on retail margins using Conley spatial
HAC standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Table D.7 The effect of the MTU on retail margins omitting September
2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
empty
Preface
“[...] economists − and everyone else − need two things to draw
a conclusion: data, and some way of making sense of the data.”
—Lars Peter Hansen, 20191
In recent decades the quantity and quality of data have increased rapidly and
large administrative records or data from private firms present numerous new research
opportunities (Einav and Levin, 2014). In the era of big data some argue that data
speaks for itself. However, there are many steps that lead from raw data to conclusions.
The more data available and the less structured it is, the more important a compass
to navigate through it becomes.
The economist’s compass to navigate data comprises economic theory and eco-
nometric methods. Recently, statistical tools for the analysis of big data have also been
brought into the field (e.g., Varian, 2014; Athey and Imbens, 2017; Mullainathan and
Spiess, 2017). Typically, economists are interested in the causal relationship between
two variables and the underlying mechanisms that drive the effect. Understanding
these fundamentals is the basis for evidence-based recommendations for firms and poli-
cymakers.
By applying microeconometric methods to novel data, this dissertation aims
to uncover causal relationships in two distinct fields: While the first three chapters
consider different aspects of international migration, the last chapter investigates the
effect of price transparency on the market power of firms.
Immigration is a highly contested issue, one which divides individuals within
and between nations. A recent Gallup World Poll found that 15 percent of interviewed
adults would like to move permanently to another country, if given the opportunity.
Projected to the world population this would mean that about 750 million people
have the intention to migrate.2 The reasons for these intentions are manifold. On
1 2013 Laureate of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics.
2 Source: https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx.
Accessed 1 September 2019.
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the one hand, there exist fundamental differences in living standards and population
growth between countries (Hanson and McIntosh, 2016). On the other hand, there are
certain shocks like conflicts, wars or natural disasters. Migration flows might become
particularly large if fundamentally disadvantaged countries are hit by shocks.3
The decision to migrate does not only change the life of the migrants, it also
has an impact on the people left behind and on those who live in the regions where
the migrants settle. Migration thus concerns almost everyone in both the sending and
receiving societies. While public discourse is often heated, it is not always based on
evidence.
The first three chapters of this dissertation aim to contribute to the evidence by
studying central questions concerning international migration. Chapter 1 investigates
whether natural disasters trigger individual migration and what role existing migrant
networks play for that decision. Chapter 2 analyzes how the economic conditions in the
country of destination at arrival affect the socio-economic integration of immigrants.
Chapter 3 studies how the distribution of public resources changes if undocumented
migrants obtain legal status and eventually the right to vote. Gaining knowledge about
these topics helps to predict future migrant flows and reap the benefits of migration.
The fourth chapter deals with a very different topic. It is motivated by the obser-
vation that many firms derive their market power, and thus their ability to price above
the perfectly competitive level, from informational frictions. At the same time, due to
modern information technologies, the costs for the collection and diffusion of informa-
tion are very low. While in some markets private comparison platforms emerged, e.g.
websites to compare prices for flights or insurance, in other markets policymakers man-
date firms to disclose prices publicly. From a theoretical perspective, however, public
price disclosure is not always beneficial for consumers. Slightly changing assumptions
on how individuals search, the nature of goods or the elasticity of demand can have a
great influence on the predictions of different theoretical models. The fourth chapter,
thus investigates under what conditions mandatory price disclosure is likely to be pro-
or anti-competitive.
A common theme of this dissertation is that either novel data and/or new iden-
tification strategies are used. Chapter 1 combines unique administrative data on 1.8
million Filipino permanent emigrants with geo-coded meteorological records to study
migration responses to typhoons at a very local geographic level. In Chapter 2, long
waiting times induced by the US immigration system are exploited to address the en-
dogenous timing of immigration. In Chapter 3, a nation-wide amnesty program in the
3 A recent example is the Syrian civil war which lead to large refugee flows into Europe in late 2015
and 2016.
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US that legalized about three million illegal immigrants is used as a natural experi-
ment to study the response of politicians to a change in the electorate. In Chapter 4,
for the first time, data on almost 20 million price notifications in the German retail
gasoline market prior to the introduction of price transparency is utilized to implement
a difference-in-differences strategy.
The remainder of this section provides an overview of each chapter of this disser-
tation. Each chapter is self-contained and can be read independently. A consolidated
bibliography is presented at the end of the dissertation.
Chapter 1, studies the effect of typhoons on migration. Typhoons, like natural
disasters in general, push millions of people into poverty every year. Whether this leads
to more or less migration is theoretically ambiguous but of central interest for policy-
makers in both sending and receiving countries, especially in light of climate change
that increases the damages caused by typhoons owing to rising sea temperatures. I
combine individual-level data for 1.8 million Filipino permanent emigrants with met-
eorological records of typhoons and find that typhoons on average increase migration
from exposed municipalities. However, this does not hold for all municipalities. The
evidence suggests that only individuals in municipalities with sufficiently large migrant
networks leave the country in response to typhoons. A key contribution of this chapter
is to shed light on two important mechanisms that drive the network effect - providing
legal entry and economic support. To investigate these mechanisms, I analyze migra-
tion to different destination countries and exploit variation in exogenous destination
country factors. In particular, I present evidence that networks are more effective if
family reunification policies of these countries are less restrictive and labor migration
policies more restrictive. Furthermore, I show that the network effect increases if the
network is economically more successful.
Chapter 2, which is joint work with Toman Barsbai and Andreas Steinmayr,
investigates how economic conditions at the time of arrival affect the socio-economic
integration of family migrants in the US. Even though family migrants account for
55 percent of all permanent immigrant arrivals in the OECD, they have received only
limited attention in economics. This chapter builds on and contributes to the literature
on how entering the labor market in a recession affects labor market outcomes. For
identification, we exploit years-long waiting times for visas that make it impossible for
family migrants to base their migration decision on economic conditions at the time of
arrival. We find that unlucky migrants that arrive during worse economic conditions
face considerable consequences. A one percentage point higher initial unemployment
rate decreases wage earnings by four percent in the short run and by 2.5 percent in the
longer run. This is due to substantial occupational downgrading. Family migrants who
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immigrate during a recession move into lower-paying occupations with strong ethnic
networks. Furthermore, they are more likely to reside with family members, which
reduces their geographical mobility.
Chapter 3, which is joint work with Navid Sabet, sheds light on the question
of what happens to the distribution of public resources when undocumented migrants
obtain legal status, and eventually citizenship and the right to vote. To answer this, we
exploit variation in the legal status of about three million illegal immigrants in the US
through a nation-wide amnesty program, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA). First, we find that state governors allocate more per capita aid to those
counties affected by the IRCA. Second, we posit that this is borne out by rational,
forward-looking governors who allocate resources strategically in pursuit of the votes
of the newly legalized who were eligible to vote five years after legalization. We provide
evidence to support this view: We find that the distribution of state aid differs signi-
ficantly according to political context and that counties affected by the IRCA receive
more resources when their governor is eligible for re-election, faces political competition
or enjoys line-item veto power. Third, our results indicate that the transfers were tar-
geted to the newly legalized, mostly of Hispanic origin, and not other constituents. We
also find that high school completion rates among Hispanics improved in counties that
received more transfers from the governor. These findings contribute to the literature
that sheds light on the distributional effects of the expansion of voter franchise as well
as the literature on the economics of legal status.
Chapter 4, which is joint work with Felix Montag, asks under what conditions
mandatory price disclosure is likely to be pro- or anti-competitive. The chapter makes
three main contributions. Firstly, we introduce a theoretical search model with collu-
sion and imperfectly informed consumers and producers. The model shows that the
level of ex ante consumer and producer transparency, as well as the number of con-
sumers adopting the mandatory price information, determine whether the policy is pro-
or anti-competitive. Secondly, we extend the empirical literature on the effect of man-
datory price disclosure on prices. In particular, we construct a unique data set to study
the effect of mandatory price disclosure in the German petrol market. Thirdly, we in-
vestigate how different market conditions lead to differential effects of mandatory price
disclosure empirically and use these results to assess the suitability of different theoret-
ical models. We find that, due to the introduction of price transparency, retail margins
decreased by 13 percent. We also find that the theoretical model is better at explaining
the relationship between the treatment effect and ex ante consumer transparency than
other models in the literature. Our results inform policymakers by highlighting how
the effect of mandatory price disclosure depends on certain market characteristics.
Chapter 1
Natural Disasters, Networks, and
Migration
Abstract
I use administrative emigration data from the Philippines from 1988 to
2015 as well as exogenous variation in typhoon exposure to provide evid-
ence on the effect of typhoons on migration and the specific role migrant
networks play. A key contribution of this paper is to shed light on two
important mechanisms that drive the network effect - providing legal entry
and economic support. I find that a one standard deviation increase in
typhoon exposure increases the migration rate of a municipality by about
one individual per 100,000 or two percent of the mean migration rate. This
effect is driven by individuals in municipalities with large migrant networks.
Furthermore, networks are more effective if family reunification policies of
destination countries are less restrictive and networks are economically more
successful, i.e., if providing legal entry and economic support is easier.
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1.1 Introduction
Recent estimates from the World Bank suggest that natural disasters cause about 300
billion USD in economic losses every year and push more than 26 million people into
poverty.1 According to the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters almost
half of all recorded losses due to natural disasters are caused by heavy storms (CRED,
2017). The destructiveness of these storms is highly correlated with tropical sea surface
temperatures (Emanuel, 2005) and will thus increase as climate change progresses.
There are many different strategies individuals may adopt to deal with negative
shocks such like natural disasters. Among the most extreme is to leave your home
permanently. Understanding the effect of natural disasters on international migration
is thus of central interest for policymakers in sending as well as receiving countries. For
the country of origin, (selective) migration can increase inequalities between regions in
times when affected areas are most vulnerable. For receiving countries, migration acts
as a defacto channel through which they are indirectly affected by natural disasters.
Since immigration is a very contested issue, it is crucial for receiving countries to be
able to both better predict above average migration flows and better understand the
selection process.
In this paper, I analyze the migration response to typhoons and the specific role
networks in the country of destination play. First, I investigate whether typhoons in
the country of origin cause migration in exposed municipalities and whether there is a
selection of migrants with respect to gender, age, and education. Second, I highlight
the important role that networks play in coping with natural disasters. Third, I shed
light on two key mechanisms through which networks support migrants: by providing
legal access and economic support.
The analysis is based on a panel of 1624 municipalities in the Philippines for the
years 2001 to 2015. I estimate a fixed-effects model exploiting exogenous variation in
typhoon exposure within municipalities over time as well as cross-sectional variation
in network size. To investigate the mechanisms, I use variation in immigration policies
and GDP per capita growth of destination countries.
Typhoons lower the attractiveness of remaining in one’s country of origin. They
destroy buildings and capital goods (Albala-Bertrand, 1993), cause business interrup-
tions in firms (Leiter et al., 2009), unemployment, and negatively affect firms in the
supply chain (Rose, 2004). Thus, typhoons depress the income of affected individuals
(Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013). Since typhoons both decrease wealth and depress
income, the effect of typhoons on migration is theoretically ambiguous. For some indi-
1 The World Bank - Results Brief - Climate Insurance (2017). Available at: https://www.world-
bank.org/en/results/2017/12/01/climate-insurance. Accessed 10 June 2019.
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viduals, liquidity constraints force them to remain in the country, while others migrate
because of worse economic perspectives.
The role of networks in coping with natural disasters can also lead to both more
or less migration. It has been shown that networks lower the costs of migration by
providing legal access or help in finding a job in the country of destination (e.g., Massey,
1988; Munshi, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Comola and Mendola, 2015). It
might thus be easier for individuals with a existing network to migrate than for those
without if hit by a typhoon. However, remittances provided by the network might help
to improve the situation in the aftermath of a typhoon and thus lower the intention to
migrate (Yang and Choi, 2007; Licuanan et al., 2015).2 It is thus an empirical question
and depends on destination country factors whether networks amplify or mitigate the
response to typhoons.
There are different mechanisms through which networks support migrants. Pro-
viding legal access to enter a country of destination is one key factor put forward by
the literature (e.g., Ortega and Peri, 2012; Mahajan and Yang, 2019). In this case,
immigration policies of potential destination countries play a key role. To perman-
ently enter a country, there are two main routes: Individuals migrate either through
the family-based or the employment-based channel. If immigration policies are more
restrictive with respect to family reunification it is more difficult for previous migrants
to sponsor family members and thus the network effect should be less pronounced. If,
on the other hand, employment-based immigration is more restricted, individuals have
to rely more on their network and thus the network effect should be more pronounced.
Another mechanism through which networks influence migration is to provide
economic support in the country of destination. However, the extent to which indi-
viduals in the network are able to do so depends on their own economic success. It is,
for example, easier for individuals to arrange a job for others if they themselves are
employed. I thus expect that the network effect is more pronounced if the network is
economically more successful.
A main contribution of this paper is related to data. The Philippines is an ideal
country to study this relationship since it is one of the largest migrant-sending and, at
the same time, the most typhoon exposed countries in the world. I am the first to use
administrative individual-level data of the universe of permanent emigrants from the
Philippines from 1988 to 2015 and exploit exogenous variation in typhoon exposure at
the municipality level to investigate the effect of typhoons on migration. The admin-
istrative migration data allows me to address a key challenge of the literature. Either
2 Gröger and Zylberberg (2016) investigate internal migration responses to a typhoon in Vietnam.
They show that households with existing networks receive more remittances and that individuals in
households without a network tend to migrate and then remit similar amounts.
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researchers have to rely on administrative census data and only observe individuals
every decade, or they have to rely on survey data with limitations regarding measure-
ment and sample size. Furthermore, the data allows me to construct a measure for
network size at the municipality level. This level of detail is generally not collected in
the censuses of destination countries, which often only record the country of birth. I
use migration flows from 1988 to 2000 as a proxy for a municipality’s network.
To measure typhoon exposure, I use meteorological records that contain best
track typhoon data, i.e., the center of every typhoon in 6h intervals. On the basis of
key parameters of each typhoon and by applying a physical model proposed by Holland
(1980), I am able to estimate the impact of every typhoon on the grid-cell level.3 I
then use grid-cell level population data to weight the impact by the number of affected
persons and aggregate typhoon exposure at the municipality-year level.
For the analysis of the mechanisms, I rely on two different data sources. To
study the role of providing legal access, I use data from the Immigration Policies
in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset (Helbling et al., 2017). It contains several indices
for the restrictiveness of immigration policies for all main destination countries. To
investigate the role of providing economic support, I use data on past GDP per capita
growth provided by the World Bank. Since I only observe migrants when they leave
the Philippines and not in the country of destination, GDP per capita growth in the
destination serves as a proxy for the economic success of the network. To support this
approach, I provide evidence that past GDP per capita growth increases wage income
and employment for Filipino immigrants in the US using the 2000 US Census and the
2001 to 2015 American Community Surveys.
I find that a one standard deviation increase in typhoon exposure increases the
migration rate of a municipality by about one individual per 100,000 or two percent of
the mean migration rate. However, the average effect hides significant heterogeneity.
First, young children and spouses of previous migrants seem to respond particularly
strongly to typhoons. The effects are also larger for less-educated individuals. Second,
only individuals in municipalities with a sufficiently large network react. This effect
is not driven by differences in population or income of the municipalities. Third,
the facilitating role of networks is more pronounced if family reunification policies
are less restrictive. Furthermore, it seems that networks are especially supportive if
labor migration is more restricted, which indicates a substitution between relying on
family reunification and migration through employment-based channels. I also provide
evidence that the network effect increases if the network is economically successful.
3 Parameters that enter the model are, among others, the distance to the typhoon, ambient and
central pressure, latitude information, the maximum wind speed of the typhoon, and the radius of
the maximum wind.
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When interpreting the results, a few things have to be kept in mind. First,
because of the high frequency of typhoons that hit the Philippines, individuals likely
incorporate the risk. The estimated effects thus have to be seen despite all meas-
ures in place to mitigate the impact of typhoons (Anttila-Hughes and Hsiang, 2013).
Second, I focus on permanent migration, which means that I am not able to observe any
short-term labor migration responses caused by typhoons. Third, since the identifying
variation comes from typhoon exposure at the municipality level, the estimated effects
represent migration responses at the local level in addition to macro-level responses.
I contribute to a fast-growing literature on the effects of climate change and
natural disasters on international migration.4 For example, Cattaneo and Peri (2016)
look at the period from 1960 to 2000 and find that higher temperatures in poor countries
decrease migration while they increase migration in middle-income countries. However,
they find that the occurrence of natural disasters does not affect the migration rate.
Beine and Parsons (2017) look at the same period and exploit bilateral migration flows.
They find that natural disasters deter individuals from migrating on average, but spur
emigration to neighboring countries and former colonies. Beine and Parsons (2017)
explicitly mention that one reason for this finding might be established diasporas.5 I
take this idea to the data and investigate whether the response to natural disasters
indeed depends on the size of the network.
I thereby build on the broad literature that studies the role of migrant networks.
The literature has shown that networks play a key role in migration dynamics as well as
migrant selection.6 While in many studies, the network is modeled linearly, Chay and
Munshi (2013) show that for black migration from southern US counties to northern
cities in the early 20th century, network effects come into play only after a certain
threshold of connectedness within a community. Using municipality-level variation
allows me to investigate whether this also holds in the present setting. Munshi (2003)
studies labor market outcomes of Mexican immigrants in the US and finds that the
larger the migration network, the higher the likelihood of a migrant of being employed
and receiving a higher wage. I contribute to this literature by investigating the specific
role of networks in coping with natural disasters. Furthermore, I discuss how important
the economic success of a network is for the network effect.
Drabo and Mbaye (2015) were the first to investigate whether natural disasters
induce a brain drain, i.e., whether mostly well-educated individuals migrate. They
4 See Millock (2015), Berlemann and Steinhardt (2017) and Beine and Jeusette (2018) for recent
surveys of the literature.
5 Diaspora refers to the stock of people born in a country and living in another one.
6 Among others Munshi (2003), Beine et al. (2011), Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015),
Patel and Vella (2013), and Docquier et al. (2014).
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use bilateral migration data from developing countries to the OECD countries and
show that natural disasters increase migration rates on average and more so for highly
educated individuals. To extend their analysis and investigate whether networks only
assist specific groups of individuals, I build on the literature on networks and self-
selection (e.g., Carrington et al., 1996; Winters et al., 2001; Pedersen et al., 2008;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015). In
particular, I provide evidence on the heterogeneity of the response to typhoons with
respect to education, age, and gender.
The paper most closely related to this study is Mahajan and Yang (2019). They
use country-level data and find that hurricanes have a positive effect on migration
to the US. Furthermore, they show that the effect size increases in a country‘s prior
migrant network size in the US. The present paper complements the evidence provided
by Mahajan and Yang (2019) in different ways.
First, instead of focusing on a country-wide analysis, I measure migration re-
sponses at the municipality level, which allows me to consider the question from a dif-
ferent perspective. In large countries, typhoons only hit certain areas directly. Thus,
estimated effects using country-level data only reveal the average response of all areas,
whether affected or not. It may well be that in directly affected areas migration de-
creases because of the adverse effects on wealth and in non affected areas migration
increases because of, for example, updated beliefs about future typhoon exposure. In
general, studies using country-level variation might thus conclude that there is no effect.
In contrast, municipality-level data can reveal such a pattern.
Second, Mahajan and Yang (2019) provide evidence that, for migration to the US,
providing a legal route of entry is a key mechanism through which networks operate. I
build on this idea and extend the analysis to many destination countries. I use variation
in the restrictiveness of immigration policies concerning family reunification and labor
migration to investigate this mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents back-
ground information on migration and typhoons in the Philippines. Section 1.3 intro-
duces the data. Section 1.4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 1.5 discusses two
key mechanisms and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Philippine Migration
The Philippines has a long tradition of migration and is one of the largest migrant-
sending countries in the world (OECD, 2018). It is also among the ten countries with
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the largest diaspora population (IOM, 2017). The migration system in the Philippines
is highly institutionalized, and there are two channels through which Filipinos can
emigrate. The first option is to leave as a temporary overseas Filipino worker (OFW)
and register with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). To
do so, individuals must have a legitimate work contract which is mainly organized by
licensed private recruitment agencies (McKenzie et al., 2014). The other option to leave
the country is to have a permanent visa (either employment-based or family-sponsored)
and register at the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO).
Data provided by CFO show that as of December 2013, about 10 million Filipinos
lived abroad. Half of these Filipinos were temporary labor migrants and the other half
permanent migrants. The destination countries of temporary and permanent migrants
are very distinct. While temporary migrants predominantly go to other Asian countries
or countries in the Middle East, the five most important destination countries for
permanent migrants are the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Italy. For
these countries, the share of Filipino permanent migrants among all Filipino migrants
is more than 90 percent.7
By law, every Filipino holding an immigrant visa, i.e., every permanent migrant,
must register with CFO before departure. Otherwise, departing from the Philippines
is not possible. At the time of registration with CFO the migration decision is already
taken.8 To register, a migrant must report to CFO in person, attend a pre-departure
orientation seminar, present her immigration visa, and complete a registration form.
After that, the migrant is allowed to leave the country permanently. The Philippines
thus offers a unique opportunity to study migration, since it keeps track of its emigrants
over decades. While this data has not been yet available for researchers, I have access
to the universe of permanent Filipino emigrants from 1988 to 2015.9
Because I do not have access to data regarding the temporary migrants provided
by POEA, I focus on permanent migration. Even though it would be interesting also
to analyze the POEA data, by definition, temporary migrants return to their home
country and thus flow data for temporary migrants might only reveal short term effects.
In contrast, for permanent migrants, return migration is less of a concern.
7 CFO migrant stock data available at https://cfo.gov.ph/news/34-statistics/30-stock-estimates-of-
overseas-filipinos.html. Accessed 25 February 2019.
8 They also have only limited possibilities to postpone migration. For the US, for example, the visa is
only valid for six months.
9 I describe the data in more detail in Section 1.3.
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1.2.2 Typhoon Climate in the Philippines
Typhoons are a highly destructive form of storms that fall under the category of cyc-
lones, i.e., areas of low atmospheric pressure, characterized by rotating winds. They are
accompanied by storm surges, strong winds, and flooding and cause substantial damage
(Yang, 2008). The Philippines is one of the countries most hit by typhoons. On average
about eight typhoons make landfall in the Philippines each year. Since the Philippines
is a large country, various areas are affected differentially each year (Anttila-Hughes
and Hsiang, 2013). Figure A.1 depicts the average typhoon occurrences per month.
The main typhoon season is May to November.
To illustrate the destructiveness that typhoons can cause, I briefly describe the
impact of typhoon Haiyan (also known as typhoon Yolanda), which was one of the
strongest typhoons that made landfall in the Philippines in recent years . Figure A.2
shows a satellite photo of typhoon Haiyan and the route it took. Typhoon Haiyan
entered the Philippines on November 7th, 2013, hit the city Guiuan in the province
Eastern Samar and made its way eastwards through the Philippines. It affected more
than 16 million persons in almost 600 municipalities (40% of all municipalities) with
6,300 confirmed casualties. The Philippine government estimated total damages worth
billions of USD with substantial damage to the infrastructure (roads, airports, telecom-
munication, etc.), and severe disruptions to both the social sector (education, health,
and housing) and the productive sector (agriculture, fishing, industry, etc.).10
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Migration and Census Data
The analysis mainly builds on administrative data collected by the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas (CFO). The data covers the universe of permanent migrants and in
total includes more than 1.8 million individuals. I have access to all individual-level
registration data for the period from 1988 to 2015 (the period for which electronic
records are available). The data contains basic personal information like gender, age
and education level. It also states to which migrant category a person belongs, e.g.,
whether the person is an employment migrant or a spouse, child, sibling or parent of a
former Filipino emigrant.
A key advantage of this data is that it contains information about the municip-
ality of origin. This data is typically not available in the Census of the destination
10Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council report avail-
able at http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/FINAL_REPORT_re_Ef-
fects_of_Typhoon_YOLANDA_HAIYAN_06-09NOV2013.pdf. Accessed 1 August 2019.
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countries and surveys that include information about migrants at the very local level
often face measurement problems. For the aggregation at municipality-level, ideally
one would like to observe the municipality the migrant lived in when hit by a typhoon.
While this exact information is not available, CFO data contains a migrant’s current
municipality at the time of registration at CFO, i.e., the last residence in the Philippines
before migrating, and her municipality of birth. I use the migrant’s municipality of
birth for the main analysis and present robustness checks using the current municipal-
ity. This is due to the fact that the attenuation bias generated by internal moves during
the lifetime is less severe than the negative bias potentially caused by internal migration
before departure in response to typhoons (Schwandt and von Wachter, 2019).11
I supplement the migration data with information from the Philippine Censuses
of 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010 obtained via IPUMS (Sobek et al., 2015) as well as the
2015 Census obtained from the Philippine Statistical Office.12 I use this information to
calculate basic statistics like population and education level at the municipality level.
The main dependent variable is the migration rate ym,t of a certain municipality
m in a given year t, i.e., the number of migrants Mm,t divided by the population
popm,t as shown in Equation 1.1. The migration rate is measured by one over 100,000
individuals, i.e., 1/1000 percent. For the heterogeneity analysis, the migration rate
is also calculated separately by certain personal characteristics, destination countries,
and migrant categories.
ym,t =
Mm,t
popm,t
(1.1)
Panel (a) of Figure A.3 shows the distribution of the yearly migration rate at
the municipality-level between 2001 and 2015. It ranges from zero to about 1,000
per 100,000 and is on average about 60 per 100,000. Figure A.4 shows a map of
the Philippines with the migration rate per municipality in 2015. Migration is most
pronounced in municipalities at the west coast of Luzon Island.
Table A.1 summarizes basic characteristics of the population and the migrants
for the full period (1988 to 2015) and for the years 2001 to 2015 separately.13 Compared
to the population in general, migrants are on average about ten years older and the
share of migrants with at least secondary education is twice as high. Furthermore,
two-thirds of migrants are female.
One of the main explanatory variables in the empirical analysis is the network
size of a municipality which I measure as a share of municipality population. Specific-
11 In any case, if I find a positive effect, the bias works against me.
12Population data from the 2015 Census available is at: https://psa.gov.ph/content/highlights-
philippine-population-2015-census-population. Accessed 25 January 2019.
13 I use data from 1988 to 2000 to calculate a proxy for the network size of a municipality and data
from 2001 to 2015 for the analysis of the effect of typhoons on migration.
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ally, I use administrative data provided by CFO to calculate the cumulative number of
migrants who left a specific municipality from 1988 to 2000. I then divide that number
by the population of the municipality in 2000 to obtain a population-adjusted measure
of migration networks Nm,2000 as shown in Equation 1.2. For the analysis of the des-
tination country factors, I also calculate the network size destination country-specific.
Nm,2000 =
∑2000
1988Mm,t
popm,2000
(1.2)
The underlying assumption is that the flows between 1988 and 2000 are a good
proxy for the actual network size of a municipality.14 While the yearly migration rate is
measured in 1/1000 percent, the network size in 2000 is displayed in percent. Panel (b)
of Figure A.3 shows the distribution of the network size in 2000. The mean network
size is about 0.7 percent. However, the figure reveals substantial heterogeneity between
municipalities with network size ranging from zero to ten percent.
1.3.2 Storm Data
I follow Yang (2008) and construct a storm index that measures population-adjusted
typhoon exposure at municipality-year level based on meteorological records. In con-
trast to other measures based on government or news reports, it is not prone to meas-
urement error due to misreporting (Mahajan and Yang, 2019).
I use best-track data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA) and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC). The data contains
the position of every typhoon center in 6h intervals.15
I calculate the maximum wind speeds w for each storm s in year t, and grid cell
i in municipality m, subtract the tropical storm wind speed threshold of 33 knots and
normalize it by the maximum wind speed observed in the data (wmax).
xi,s,m,t =

(wi,s,m,t−33)2
(wmax−33)2 , if wi,s,m,t ≥ 33 knots
0, if wi,s,m,t < 33 knots
(1.3)
To calculate wind speeds for every typhoon on grid cell level, I apply a phys-
ical model by Holland (1980). 16 To obtain population estimates for every grid cell,
14 I also use other network measures described in more detail in Section 1.3.3 for robustness checks.
15Figure A.5 shows a map with best-track data in 6h intervals of typhoons close to the Philippines
that is considered for the analysis.
16Besides the distance, the ambient and central pressure, the latitude, and the maximum wind speed,
also the radius of maximum wind speed enters the model. However, this measure is not provided by
NOAA. Therefore, I use JTWC data to train the model for predicting the radius of maximum wind
speed, which I then apply to the NOAA data.
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data on population is obtained from the Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
(SEDAC). The relevant municipality is determined using a spatial join with the admin-
istrative border layer. Because climatologists model the impact of winds on structures
typically with a quadratic term (Emanuel, 2005), the numerator and denominator are
squared.
I then aggregate the population-weighted grid cell data to municipality-year ob-
servations.
SIm,t =
∑
i(popi,m
∑
s xi,s,m,t)
popm
(1.4)
Thus, the storm index reflects intensity-weighted events per capita. For example, a
storm index of one could correspond to a year in which all residents in a municipality
were exposed to a storm with maximum wind speed xi,s,m,t = 1 once or to a year in
which all residents of a municipality were exposed to a storm with intensity xi,s,m,t = 0.5
twice. For the ease of interpretation, I use the standardized storm index (SSI) for the
analysis.
SSIm,t =
SIm,t − µSIm,t
σSIm,t
(1.5)
Figure A.6 shows that the mean as well as the maximum standardized storm
index for the years 1990 to 2015. It reveals that exposure to typhoons increased. This
is in line with data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) provided by the
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).17 Figure A.7 displays
the occurrence of typhoons in the Philippines for the same period and shows a slight
upward trend from five typhoons in 1990 to ten typhoons in 2015. Figure A.8 shows
a map with the median standardized storm index from 1990 to 2015 for Philippine
municipalities as well as incidences of very heavy typhoons. While on average more
typhoons occur in the north of the Philippines, there is substantial variation in the
timing and location of certain typhoons.
1.3.3 Additional Data Sources
Immigration policy. To study how legal boundaries affect the role networks can play,
I use data from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) dataset (Helbling
et al., 2017). The data covers 33 OECD countries between 1980 and 2010. The main
advantage of this database is that it not only covers changes in the restrictiveness of
17The database combines information from different sources, including UN agencies, non-governmental
organizations, insurance companies, research institutes, and press agencies.
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immigration regimes but also codes the absolute level.18 In particular, it is divided
into six broad categories (family reunification, labor migration, asylum and refugees,
co-ethnics, control, and policy rights). The restrictiveness index is available aggreg-
ated as well as for different subcategories and is measured on a numerical scale from
zero (unrestricted) to 100 (very restricted). Table A.2 shows summary statistics for
the specific policy restrictiveness indices used for the analysis and reveals significant
variation in how certain immigration channels are restricted.
Economic conditions. I use World Bank data to investigate whether the eco-
nomic strength of the network is important for the role networks play.19 This data
includes detailed information on different economic measures, compiled from officially-
recognized international sources. In particular, I use the data to calculate GDP per
capita growth for the destination countries considered in this paper. Figure A.9 shows
the distribution of this measure. The mean GDP per capita growth in the period from
2001 to 2015 is about one percent.
Alternative network measure. As mentioned before, for the main analysis, I
aggregate CFO flow data from 1988 to 2000 to proxy for the network size of a muni-
cipality. To get an additional measure of municipality-level network size and to check
how sensitive the analysis is with respect to different network measures, I combine dif-
ferent data sets available for the United States.20 In particular, I use data from several
historical passenger lists that include the municipality of birth and the year of immig-
ration. Additionally, I include US Social Security Applications and Claims data that
covers information about the municipality of birth for individuals that passed away
before 2007. Table A.4 summarizes information about these data. I then aggregate the
individual-level data at municipality level to obtain alternative measures of network
size for each municipality.21
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I describe the empirical setup and introduce the two main specifications
for the analysis. The first structural relationship of interest is the effect of typhoon
18There are different databases aiming to measure characteristics of immigration policy. The Determi-
nants of International Migration (DEMIG) database covers 45 countries and more than 6,000 policy
changes regarding migration for a period from 1945 to 2013. A drawback of this data is that it
only provides coding for policy changes and no index for the level of restrictiveness. In contrast, the
International Migration Policy And Law Analysis (IMPALA) project covers immigration law and
policies from 1960 to 2010 for over 25 countries. However, this data is not yet publicly available.
19Data obtained via Stata’s wbopendata command. Sources are the World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
20Data is obtained from Ancestry.com. Since it is only available for the US, I focus on migration from
the Philippines to the US when using this data.
21 I use the additional network measures in Section 1.4.2 to check whether the results are robust.
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exposure on migration. The second specification highlights the key role networks play.
I then discuss features of the research design important for the interpretation of the
results. Finally, I present the results and discuss the robustness of the findings.
1.4.1 Setup
The analysis is based on a panel of 1624 municipalities in the Philippines for the years
2001 to 2015. I estimate a fixed-effects model using exogenous variation in typhoon
exposure within municipalities over time. The key identifying assumption is strict
exogeneity of typhoon exposure.
Average effect. In order to provide causal evidence of the effect of typhoons on
migration, I estimate the following equation:
ym,t = α+ β SSIm,t−1 + γm + ηt + m,t (1.6)
where ym,t is the migration rate in municipality m in year t and SSIm,t−1 the stand-
ardized storm index in year t − 1. The standardized storm index serves as a proxy
for typhoon exposure. It is lagged by one year because the typhoon season in the
Philippines starts in the second half of the year and it may take some time until indi-
viduals can realize their intention to migrate. The specification includes municipality
fixed effects γm to capture any structural differences between municipalities. This is
important since Figure A.8 shows that some areas have on average a higher exposure
to typhoons than others. To control for overall changes in migration over time, year
fixed effects ηt are included. m,t is an i.i.d error term.22 To investigate heterogeneities
between different individuals, I also calculate the migration rate separately for males
as well as different age and education groups. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.23
The sign of β is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, typhoons might
decrease wealth which makes it more likely that liquidity constraints are binding and
migration decreases. On the other hand, typhoons might lower the income of individu-
als which increases the wage differential between the country of origin and destination
and makes it more profitable to migrate. Depending on the relative size of the wealth
effect and the income effect, β can thus be positive or negative.
To support the key identifying assumption, Table 1.1 shows the correlation
between typhoon exposure in year t and t − 1. As already visible in Figure A.8,
22 In Section 1.4.2, I present robustness checks that include municipality specific linear time trends.
23When I discuss the robustness of the findings, I also present results using standard errors clustered
at the province level as well as using Conley spatial HAC standard errors to account for spatial and
temporal autocorrelation (Conley, 1999).
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Table 1.1: Correlation between typhoons
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SSIt−1 0.203*** -0.039*** 0.289*** -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360
Municipality FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624
Notes: Storm data is based on own caclulations using data
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC). The data
is aggregated on the municipality level. The table shows
coefficients from regressing the std. storm index in t on the
std. storm index in t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
the positive correlation in column (1) reveals that some areas are more likely to be ex-
posed to typhoons than others. However, once municipality fixed effects are included
the correlation becomes less strong. And finally, typhoons in year t − 1 lose all their
predictive power for typhoons in year t once the regression also controls for year fixed
effects. The evidence thus suggests that it is as good as random whether a typhoon
hits a specific municipality in a certain year.
Figure 1.1 depicts an illustrative example of the identification strategy. Panel (a)
displays the average number of migrants 25 months before and after typhoon Haiyan hit
the Philippines in November 2013.24 Panel (b) shows the same data taking out monthly
variation. Municipalities are classified into five quantiles depending on how strong
they were affected by the typhoon. Figure 1.1 shows that migration from affected and
unaffected municipalities evolves very similarly before the typhoon hit the Philippines.
However, about half a year later, migration from very strongly affected areas starts
to increase significantly. In the peak about 16 months after the typhoon, there were
almost 20 migrants per municipality more than if the group would have followed the
original trend.
Network size. To investigate the role of networks, I exploit cross-sectional vari-
ation in the network size of a municipality and estimate the following equation:
ym,t = α+ β SSIm,t−1 + δ (SSIm,t−1 ×Nm,2000) + γm + ηt + m,t (1.7)
In particular, I interact the standardized storm index with the municipality’s network
size in the year 2000, Nm,2000. The network measure is composed of the aggregated
24Typhoon Haiyan was among the most destructive typhoons that ever made landfall in the Philippines.
For more details, see Section 1.2.2.
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Figure 1.1: Effect of typhoon Haiyan on migration
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Notes: The analysis is based on raw migration data from CFO for the years 2012 to 2015 aggregated
on the month level. Panel (a) shows the average number of migrants of a municipality for differently
affected areas using kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing. Panel (b) shows the residual number
of migrants after regressing the number of migrants on month dummies. Typhoon Haiyan hit the Phil-
ippines on November 7, 2013. The average exposure to typhoon Haiyan measured by the std. storm
index for the different groups were: low: -0.45; low-med: -0.18; med: 0.04; med-high: 0.48; high: 1.57.
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number of migrants that left a municipality between 1988 and 2000 divided by the
population.25
Again, the sign of δ is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, networks might
provide, for example, a legal immigration route to a potential country of destination,
which facilitates migration for individuals hit by typhoons. On the other hand, targeted
remittances from the network might lower migration intentions.
However, network size might also be correlated with other municipality charac-
teristics that could drive the observed heterogeneity. Therefore, in Section 1.4.2, I also
present results of the interaction between the standardized storm index and two other
municipality characteristics: population and income. The analysis confirms that the
network effect is not driven by these municipality characteristics.
Municipality versus country analysis. For the interpretation of the results it is
important to keep in mind that the variation comes from typhoon exposure at the
municipality level. In contrast, macro studies estimate the average effect of typhoon
exposure on migration at the country-level. Consequently, such studies might find no
effect of typhoons on migration if typhoons decrease migration in affected areas and
increase migration in non-affected areas. The perspective changes if municipality-level
variation is considered. Instead of estimating the average effect, I estimate the direct
effect of a typhoon on the affected municipality. However, this also means that all mu-
nicipalities which are not directly exposed to a certain typhoon serve as the comparison
group. These municipalities might be indirectly affected by typhoons through trade or
the general labor market. Also, psychological reasons such as awareness of a potential
threat might play a role.
Thus, the estimated effect is the direct effect net of the indirect effects. If the
sign of the effect is the same for directly and indirectly affected areas, the estimated
coefficients are lower bounds. However, if the sign is the opposite, the estimated
coefficients are upward biased. It could very well be that typhoons decrease migration
in directly affected areas and at the same time increase migration in indirectly affected
areas, for example, due to the absence of wealth effects in indirectly affected areas. It is,
however, rather unlikely that the opposite holds, i.e., that typhoons increase migration
in directly affected areas and decrease migration in indirectly affected areas. I interpret
the results with these considerations in mind.26
25 In addition, I show results of interacting the standardized storm index with different network size
quantiles.
26 In Section 1.4.2, I shed light on potential spillovers and present results where I exclude close by but
unaffected municipalities from the analysis.
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1.4.2 Results
Effect of Typhoon Exposure on Migration
In this section, I investigate the causal effect of typhoons on migration. To shed light
on migrant selection, I also analyze effect heterogeneity with respect to individual
characteristics.
Figure 1.2 displays the results. It shows the effect of typhoon exposure on the
migration rate for all migrants as well as the effect for different subgroups of the
population.27 The left panel depicts the effect in migrants per 100,000 and the right
panel shows the same effect relative to the mean migration rate of the particular group.
Instead of group-specific population size, the denominator is always the total population
of a certain municipality. Thus, the effects for the different subgroups, e.g., males and
females, add to the effect for all migrants.
Average effect. Figure 1.2 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the
standardized storm index leads on average to an increase in the migration rate by
about 0.9 individuals per 100,000 or 1.6 percent of the mean respectively. Thus, a
negative origin country shock in the form of a typhoon increases migration on average.
Mahajan and Yang (2019) find for example that a one standard deviation increase in
hurricanes increases worldwide migration to the United States by about 12 percent of
the sample mean. Despite the fact that their setting is different and there could be in
general heterogeneity in the effect size with respect to origin and destination countries,
there is also another explanation that might explain the difference. In contrast to the
present study, they use country-level variation in typhoon exposure. If migration also
increases in not directly affected areas because of spillovers through trade or general
labor market effects, the estimated effect using micro-level variation is likely to be
lower.28
Gender. For both males and females, exposure to typhoons increases migration
by about 0.5 individuals per 100,000. However, relative to the mean, the effect for
males is larger than for females (2.2 vs. 1.2 percent). One reason for this could be that
as a response to typhoons migrants in the country of destination sponsor their spouses
and that the gender composition of this sponsoring pattern is different than the usual
gender migration pattern. I describe heterogeneities with respect to migrant categories
below.
Age. In order to investigate whether there is a selection with respect to age,
27The corresponding tables are Table A.5, Table A.6, Table A.7, and Table A.8 in the appendix.
28 In Section 1.4.1, I discuss how spillovers theoretically can affect the estimates and in the robustness
checks at the end of this section, I empirically show how the exclusion of close by but unaffected
municipalities affects the results.
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Figure 1.2: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration
All
Males
Females
0-13
14-21
22-44
45-64
65-
less than primary
primary
secondary
college
Children
Parents
Spouses
Siblings
Married to foreigner
Employment migrants
Gender
Age
Education (age>22)
Category
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 -2 0 2 4 6
Effect in 1/1000 pct. Effect relative to mean in pct.
Notes: The figure displays the results from estimating Equation 1.6. The dependent variable is the
yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The independent variable is the standardized storm index in
year t-1 The left panel displays the estimated coefficient β. The right panel shows the estimated coef-
ficient relative to the mean migration rate (in pct.). Coefficients are displayed for all migrants and
for different groups of migrants. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. The figure also displays 95 percent confidence intervals.
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I divide migrants into five age groups (share among total migrants in parentheses):
Migrants between 0 and 13 (17%), 14 and 21 (17%), 22 and 44 (44%), 45 and 64
(16%) and migrants 65 or older (6%). Figure 1.2 shows that the effect is positive
and significant for all but the oldest age group. In absolute terms, with about 0.4
additional migrants per 100,000, individuals between 22 and 44 are most responsive
to typhoons. However, relative to the mean, the migration rate of children between
0 and 13 years increases by 3.5 percent of the mean and therefore reacts strongest
to typhoon shocks. This effect could be driven either by parents that migrate and
decide to take their children with them or by parents that are already residing in the
country of destination and decide to sponsor their children. All other age groups reveal
a smaller response of about 1.5 percent of the mean, except individuals 65 or older,
who might have a lower willingness to resettle.
Education. For the analysis of different education groups, I only consider indi-
viduals above the age of 22, who most likely finished their secondary education. The
response in migration rates for the education groups varies from 0.2 percent relative to
the mean migration rate for individuals with secondary school education to 2.4 percent
for individuals with less than primary school education, and only the latter is precisely
estimated. Thus, it seems that lower educated individuals react to typhoon shocks
more. For a one standard deviation increase in the standardized storm index about 0.3
additional migrants with less than primary school education leave the country.
Migrant category. The individual-level migration data also contains information
about the relationship between the migrant and her sponsor, i.e., a contact person
already residing in the country of destination. For employment-based migrants that
person is someone in the sponsoring firm, for family migrants, it is a relative that
already lives abroad. Figure 1.2 shows the results for five distinct categories, which in
total account for almost 90 percent of permanent Filipino migrants: Spouses (20%),
children (34%), parents (10%) and siblings (3%) of former migrants as well as spouses of
foreigners (16%) and employment migrants (6%).29 The effect is positive and signific-
ant for spouses, children and employment migrants with effect sizes of 2.5 percent, 1.7
percent and 2.9 percent of the mean. In absolute terms, children of former Filipino mi-
grants are most responsive with almost 0.35 additional children sponsored per 100,000
for every standard deviation increase in typhoon exposure. There is a negative rela-
tionship for spouses of foreigners. The effect for parents and siblings is not statistically
significant.
29Spouses of foreigners refers in this context to spouses that are sponsored by foreign citizens, not
including naturalized Filipinos. The latter are part of the category "Spouses".
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Figure 1.3: Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics
Average effect
1st tercile
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Network size
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Notes: The figure displays coefficients from regressing the yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.) on
the standardized storm index in year t-1 interacted with municipality characteristics. Coefficients are
displayed for the average effect and for seperate regressions for heterogeneities with respect to network
size, population and income level. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at municipality-level. The figure also displays 95 percent confidence intervals.
The Role of Migration Networks
In the previous section, I shed light on effect heterogeneity between individuals. Now,
I investigate the role of established migrant networks in the countries of destination. I
estimate Equation 1.7 and interact the storm index with several municipality character-
istics. For the ease of interpretation, I classify municipalities into terciles with respect
to network size, population, and income and run separate regressions for each hetero-
geneity. Figure 1.3 displays the coefficients of the interactions between the standardized
storm index and the respective dummy variables.30
Individuals in municipalities with larger networks show a larger response to
typhoon shocks. The migration rate in municipalities in the first tercile slightly de-
creases and does not significantly change for municipalities within the second tercile.
In contrast, for municipalities within the last tercile, a one standard deviation increase
in typhoon exposure leads to more than two additional migrants per 100,000. How-
30Table A.9 in Appendix A.3 displays the corresponding table and Table A.10 confirms the results
using linear interactions.
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ever, one might be concerned that other municipality characteristics drive the observed
heterogeneity. Obvious candidates are the population size and the income level of mu-
nicipalities. Figure 1.3 shows that there is little heterogeneity with respect to these
characteristics. If anything, individuals in more populated municipalities tend to be
more responsive to typhoon exposure.
To test whether the heterogeneity with respect to networks remains after con-
trolling for population and income level of a municipality, I turn to a linear specification
and include all three municipality characteristics into one regression. Table A.10 sum-
marizes the results. First, it confirms that the average effect is driven by municipalities
with larger networks using a linear measure of network size (column (2)). Without any
network available, typhoons lead to less migration.31 Columns (3) and (4) show that
neither the interaction term of the standardized storm index with population nor with
the income level of a municipality is statistically significant. In column (5), all three
municipality characteristics are included. The estimated interaction effect of the stand-
ardized storm index and the network size remains economically sizable and statistically
significant.
I now investigate whether networks are especially supportive for certain groups
of migrants. Figure 1.4 shows the coefficients from estimating Equation 1.7 for all
migrants as well as specific groups of migrants. In particular, the left panel depicts
the main effect β, and the right panel the interaction effect δ.32 Figure 1.4 shows
that the network effect is positive and significant for both males and females. It also
highlights the importance of networks for immediate relatives like children, parents and
spouses. For these categories, the network effect is particularly strong. The figure also
reveals that for persons between 45 and 64, siblings and spouses of foreigners, there is
no significant network effect. Interestingly, there is a positive and significant network
effect for either very low or very high educated individuals, which is contrary to the
finding of McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) who show that especially low skilled Mexican
gain from networks when migrating to the US. However, if family reunification is an
important channel through which individuals migrate, this might be different because
family members already residing in the country of destination might care about the
education level of persons they sponsor.
Figure 1.4 also shows that networks do not push employment migration when
coping with typhoons. One reason might be that in areas with larger networks, indi-
31Figure A.10 indicates that the linear interaction between the standardized storm index and network
size is a good approximation for a rather nonparametric approach where network size is divided into
15 quantiles and then interacted with the standardized storm index. While it shows that for half
of the municipalities there is a negative or no effect of storms, for the last six quantiles there is a
positive and significant relationship.
32The corresponding tables are Table A.5, Table A.6, Table A.7, and Table A.8 in the appendix.
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Figure 1.4: The role of migration networks
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Notes: The figure displays the results from estimating Equation 1.7. The dependent variable
is the yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The independent variables are the standard-
ized storm index in year t-1 and the interaction between the standardized storm index in t-1
with the network size. The figure display the main effect β on the left and the interaction ef-
fect δ on the right panel. Coefficients are displayed for all migrants and for different groups
of migrants. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. The figure also displays 95 percent confidence intervals.
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viduals might not need to migrate through the employment-based migration channel
but can rather rely on family reunification channels.
Robustness
Weighting and time trends. One might be concerned that different municipality- specific
migration trends could bias the results. However, columns (2) to (4) in Table A.11
show that the results are robust to the inclusion of municipality- specific linear time
trends. While the average effect decreases when time trends are included, it remains
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, if I use the population
size in the year 2000 as a weight, the average effect increases (see columns (3) and (4)).
In contrast, the network effect remains remarkably stable to both changes.
Internal Migration. For the main analysis, I calculate migration rates based
on individuals birthplace. However, individuals might internally migrate during their
lifetime for any reason before migrating to another country. Because I attribute those
internal movers to the wrong municipality, there is attenuation bias. Given the data
available, I can also aggregate the data using the current municipality (at the time of
registration at CFO). Although it is likely that the bias is even larger in the latter case,
I present results using this alternative aggregation in column (5) of Table A.11. The
results are robust to the alternative measurement, and if anything, the network effect
becomes larger.
Standard errors. One might be concerned that clustering at the municipality
level is insufficient. I address this issue in two ways: First, I cluster the standard errors
at the province level to allow for the error terms to be correlated on a greater regional
level. Column (6) Table A.11 shows that the results are robust. Second, to account
for spatial and serial correlation in the error term, I re-estimate the main specifications
using Conley spatial HAC standard errors (Conley, 1999). Spatial autocorrelation
is assumed to decrease linearly up to a 100 kilometers cut-off. Serial correlation is
assumed to decrease linearly for up to 15 years. Column (7) of Table A.11 shows that
the results hold.
Spillovers. A concern might be that some municipalities not directly affected
by a typhoon might be affected indirectly, for example, because of effects on the local
economy. To investigate how this affects the results, I exclude municipalities close to
municipalities that are hit by a heavy typhoon. In particular, I classify typhoons above
the 75th quantile as heavy.33 Table A.13 shows the effects for different exclusion radii
33 In Table A.12, I investigate the effect of heavy typhoons. The results show that heavy storms
increase migration by three persons per 100,000 or five percent of the mean migration rate. Again,
this effect is entirely driven by individuals from municipalities with larger networks. In above-median
network-size municipalities, the effect increases to about five persons per 100,000.
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(from 20 up to 100 km). The larger the radius for excluding close by municipalities, the
larger the effect of typhoons on migration. The estimated effect becomes almost twice
as large compared to the baseline specification if not directly affected municipalities in
a radius of 100 km are excluded. It thus seems that also individuals in municipalities
indirectly affected migrate more in response to typhoons.
Alternative network measures. In the main analysis, network size is determined
by CFO flow data from 1988 to 2000. As a robustness check, I use data from the United
States Social Security Applications and Claims Index. The data consists of people who
died in the US and contains information about the date and place of birth at the mu-
nicipality level. Unfortunately, there is no information about the immigration year.
To measure the network size of a municipality in the year 2000, I take all individuals
who died in the US before 2001 and aggregate the number of individuals at the mu-
nicipality level. The underlying assumption for this approach is that people who died
are a good proxy for the population of immigrants. However, this may overestimate
long-established networks since older persons are more likely to die. Therefore, this
complements the analysis using the flow data from 1988 to 2000, which captures more
recent networks. Additionally, I use data on migration flows from the early 1880s until
the 1960s from US passenger lists, which capture migrant networks established a very
long time ago.34 Table A.15 shows that for the US only, the network effect is posi-
tive and significant. Reassuringly, the findings using the Social Security data are very
similar in magnitude compared to the main results. In contrast, the network measure
calculated based on the passenger lists does not seem to be an important driver of the
effect.
1.5 Mechanisms
The previous results suggest that network size is important. To shed light on the mech-
anisms through which networks influence migration, I turn to a destination-specific
analysis.35 First, I outline the specification. Then, I focus on two key mechanisms
brought forward in the literature: Providing a legal route to immigration and provid-
ing economic support.
34Table A.14 in the appendix shows that the correlation between the different network measures varies
significantly. While the pairwise correlation coefficient between the social security network measure
and the passenger list is 0.76, the correlation with the main network measure is 0.54. The correlation
between the main network measure and the passenger list is only 0.28.
35Table A.16 replicates the main results for the sample with country of destination specific networks.
Reassuringly, the relationships established before with respect to typhoon exposure and network size
also hold for the destination country-specific analysis.
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1.5.1 Setup
In the destination country analysis, one observation is a municipality-year-destination
country combination.
ym,d,t = α+ β SSIm,t−1 + δ (SSIm,t−1 ×Nm,d,2000)
+ θ (SSIm,t−1 ×Nm,d,2000 × Fd,t) +Xm,d,t + m,d,t
(1.8)
The migration rate ym,d,t is measured as the number of individuals per 100,000 who
migrate from a certain municipality m to a specific destination country d in year t.
Network size Nm,d,2000 is calculated at the municipality-country level and is a proxy for
the migrant stock in a specific destination country. SSIm,t−1 is the standardized storm
index in year t − 1. The effect of interest is the triple interaction of the standardized
storm index, the destination country-specific network size, and the exogenous factor
Fd,t. The regression includes municipality-destination country as well as year fixed
effects.36
The exogenous factors of interest are the destination country’s immigration re-
gime measured by the policy restrictiveness index PRId,t−1 and the networks economic
strength proxied by the average GDP growth GDPGd,t−5−t−1 (GDPGd,t−10−t−1) in the
previous 5 (10) years. Since the policy in place is relevant at the time of application,
not actual migration, I lag the policy restrictiveness index by one year.37 The coef-
ficient for Fd,t and the double interaction terms of SSIm,t−1, Nm,d,2000 and Fd,t are
included in Xm,d,t. The hypothesis is, that the migration facilitating role of networks
increases in the openness of immigration regimes regarding the family channel and in
the economic strength of networks.
1.5.2 Providing Legal Entry
Mahajan and Yang (2019) show that one key mechanism through which networks
operate is by providing legal entrance to the US. While they look at different entry
36Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) raise the issue that migration flows between pairs of
countries do not only depend on the attractiveness of a specific destination country but rather on the
relative attractiveness of the destination countries. Following the terminology of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), who discussed this in the context of international trade, Bertoli and Fernández-
Huertas Moraga (2013) call this phenomenon multilateral resistance to migration. According to
them, multilateral resistance can cause a bias in the estimates of determinants of bilateral migration
flows. However, as Beine et al. (2015) point out, including country of origin fixed effects account for
the effect of multilateral resistance, if it does not vary across destination countries (see Bertoli and
Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) for a discussion). Furthermore, Beine (2016) as well as Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2015) show that multilateral resistance is a minor concern when
estimating network effects.
37Because data is only available until 2010, I take the 2010 restrictiveness index for the years 2010 to
2015.
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Table 1.2: The role of policy restrictiveness
Family Labor
Family
members Quotas
Financial
requirem. Tests Job offer Funds
SSIt−1 -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.14*** 0.01 -0.00 -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 3.96*** 7.18*** 11.59*** -4.36*** -12.72*** -1.04**
(0.69) (0.77) (1.50) (0.90) (1.87) (0.52)
PRIt−1 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSIt−1 × PRIt−1 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Network2000 × PRIt−1 -9.91*** 0.22 0.21 1.43*** 0.32 -1.40***
(0.70) (0.34) (0.95) (0.22) (0.24) (0.33)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 × PRIt−1 -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.33***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 462840 462840 462840 462840 462840 414120
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015 aggreg-
ated at municipality and destination country level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. Data for the Policy Restrictiveness Index is from the
Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database. The policy restrictiveness indices (PRI) are
measured in percent with zero being not restrictive and 100 being very restrictive. The dependend
variable is destination country specific yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes
municipality-destination country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-
level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
classes through which immigrants come, I investigate this mechanism by looking at the
restrictiveness of immigration regimes for different destination countries.
On the one hand, the restrictiveness of immigration regimes limits how networks
can operate. On the other hand, if immigration policies are very restrictive, individuals
might especially rely on networks. Therefore, it is useful to consider different aspects
of the immigration system. The IMPIC database provides indices of restrictiveness for
different immigration categories. For the analysis, I consider family and labor migration
policies. Within these broad categories, I look at specific areas. In the family category
I investigate policies regarding family members, quotas, and financial requirements,
and in the labor category I analyze policies regarding labor market tests, job offers and
financial funds.38 The policy restrictiveness index (PRI) has a numerical scale from
zero (unrestricted) to 100 (very restricted).
I estimate Equation 1.8 for the different restrictiveness indices. Table 1.2 shows
that the more open a destination country is in terms of family reunification, the more
38Table A.3 describes the categories that are used for the analysis and Table A.2 displays the summary
statistics for these respective indices.
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important is the network effect when a municipality is hit by a typhoon. In particular,
it seems that networks facilitate more migration in response to typhoons if more kinds
of family members are allowed to be sponsored (column (1)). A decrease from the 75th
quantile to the median restrictiveness of this measure, i.e., a decrease in eight points,
increases the interaction effect of typhoon exposure and network by almost 25 percent.
There is also an amplifying of the network effect if less restricted family reunification
policies are in place (column (2)) or if there are less strict financial requirements for
family migrants (column (3)).
However, the opposite applies when looking at restrictions regarding labor mi-
gration. The evidence suggests that the more restrictive immigration policies for
employment-based migrants are, the more helpful are networks when hit by a typhoon.
In particular, networks seem to be supportive if job applicants are tested (column (4)),
if job offers are required to be considered for immigrating via an employment-based
visa (column (5)), and if financial funds are required (column (6)). Thus, it seems to
be the case that there is a substitution between relying on networks and migrating via
employment-based channels.39
1.5.3 Providing Economic Support
Sometimes networks have more supporting power than at other times. For example,
it might be easier for a network to help cover migration costs or to find a job if indi-
viduals in the network are economically successful. Since I do not observe the success
of individuals in the destination country, I take past GDP per capita growth in the
country of destination as exogenous variation in the economic success of individuals in
the destination country. It thus serves as proxy for the economic success of the net-
work. In particular, I measure past GDP per capita growth for every country-specific
municipality network.40
Table A.19 shows for the case of Filipino immigrants to the US, that past GDP
per capita growth has a significant effect on wage income and employment. If average
GDP per capita growth in a certain state in the last ten years is one percentage point
higher, employment increases by 0.4 percentage points and wage income by 1.4 percent.
Table 1.3 includes the triple interaction of standardized storm index, network
size, and GDP per capita growth as well as all pairwise interactions. I find that the
interaction effect of the standardized storm index and the network size is stronger if
39Table A.17 and Table A.18 in the appendix show that the results are robust to using the average
policy restrictiveness index from 2001 to 2010 or the policy restrictiveness index from 2000.
40 It might well be that economically more successful networks also send more remittances which might
lower migration intension. However, I do not observe remittances and I am thus not able to to
disentangle these effects. The estimated effect thus reflects the sum of these two factors.
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past GDP per capita growth is higher. This holds for the case of more recent average
GDP per capita growth in years t−5 to t−1 in column (1) and more long term average
GDP per capita growth in years t− 10 to t− 1 in column (2). In both cases networks
do not seem to amplify migration in response to typhoons in the case of negative or
close to zero GDP per capita growth. However, for every percentage point increase in
GDP per capita growth the interaction effect of typhoon exposure and network size
increases by about one. It thus seems that it is easier for economically more successful
networks to help individuals exposed to typhoons to migrate than for less successful
networks.
Table 1.3: The role of economic success
Average
GDP growth
t-5 to t-1
Average
GDP growth
t-10 to t-1
SSIt−1 0.02* 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 0.66 0.18
(0.42) (0.70)
GDP growth -0.03*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.00)
SSIt−1 × GDP growth -0.05*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Network2000 × GDP growth -1.02* 0.99
(0.61) (0.72)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 × GDP growth 1.09*** 1.24***
(0.35) (0.43)
Observations 462840 462840
# Cluster 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 2.99 2.99
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO
for the years 2001 to 2015 aggregated at municipality and destina-
tion country level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. GDP data is from the
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data
files. The dependend variable is destination country specific yearly mi-
gration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). Average GDP growth is measured in
percent. The regression includes municipality-destination country and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-level.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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1.6 Conclusion
Typhoons push millions of people into poverty each year and the destructiveness of
typhoons will increase as climate change progresses. In this paper, I study the impact of
typhoons on migration in the Philippines. I combine unique individual-level migration
data with a sophisticated measure of typhoon exposure based on meteorological records.
I exploit the richness of the data to shed light on the direct effect and abstract from
more indirect macro-level effects.
I find that with every standard deviation increase in typhoon exposure, migration
increases by about one per 100,000 individuals. On the one hand, migrants leave
the country using employment-based channels. On the other hand, family members
already in the country of destination sponsor their children, parents and spouses, which
highlights the key role of migrant networks.
However, networks are not always able to fully facilitate migration. To shed light
on the mechanism through which networks operate, I combine exogenous shocks in the
country of origin with exogenous destination country factors. I find that if immigration
policies concerning family reunification are more restrictive, the supportive power of
the network decreases which is consistent with the idea that providing legal entrance
to a potential destination country is a key mechanism. Moreover, the network effect
increases if the network is economically successful.
It might thus well be that at different times, equally sized networks provide
different support. Therefore, it is crucial for studying migration responses to any
shocks, to consider the situation in potential destination countries. Understanding
the role of networks is key for policy makers, especially in the country of destination.
If regions with a large diaspora in certain destination countries are hit by natural
disasters, migration flows are likely to concentrate to these destinations. The findings
of this paper thus help predict future migration flows.
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Appendix A
A.1 Background
Figure A.1: Typhoon activity in the Philippines
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Source: Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration, Period 2000-
2009.
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Figure A.2: Typhoon Haiyan striking the Philippines
(a)
(b)
Notes: Panel (a) shows Typhoon Haiyan at peak intensity and approaching the Philippines on Novem-
ber 7, 2013. Source upper photo: Nasa. Panel (b) shows a track map of Typhoon Haiyan with the loc-
ation of the storm at 6-hour intervals. The color corresponds to the typhoon’s maximum wind speeds
as classified in the Saffir−Simpson scale. It ranges from light blue (tropical depression, i.e. <62 km/h)
to red (category 5, i.e. > 252 km/h). Source lower photo: WikiProject Tropical cyclones/Tracks, with
the background image being from NASA and tracking data from JTWC.
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A.2 Data
Figure A.3: Distribution of migration rate and network size
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Notes: The data is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 1988 to 2015 aggregated
at municipality-level. Panel (a) shows a histogram of the migration rate of municipalities from 2001 to
2015 (in 1/1000 pct.). Panel (b) shows a histogram of the measure of the network size of municipalit-
ies. It is the cumulative number of migrants from a municipality between 1988 and 2000 in percent.
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Figure A.4: Map of migration rate by municipality, 2015
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Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the year 2015 aggregated at
municipality-level. The map shows the migration rate of municipalities (in 1/1000 pct.).
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
1988-2015 2001-2015
Mean SD Mean SD
Migration data
Migration rate in 1/1000 pct. 60.1 (78.5) 59.3 (71.3)
Number of migrants p.a. 39.9 (235.9) 44.8 (233.8)
Number of marriage migrants p.a. 4.6 (24.2) 7.1 (30.3)
Number of children p.a. 13.7 (102.2) 15.4 (97.0)
Number of parents p.a. 3.7 (13.5) 4.3 (14.4)
Number of spouses p.a. 8.0 (38.5) 9.2 (37.6)
Number of siblings p.a. 2.2 (11.5) 1.5 (7.0)
Average age 35.5 (8.6) 35.6 (8.2)
Share males 0.3 (0.2) 0.3 (0.2)
Share at least university completed 0.8 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2)
Share at least secondary education (25-65) 0.8 (0.2) 0.8 (0.2)
Share at least secondary education (25-45) 0.9 (0.2) 0.9 (0.2)
Census data
Population in thous. 51.2 (108.4) 59.3 (124.5)
Share males 0.5 (0.01) 0.5 (0.01)
Average age 24.6 (2.2) 26.4 (2.1)
Literacy rate 0.9 (0.10) 0.9 (0.07)
Share of internet availability 0.04 (0.06) 0.04 (0.06)
Share of tv availability 0.4 (0.3) 0.6 (0.2)
Average years of schooling 6.3 (1.2) 7.1 (1.1)
Share oversea worker 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Share at least secondary education 0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.2)
Share at least secondary education (25-65) 0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.2)
Share at least secondary education (25-45) 0.4 (0.2) 0.5 (0.2)
Average family size 6.0 (0.5) 5.6 (0.4)
Share employed (in labforce) 0.6 (0.03) 0.6 (0.03)
Share married 0.4 (0.03) 0.4 (0.03)
Storm data
Std. storm index -0.0007 (1.0) 0.04 (1.1)
Std. neighbouring storm index -0.005 (1.0) 0.05 (1.1)
Observations 45752 24510
Notes: The migration data is based on individual migration data from CFO for the
years 1988 to 2015. Census data for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010 and 2015 comes
from the Philippine Census .Storm data is based on own caclulations using data Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Joint Typhoon
Warning Center (JTWC). All variables are aggregated at the municipality level.
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Figure A.5: Best-track typhoon data
Notes: The map shows the route of all typhoons between 1990 and 2015 using best-track data in 6h
intervals from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Figure A.6: Standardized storm index 1990-2015
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Notes: Storm data is based on own caclulations using data National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA) and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC). The left panel shows the mean
standardized storm index for the years 1990 to 2015 and the right panel the max standardized storm
index.
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Figure A.7: Occurrences of typhoons in the Philippines, EM-DAT data
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Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) provided by the Centre for Research on the Epidemi-
ology of Disasters (CRED).
Table A.2: Summary statistics for selected policy restrictiveness indices
Mean Sd Min Max Count
Family
Family member 23.5 31.1 0 100 589
Quotas 19.3 34.8 0 100 588
Financial requirements 41.0 33.8 0 100 589
Labor
Tests 38.7 28.7 0 100 589
Job offer 64.6 22.6 0 100 584
Funds 16.7 26.9 0 100 527
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the Policy Re-
strictiveness Index for different immigration categories from the
Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database. The data
consists of the 19 destination countries relevant for the analysis
for the years 2000 to 2010. The indices measure the restrictive-
ness of immigration policies with 0 being very open and 100 being
very restrictive.
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Figure A.8: Map of typhoon exposure by municipality, 1990-2015
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Notes: Storm data is based on own caclulations using data National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration (NOAA) and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC). The map shows the median
standardized storm index from 1990 to 2015 as well as occurrences of heavy storms, i.e. storms above
the 75th percentile of the storm distribution.
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Table A.3: Description of categories in the IMPIC database
Category Subcategory Description
Family Family mem-
bers
Which family members were allowed to immigrate according
to the regulations governing family reunification? Please also
consider family members who are allowed to immigrate under
certain conditions only.
Family Quotas family
reunification
Were there quotas (numerical limits) on the overall number
of sponsored persons?
Family Financial
requirements
Were sponsors required to prove the ability to financially sup-
port themselves and their family? If yes, please specify how.
Labor Labor market
tests
Did your country use a labor market test (i.e. job applications
are tested against the available pool of eligible workers for the
job opening to make sure no settled worker could do the job)?
Labor Job offer Was a concrete job offer (e.g. acceptance letter, formal invit-
ation) or a contract signed in advance required or beneficial
for immigrating?
Labor Specific finan-
cial funds
Did migrant workers need to prove the ability to support
themselves? Such a proof might concern the fact that a spe-
cific income per month or a certain amount of financial funds
is required.
Source: The Immigration Policies in Comparison Dataset Technical Report (Bjerre et al., 2016).
Figure A.9: Average GDP per capita growth of networks, 2001 to 2015
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Notes: The histogram shows the average GDP p.c. growth for the years 2001 to 2015 and the re-
levevant destination countries. Data comes from the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.
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Table A.4: Data sources for alternative network measures
Data Years # Fil. Description Information available
U.S., Social
Security Ap-
plications and
Claims Index
1936-
2007
132,599 Information filed with the
Social Security Adminis-
tration through the ap-
plication or claims pro-
cess
Name, date and place of birth,
citizenship, sex
California,
Passenger and
Crew Lists
1882-
1959
60,157 Passenger and crew lists
of ships and some air-
planes arriving in Califor-
nia.
Name, age, birth date and
place, gender, nationality, last
residence, port of departure
and arrival, date of arrival
New York,
Passenger and
Crew Lists
1900-
1959
5,643 Passenger lists of ships ar-
riving from foreign ports
at the port of New York.
Name, age, birth date and
place, gender, nationality, last
residence, port of departure
and arrival, date of arrival
Honolulu,
Hawaii, Pas-
senger and
Crew Lists
1820-
1957
222,154 Passenger arrival and de-
parture lists for Honolulu
by ship and airplane
Name, age, birth place, gender,
nationality, occupation, last
residence, ultimate destina-
tion, date of arrival
Florida, Pas-
senger List
1898-
1963
1,996 Passenger lists of ships
and airplanes arriving
from foreign ports at
various Florida ports.
Name, age, birth place, gender,
nationality, port of departure
and arrival, date of arrival, fi-
nal destination
Washington,
Passenger and
Crew Lists
1882-
1965
32,323 Passenger and crew lists
of ships arriving at ports
in Washington state.
Name, age, birth date and
place, gender, nationality, last
residence, port of departure
and arrival, date of arrival
Notes: # Fil. corresponds to the number of Filipinos in the data. Data is obtained from Ances-
try.com.
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A.3 Empirical Analysis
Table A.5: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, average and by gender
Average Males Females
Panel A: Average effect
SSIt−1 0.93*** 0.49*** 0.44***
(0.19) (0.10) (0.13)
Rel. to mean dep. var (pct.) 1.6 2.1 1.2
Panel B: Network effect
SSIt−1 -0.72** -0.29* -0.43*
(0.34) (0.17) (0.23)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 2.20*** 1.04*** 1.15***
(0.44) (0.23) (0.29)
Observations 24360 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 59.44 22.91 36.52
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from
CFO for the years 2001 to 2015 aggregated at municipality-
level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. The de-
pendend variable is yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.).
The regression includes municipality and year fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-level.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by age
Age 0-13 Age 14-21 Age 22-44 Age 45-64 Age 65-
Panel A: Average effect
SSIt−1 0.23*** 0.12** 0.41*** 0.15* 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.05)
Rel. to mean dep. var (pct.) 3.5 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.4
Panel B: Network effect
SSIt−1 -0.28*** -0.10 -0.25 0.01 -0.10*
(0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 0.68*** 0.29** 0.89*** 0.18 0.16**
(0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.15) (0.07)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 6.65 7.5 27.93 11.95 5.38
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to
2015 aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses and
interpolated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration rate
(in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table A.7: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by education
Less than primary Primary Secondary College
Panel A: Average effect
SSIt−1 0.32*** 0.11 0.01 0.06
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
Rel. to mean dep. var (pct.) 2.4 1.8 0.2 0.9
Panel B: Network effect
SSIt−1 -0.12 0.21* 0.04 -0.28***
(0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 0.59*** -0.14 -0.04 0.46***
(0.22) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 13.41 6.16 6.46 7.17
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to
2015 aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migra-
tion rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure A.10: Effect of storms on migration rate by network quantiles
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Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015 ag-
gregated at municipality-level. The x-axis displays 15 network size quantiles. The y-axis the effect on
the yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at municipality-level. The thin blue lines show the 95 confidence inter-
val. The blue dots show the interaction term betweeen the network size quantile and the standardized
storm index. The red diamonds show the effect calculated at the mean migration rate for the different
quantile from a regressing of the migration rate on the continuous network size measure (as done in
the baseline specification).
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Table A.8: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration by category
Children Parents Spouses Siblings
Spouses
of foreign.
Emp.
migrants
Panel A: Average effect
SSIt−1 0.35*** 0.07 0.25*** -0.01 -0.12** 0.08**
(0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Rel. to mean dep. var (pct.) 2.5 0.9 1.7 -0.4 -1.1 2.8
Panel B: Network effect
SSIt−1 -0.38** -0.18** -0.47*** 0.09** -0.05 0.12***
(0.18) (0.08) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 0.97*** 0.34*** 0.95*** -0.13* -0.10* -0.04
(0.25) (0.11) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 14.15 8.5 14.94 2.41 10.76 2.96
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015 ag-
gregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses and interpolated for
the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The
regression includes municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-
level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics
Municipality heterogeneities
Average effect Network Population Income
Average effect
SSIt−1 0.93***
(0.19)
Network size
Small × SSIt−1 -0.47**
(0.20)
Medium × SSIt−1 0.29
(0.23)
Large × SSIt−1 2.25***
(0.37)
Population size
Small × SSIt−1 0.58
(0.37)
Medium × SSIt−1 0.88***
(0.29)
Large × SSIt−1 1.43***
(0.26)
Income level
Low × SSIt−1 0.92***
(0.30)
Medium × SSIt−1 0.62**
(0.27)
High × SSIt−1 1.48**
(0.62)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 19575
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1305
Mean dependent variable 59.44 59.436 59.436 59.436
Notes: The table displays coefficients from regressing the yearly migration rate (in
1/1000 pct.) on the standardized storm index in year t-1 interacted with municip-
ality characteristics. Coefficients are displayed for the average effect and for seper-
ate regressions for heterogeneities with respect to network size, population and
income level. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Effect heterogeneity by municipality characteristics (linear)
Municipality heterogeneities
Average effect Network Population Income All
SSIt−1 0.93*** -0.72** -2.72 0.73*** -2.55
(0.19) (0.34) (3.37) (0.24) (4.46)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 2.20*** 2.23***
(0.44) (0.48)
SSIt−1 × Population (log) 0.35 0.12
(0.32) (0.42)
SSIt−1 × High income mun. 0.26 0.76*
(0.34) (0.42)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24075 24075
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1605 1605
Mean dependent variable 60.06 60.06 60.06 60.06 60.06
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to
2015 aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses and
interpolated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration rate
(in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, robustness
Weighting and time trends
Current
muni.
Prov.
cluster
Conley
HAC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Average effect
SSIt−1 0.93*** 0.41** 1.24*** 0.73*** 0.91*** 0.93*** 0.93**
(0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.25) (0.37)
Rel. to mean dep. var (Pct.) 1.6 0.7 2.1 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6
Panel B: Network effect
SSIt−1 -0.72** -1.07*** -0.76** -1.52*** -1.40*** -0.72* -0.72
(0.34) (0.28) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31) (0.43) (0.48)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 2.20*** 1.98*** 2.09*** 2.36*** 3.06*** 2.20*** 2.20***
(0.44) (0.36) (0.34) (0.30) (0.39) (0.52) (0.61)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mun-Year trends No Yes No Yes No No No
Population weights No No Yes Yes No No No
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 87
Mean dependent variable 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015
aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses and interpolated
for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration rate (in Pct.). The re-
gression includes municipality and year fixed effects. In column (5) individual migration data is
aggregated using the current municipality. In the other columns the aggregation is based on the
birth place municipality. In column (1)-(5) standard errors are clustered at municipality-level, in
column (6) on province level and in column (7) standard errors are estimated using Conley spatial
HAC. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Effect of heavy typhoons on migration
(1) (2)
Panel A: Average effect
Heavy storm (SSIt−1 > 75th quantile) 3.02*** 3.02***
(0.51) (0.51)
Rel. to mean dep. var (Pct.) 5.1 5.1
Panel B: Network effect
Heavy storm (SSIt−1 > 75th quantile) 0.08 0.03
(1.05) (0.48)
Heavy storm (SSIt−1 > 75th quantile) × Network2000 3.10**
(1.28)
Heavy storm (SSIt−1 > 75th quantile) × Above median network size 4.59***
(0.89)
Observations 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 59.44 59.44
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001
to 2015 aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration
rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table A.13: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, spillovers
all 20 km 40 km 60 km 80 km 100 km
Panel A: Average effect
Heavy storm 3.02*** 3.63*** 4.06*** 4.50*** 5.20*** 5.52***
(0.51) (0.53) (0.53) (0.54) (0.55) (0.56)
Rel. to mean dep. var (pct.) 5.1 6.1 6.8 7.6 8.7 9.3
Panel B: Network effect
Heavy storm 0.08 0.15 0.24 0.60 0.72 0.88
(1.05) (1.11) (1.09) (1.12) (0.98) (1.00)
Heavy storm × Network2000 3.10** 3.73*** 4.14*** 4.28*** 4.99*** 5.24***
(1.28) (1.39) (1.38) (1.43) (1.26) (1.29)
Observations 24360 23764 23070 22355 21679 21131
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44 59.44
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to
2015 aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migra-
tion rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes municipality and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Correlation between different network measures
Network
USA 2000
Network
social security index
Network
passenger lists
Network USA 2000 1.00 0.54 0.28
Network social security index 0.54 1.00 0.76
Network passenger lists 0.28 0.76 1.00
Notes: The table shows pairwise correlation coefficients of the different network meas-
ures aggregated at municipality-level. Network USA 2000 is based on flow migration
data from CFO for the years 1988 to 2000. Network social security index is based on US
Social Security Applications and Claims data that covers information about individu-
als who passed away in the US before 2007. Network passenger lists is based on data
from several historical passenger lists for immgigrants to the US from 1820 to 1965.
Table A.15: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, alternative network measures
Main network measure Alternative network measures
USA 2000 USA 2000 SSI SSI PL PL
SSIt−1 -0.25 -0.69*** 0.31* 0.27 0.47*** 0.52***
(0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16)
SSIt−1 × Network size 1.48*** 2.48*** 1.42* 2.16** 0.22 0.31
(0.44) (0.43) (0.81) (1.06) (0.17) (0.24)
Observations 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360 24360
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 37.75 37.75 37.75 37.75 37.75 37.75
Mun-Year trends No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015
aggregated at municipality-level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses and interpol-
ated for the years without census. The dependend variable is yearly migration rate (in 1/1000
pct.). The network variable is measured in different ways. For columns (1) and (2) flow data
for the migrants from the Philippines to the US from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas
cumulated for the years 1988 to 2000, divided by a municipalities population and measured in
percent. For columns (3) and (4) data from the U.S., Social Security Applications and Claims
Index and for columns (3) and (4) data from US passenger lists are used to calculate the net-
work measure following the same method as described above. Standard errors are clustered at
municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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A.4 Mechanisms
Table A.16: Effect of typhoon exposure on migration, destination country specific
analysis
(1) (2)
SSIt−1 0.05*** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 1.90***
(0.32)
Observations 487200 487200
# Cluster 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 2.99 2.99
Rel. to mean dep. var (Pct.) 1.6
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migra-
tion data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015
aggregated at municipality and country of destin-
ation level. Population data is from the Philip-
pine Censuses and interpolated for the years without
census. The dependend variable is yearly migra-
tion rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes
municipality-destination country and year fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-
level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.17: The role of policy restrictiveness, mean policy restrictiveness index
Family Labor
Family
members Quotas
Financial
requirem. Tests Job offer Funds
SSIt−1 -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.14*** 0.01 0.00 -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 6.93*** 7.18*** 11.62*** -5.92*** -12.73*** -1.04**
(0.77) (0.77) (1.50) (1.01) (1.87) (0.52)
SSIt−1 × PRImean -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 × PRImean -0.26*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.33***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 462840 462840 462840 462840 462840 414120
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015
aggregated at municipality and destination country level. Population data is from the Philippine
Censuses and interpolated for the years without census. Data for the Policy Restrictiveness Index
is from the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database. The policy restrictiveness indices
(PRImean) are the average PRIs from 2001 to 2010 (years for which data is available) and are meas-
ured in percent with zero being not restrictive and 100 being very restrictive. The dependend vari-
able is destination country specific yearly migration rate (in 1/1000 pct.). The regression includes
municipality-destination country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at municipality-
level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Table A.18: The role of policy restrictiveness, policy restrictiveness index in 2000
Family Labor
Family
members Quotas
Financial
requirem. Tests Job offer Funds
SSIt−1 -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.12*** 0.03 0.04* -0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 7.90*** 7.18*** 11.47*** -8.12*** -12.85*** -1.04**
(0.91) (0.77) (1.49) (1.30) (1.87) (0.52)
SSIt−1 × PRI2000 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SSIt−1 × Network2000 × PRI2000 -0.31*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.39*** 0.27*** 0.33***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 462840 462840 462840 462840 462840 414120
# Cluster 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624 1624
Mean dependent variable 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99 2.99
Notes: The analysis is based on individual migration data from CFO for the years 2001 to 2015 aggreg-
ated at municipality and destination country level. Population data is from the Philippine Censuses
and interpolated for the years without census. Data for the Policy Restrictiveness Index is from the
Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) database. The policy restrictiveness indices (PRI2000)
are fixed in the year 2000 and measured in percent with zero being not restrictive and 100 being very
restrictive. The dependend variable is destination country specific yearly migration rate (in 1/1000
pct.). The regression includes municipality-destination country and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at municipality-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Table A.19: Effect of past GDP per capita growth on employment and wage in-
come
Employment Income (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average GDP p.c. growth (t-5 to t-1) 0.004** 0.004
(0.002) (0.004)
Average GDP p.c. growth (t-10 to t-1) 0.006*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.004)
Observations 74839 74839 60510 60510
Notes: The analysis is based on Filipino immigrants in the US who are likely to be
in the workforce, i.e., between 23 and 60 years old. Data comes from the 2000 US
Census and 2001 to 2017 American Community Survey. The regression includes
constrols for gender, age, age to the square, years of schooling, years of school-
ing to the square, as well as state, year and years in the US fixed effects. Em-
ployment is a dummy variable that is one if the individual is employed. Income
(log) is the log of real wage income conditional on being employed. Identification
comes from variation in average state-level GDP p.c. growth in the last five (ten)
years previous to observation. Standard errors are clustered on state-year level.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Chapter 2
Immigrating into a Recession∗
Abstract
We analyze how economic conditions at the time of arrival shape the eco-
nomic integration of family migrants in the US. Our identification strategy
exploits years-long waiting times for visa that decouple the migration de-
cision from economic conditions at the time of arrival. We find that initial
economic conditions have considerable consequences for the integration of
family migrants. A one pp higher initial unemployment rate decreases wage
income by four percent in the short run and by 2.5 percent in the longer
run. This is the result of substantial occupational downgrading. Family
migrants who immigrate into a recession draw on ethnic networks to mit-
igate the negative labor market effects. They are also more likely to reside
with family members, reducing their geographical mobility.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Toman Barsbai and Andreas Steinmayr.
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2.1 Introduction
Family-sponsored visas are the primary entryway for permanent immigrants to the
OECD. In 2015, family migrants accounted for 48 percent of all permanent immigrant
arrivals in the OECD. By contrast, labor migrants accounted for only 16 percent.
This pattern also holds for the US. In 2015, 65 percent of all persons obtaining lawful
permanent resident status in the US were family-based migrants. Only 14 percent
were employment-based migrants.1 Nevertheless, family migrants have received limited
attention in economics.
Two key features characterize the system of family-sponsored visas in the US.
First, as a result of yearly caps on the number of available visas and excess demand, it
usually takes several years until a family-sponsored visa is granted. In addition, once
family members obtain their visas, they must move to the US within a period of six
months. Hence, the macroeconomic conditions family migrants face at arrival in the
US are beyond their control. Some family migrants happen to immigrate into a boom,
whereas others happen to immigrate into a recession. Second, as their visas are not
sponsored by an employer, family migrants typically arrive without a job. These two
features make the economic integration of family migrants potentially susceptible to
initial labor market conditions.
In this paper, we analyze how unemployment rates at the time of arrival in
the US shape the economic integration of immigrants over a period of ten years. We
introduce a new identification strategy that exploits the inability of family migrants to
synchronize their arrival with labor market conditions in the US. Our focus is on key
labor market outcomes, in particular, employment and wage income. We also provide
evidence on the underlying mechanisms and coping strategies.
Economic theory suggests that entering the labor market in a recession increases
the odds of unemployment and job-skills mismatch. Due to lower levels of destination-
specific human capital, immigrants might also be pushed to enter occupations with
larger ethnic networks. These jobs may provide fewer opportunities to accumulate
destination-specific human capital and experience, thus limiting upward mobility. In
addition, future employers may perceive past labor market outcomes as a signal of pro-
ductivity. Initially, unemployed or mismatched immigrants may thus face persistently
lower wages. We thus hypothesize that immigrating into a recession is associated with
worse labor market outcomes, even in the longer run.
1 Figures for the OECD come from the 2017 International Migration Outlook and exclude migration
movements within areas of free circulation (mainly within the EU). Figures for the US come from
the 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Humanitarian migrants (refugees and asylum seekers)
and winners of the diversity lottery in the US account for most of the remaining share.
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We base our empirical analysis on cross-sectional data from the American Com-
munity Survey and the US census for the period 2000-2016. The data provides inform-
ation on the year of immigration. We are thus able to analyze the effect of state-level
unemployment rates in the year of arrival on immigrants’ labor market outcomes in
the year of observation. Our econometric specification includes years-since-migration,
state, year-of-observation, and year-of-immigration fixed effects and exploits variation
in initial unemployment rates within states over time. This specification allows us to
control for the general path of economic integration over time, persistent differences in
economic conditions or immigrant characteristics across states, nation-wide economic
conditions at the time of observation, and changes in the characteristics of immigrant
cohorts.
The key challenge for identification is that migration decisions are endogenous
to economic conditions. If the characteristics of immigrants to a specific state differ
between good and bad economic times, observed differences in economic integration
may be due to differences in immigrant characteristics, not differences in initial eco-
nomic conditions. As argued above, family migrants cannot choose their date of im-
migration based on economic conditions. In addition, family migrants typically join
their sponsor’s household in the US. Hence, family migrants do not choose the US state
based on economic conditions either. As a result, the local economic conditions family
migrants face at arrival are exogenous. We offer support for our identifying assumption
by showing that unemployment rates in the year of arrival cannot predict the size and
composition of inflows of family migrants to US states. We also show that selective
return migration is unlikely to bias our results. In general, rates of return migration
are very low for family migrants. We also show that survival rates of migrants in
our sample do not systematically differ by year of arrival and hence different initial
economic conditions.
Currently available datasets do not provide information on the visa type. We are
thus not able to directly identify family migrants. In our main analysis, we therefore
restrict the sample to working-age immigrants from countries for which family-based
migration is the dominant mode of migration to the US. We also offer alternative
strategies that identify (i) family migrants from the Philippines based on administrative
data from the Philippine government and (ii) immigrant spouses with waiting times
based on the timing of immigration and marriage.
We have three main findings. First, immigrating into a recession substantially
worsens labor market outcomes, even in the longer run. A one pp higher unemployment
rate at the time of arrival has only a small and short-lasting effect on employment rates.
However, it decreases real wage income in the first four years by about four percent,
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with slow convergence to a persistent negative effect of about 2.5 percent afterward.
The average family migrant thus experiences a cumulative loss of wage income of about
USD 25,000 over a period of ten years from immigrating into a recession, which roughly
corresponds to a three pp increase in the unemployment rate. Second, the negative
effect on wage income is the result of a combination of occupational downgrading, lower
hourly wages, and a decrease in working hours. Third, family migrants rely on ethnic
and family networks to cope with adverse economic conditions. Migrants who arrive
at times of high unemployment use ethnic networks to mitigate the negative labor
market effects. They are also more likely to reside with family members, most likely
the sponsor of their visa. The immobile support received from the family, however,
may reduce the geographic mobility of migrants. Indeed, we find that migrants who
arrive at times of high unemployment do not increase their geographical mobility. The
resulting job search frictions could provide a potential explanation for the observed
persistence of the effects.
Our paper builds on and contributes to two strands of literature. One strand of
the literature has examined how immigrant earnings evolve after their arrival in the
destination country and whether immigrant earnings assimilate to native earnings over
time (starting with the seminal papers by Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985)).2
The other strand of the literature we relate to has studied how entering the labor
market in a recession affects labor market outcomes. A few studies have focused on
immigrants. Chiswick et al. (1997), using data from the US Current Population Survey
for the 1980s, find that immigrants who arrive in a recession have lower employment
rates initially but quickly catch up with natives. In contrast, Chiswick and Miller
(2002), using data from the 1990 US Census, find that immigrants who arrive in a
recession have substantially lower earnings and take about 30 years to close this earning
gap. These studies, however, do not address the potential endogeneity of migration
decisions. Differences in observed labor market outcomes may therefore be due to
differences in immigrant characteristics, not differences in initial economic conditions.
Most closely related to our paper, Åslund and Rooth (2007) explicitly address
this issue. They exploit a placement policy that exogenously assigns refugees to initial
locations in Sweden. They find that arriving in a recession reduces refugees earnings
and employment rates for at least ten years. Godøy (2017) and Mask (2018) also
exploit refugee placement policies and report similar, but less long-lasting effects for
refugees in Norway and the US.
A number of studies have also investigated the labor market effects of graduating
in a recession. Using data on Norwegian secondary school graduates from the 1990s,
2 For a recent review, see Duleep (2015).
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Raaum and Røed (2006) find that those who graduate in a recession are less likely to
be employed during the first ten years of their work careers. Using data on US college
graduates from the 1980s, Kahn (2010) shows that those who graduate in a recession
persistently earn lower wage incomes and work in lower-level occupations, but do not
see changes in their working hours. Using data on Canadian college graduates from
the 1980s and early 1990s, Oreopoulos et al. (2012) document similar effects. More
recently, Altonji et al. (2016), using data on US college graduates from the period
1974-2011, find that those who graduate in a recession see a substantial reduction in
initial earnings through less full-time work and lower wages. They document, however,
only small persistent effects on wages.
A few studies have gone beyond graduates and extend the set of workers under
study to include school leavers at all levels. Kwon et al. (2010), using data on white-
collar workers from Sweden for the period 1970-1990, show that workers who enter
the labor market during a boom earn higher wages and are promoted more quickly.
Brunner and Kuhn (2014), using data on male workers entering the Austrian labor
market between 1978 and 2000, find that high unemployment rates at the time of
labor market entry have a persistent negative effect on wage income. This effect is
more pronounced for blue-collar workers who may be permanently locked into low-
paying jobs. Most recently, Schwandt and von Wachter (2019) show that entering the
labor market at times of high unemployment substantially reduces earnings. The effect
is driven by a reduction in working hours and hourly wages and persists for about ten
years.
We contribute to these two strands of literature in a number of ways. First, we
provide the first evidence on the economic integration of family migrants who consti-
tute a very relevant population group in the US and the OECD in general. Second,
we introduce a novel identification strategy and show that initial economic conditions
can generate substantial heterogeneity in the evolution of earnings across immigrant co-
horts. Third, we broaden the evidence that labor market outcomes are path-dependent
and not only depend on contemporaneous economic conditions (e.g., see Beaudry and
DiNardo, 1991). It is not clear a priori that previous findings for native labor mar-
ket entrants and refugees also apply to family migrants. Family migrants may enter
different segments of the labor market and can draw on established networks that
may cushion the effects of initial economic conditions. Fourth, we show that adverse
economic conditions at the time of arrival constitute a key mechanism for explaining
widely documented immigrant-specific phenomena such as downgrading and reliance
on family and ethnic networks.
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2.2 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we briefly explore potential mechanisms through which initial economic
conditions potentially affect the economic integration of immigrants. Recessions af-
fect the number and types of initial job opportunities available on the labor market.
Entering the labor market in a recession hence likely increases the odds of being un-
employed or experiencing job mismatching with the associated lower wages (Bowlus,
1995; McLaughlin and Bils, 2001; Devereux, 2002). This may be particularly true for
immigrants, as their labor market outcomes are generally more responsive to business
cycle fluctuations than those of natives (Dustmann et al., 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny,
2010). If future employers perceive past spells of unemployment or low wages as a
signal of low productivity, initially unemployed or mismatched individuals may then
face persistently lower wages (Jacobson et al., 1993; Arulampalam, 2001; Gregg, 2001;
Gregory and Jukes, 2001; Couch and Placzek, 2010; Kroft et al., 2013).
The scarring effect is likely more pronounced for immigrants than for natives.
Initial unemployment and job mismatching make them less likely to accumulate the
optimal destination-country specific human capital and experience. Given the limited
transferability of human capital and experience from the origin to the destination
country (e.g., Friedberg, 2000), it may thus be more difficult for immigrants than
natives to signal their idiosyncratic productivity to future employers. Similarly, if
immigrants initially enter the ethnic economy and accumulate skills that are specific
to the ethnic economy, they may be more likely to remain in it and potentially face
limited upward mobility (similar to the argument made by Borjas (1992)).
However, adverse economic conditions at arrival do not need to have a persistent
effect on the labor market outcomes of immigrants. Immigrants may simply take more
time to complete the job-matching process. With diminishing marginal returns to
the optimal labor market experience, immigrants may be able to recover from initial
shocks over time. The ability to do so depends on the presence of search frictions
and immigrants occupational, sectoral, and geographical mobility (on the importance
of mobility, see Topel and Ward, 1992). On the one hand, due to the scarring effect
and discrimination on the labor market, immigrants may face more search frictions
than natives. On the other hand, due to lower degrees of attachment, immigrants may
also have lower moving costs and therefore be more mobile than natives (Green, 1999
Braun and Kvasnicka, 2014; and Cadena and Kovak, 2016). The mobility of family
migrants, however, might be lower as they initially move to their sponsor’s household
and might depend on the support of family members. From a theoretical perspective,
it is thus not clear how persistent the negative labor market effects of immigrating into
a recession are.
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2.3 The System of Family-sponsored Immigration to the US
The Immigration Act of 1990 established the current system of legal permanent im-
migration to the US. There are four main pathways of permanent immigration: family-
sponsored immigration, employment-based immigration, the Diversity Immigrant Visa
program, and admission on humanitarian grounds through refugee and asylum pro-
grams. US immigration law has historically emphasized family reunification, which
remains the most common legal basis for immigration to the US.3
Family migrants to the US require a sponsor who provides legal entitlement to a
visa. Family members residing in the US as a US citizen or a lawful permanent resident
(LPR or green-card holder) can act as sponsors. Sponsors need to prove that they can
support their own family and the sponsored family member at an income level at or
above 125 percent of the federal poverty level. They also need to sign an affidavit of
financial support, which legally obliges them to support sponsored family members for
ten years or until they become a US citizen (Kandel, 2018b).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 provides several broad classes of
admission for family members to gain LPR status. The resulting admission categories
depend on the relationship between the sponsor and the family member, the age and
marital status of the family member, and on whether the sponsor is a US citizen or
a LPR (see Table 2.1). Importantly, there are caps on the number of visas available
in each category per year. The only exception are immediate relatives of US citizens,
i.e., spouses, parents, and unmarried children under the age of 21 years. They are not
subject to numerical limitations.
The Immigration Act of 1990 caps the total number of immigrants to come to
the US as an LPR at 675,000 per year. This number includes 480,000 family-sponsored
immigrants, 140,000 employment-based immigrants, and 55,000 diversity immigrants.
To account for the fact that immediate relatives of US citizens are not subject to nu-
merical limitations, the annual cap of 480,000 family-sponsored immigrants is adjusted
in the following way:
480,000 (annual total cap on family-sponsored immigrants)
− number of immediate relatives granted LPR status in the prior year
− number of aliens paroled into the US for at least a year in the prior year
+ number of unused employment-based visas from the prior year
The minimum adjusted number of family-sponsored immigrants, however, is fixed
at 226,000 per year. As the number of immediate relatives granted LPR status has
exceeded 254,000 every year, the annual cap for other family-sponsored immigrants
3 There are a few other pathways to Lawful Permanent Resident status, but they are quantitatively
not important.
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Table 2.1: Family-sponsored admission categories
Category Sponsor Family members Visas
IR US citizen Spouses, parents and unlimited
unmarried children under 21
F1 US citizen Unmarried sons and daughters 23,400
and their minor children
F2A LPR Spouses and minor children 87,900
F2B LPR Unmarried sons and daughters 26,300
F3 US citizen Married sons and daughters 23,400
F4 US citizen Siblings and their 65,000
minor children
Source: Congressional Research Service, summary of INA §203(a) and §204; 8 USC. §1153.
Note: Unused visas from the previous year can partially increase the number of visas in in-
dividual categories. For more details see CSR report R43145.
has effectively remained at the minimum of 226,000 for the past two decades (Kandel,
2018a). Table 2.1 shows the resulting number of family visas available for the different
categories. In addition, per-country ceilings regulate that citizens from a single country
cannot account for more than seven percent of all available visas.4
Demand for family-based migration far exceeds the number of available visas per
year. As a result, the caps have created a large backlog of individuals whose LPR
visa petitions have been approved by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) but for whom no visas are available. As of November 1, 2017, 3.95 million
approved LPR visa petitions in the family track were pending and waiting for visa
processing (Kandel, 2018a). Within admission categories, the Department of State
processes visa applications in the order in which petitions were filed. Visa applicants
therefore typically wait for several years before they receive their visa.
The Department of State regularly publishes the waiting times for those ap-
plicants who are currently invited for visa processing in its monthly Visa Bulletin.
Figure 2.1 shows the waiting times, defined as the time between filing a petition and
being invited for visa processing, for different categories of family migrants for the
period 1990-2016. For example, in 2005, family migrants receiving F1 visas (unmar-
ried sons and daughters of US citizens) or F2A visas (spouses and minor children of
LPRs) had been in the queue for about four years, those receiving F2B visas (unmarried
sons and daughters of LPRs) for about eight years, those receiving F3 visas (married
sons and daughters of US citizens) for about six years, and those receiving F4 visas
4 Exceptions are possible for category F2A and some employment-based visas. For more details, see
Kandel (2018a).
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(siblings of US citizens and their minor children) for about twelve years. Due to the
binding per-country ceilings, applicants from the largest countries of origin, Mexico,
China, India, and the Philippines, have different and mostly longer waiting times (see
Figure B.1 in the appendix). Across admission categories and countries of origin, the
average applicant waited for about ten years for a numerically limited visa during the
period 1990-2016.
Prospective family migrants do not only face long waiting times, they also face
considerable uncertainty about the length of waiting times. At the time of filing their
petition, they only know the waiting times of applicants who have just been invited for
visa processing in each admission category. Their effective waiting times, however, may
well differ depending on how many other prospective migrants from the same and other
countries have filed petitions in the same admission category. Indeed, as Figure 2.1
shows, waiting times have not been constant over time. They have considerably in-
creased for most admission categories since the 1990s.
Once family members obtain their visa, they have limited options to choose the
date of departure. Visas are only valid for up to six months, so migrants have to enter
the US within that period. Only after arriving in the US will they receive their LPR
status.5
The combination of long waiting times, uncertainty about the length of waiting
times, and the short validity of the visa forces family migrants to enter the US within
a narrow time window that is beyond their control and not known a priori. Family mi-
grants are thus not able to synchronize their arrival with labor market conditions in the
US. Our identification strategy exploits this particular feature of the US immigration
system to overcome the problem of endogenous migration decisions.
5 Some migrants also adjust their status while being in the US. However, adjustment of status is not
common for family migrants. According to the 2015 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, only 16,783
family migrants did so in 2015.
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Figure 2.1: Waiting times for family migrants by admission category
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Notes: The graph shows waiting times for unmarried sons and daughters of US citizens (F1), spouses
and children of legal permanent residents (F2A), unmarried adult children of legal permanent residents
(F2B), married sons and daughters of US citizens (F3) and brothers and sisters of US citizens (F4).
Data source: U.S. Department of State, own calculations. Figure B.1 in the appendix shows waiting
times for applicants from Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines, where the per-country ceiling is
binding.
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2.4 Data
We base our analysis on data from the 2000 US census and the American Community
Survey (ACS) for the period 2000-2017, obtained via IPUMS. This data has two ad-
vantages over other potential data sources. First, the sample is large, even if we restrict
it to immigrants with specific characteristics. Second, the data provides information
on the year of immigration and country of birth as well as a wide range of labor market
outcomes.6
Like other currently available datasets, however, our data does not provide in-
formation on the visa type. And the US census and the ACS sample all types of
permanent residents as well as aliens who reside in the US on a temporary visa or
irregularly. We are hence not able to directly identify family migrants. In our main
analysis, we therefore restrict the sample to immigrants from countries for which family-
based migration is the dominant mode of migration to the US. As part of our robustness
checks, we also explore two alternative strategies. Both yield similar results.
To understand the relative importance of different modes of migration to the
US, we use data from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Published by the US
Department of Homeland Security, the yearbooks provide information on the number
of immigrants and aliens who are admitted to the US by admission category, coun-
try of origin, and year. We only consider categories that are likely to be sampled
by the census and the ACS. They include all different types of LPRs (family-based,
employment-based and others, including diversity migrants and admissions on human-
itarian grounds), students and exchange visitors on temporary visas, and temporary
workers. They exclude tourists, business travelers, and diplomats. For each country of
origin, we then calculate the share of three different types of migrants distinguishing
between family-based migrants, employment-based migrants, and all other migrants.
Figure 2.2 shows the dominant mode of migration to the US for different coun-
tries. We define the dominant mode to account for more than 50 percent of yearly
admissions in each of the years 2005, 2010, and 2015. Doing so allows us to identify
countries for which the dominant mode of migration is stable over time. We define
countries as mixed when no mode of migration accounts for more than 50 percent in
all three years.
Countries with predominantly family-based migration include the Philippines,
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Yemen, Guyana, and some small island states. Countries
with predominantly employment-based migration mostly consist of OECD countries.
They also include Argentina, South Africa, and India. Other modes of migration only
6 We do not use the 2010 US census as it was a short-form-only census and does not provide the
relevant information.
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dominate in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa. All other countries have mixed
modes of migration to the US.
Table B.1 in the appendix shows that this definition of country types indeed cap-
tures meaningful differences in the composition of migrants. In 2015, family migrants
accounted for 68 percent of migrants from countries with predominantly family-based
migration. With 3 percent and 23 percent, the share of family migrants was much
lower for countries with predominantly employment-based migration or mixed coun-
tries. Similarly, employment-based migrants accounted for 65 percent of migrants from
countries with predominantly employment-based migration, but only for 9 percent and
21 percent of migrants from countries with predominantly family-based migration or
mixed countries.
In the subsequent analysis, we restrict the sample to migrants from countries with
predominantly family-based migration to the US. They are most likely to be family
migrants. Individuals from the Philippines (55.7%) and Vietnam (30.9%) make up for
the vast majority of the sample. Individuals from British Guyana (5.5%), Cambodia
(2.3%), Laos (2.2%), Yemen (1%), and some small island states (2.4%) play a minor
role in the sample. It is important to note, however, that these countries also send
significant shares of non-family migrants and that many family migrants are immediate
relatives who do not face long waiting times (see Table B.1 in the appendix). We revisit
this issue in our robustness checks.
We also restrict the sample to individuals who were between 22 and 60 years old
at the time of immigration and the time of observation. This age restriction focuses on
individuals who are likely to become active in the labor market at arrival. In addition,
it excludes minor children of US citizens who can be sponsored without waiting times
(see Table 2.1). It also excludes young adults who immigrate as students or exchange
visitors as well as parents of US citizens who immigrate after retirement. These groups
do not face waiting times either. Finally, we also restrict the sample to migrants who
have at most spent ten years in the US.
Table B.2 provides summary statistics of demographic characteristics and out-
come variables for family migrants in column (1). For comparison, the table also shows
the same statistics for migrants from the Philippines, the most important country of
origin of family migrants in our sample, in column (2); employment-based migrants,
in column (3); natives, i.e., US-born individuals, in column (4); and US-born college
graduates in column (5). For all populations, we restrict the sample to individuals who
were between 22 and 60 years old at the time of observation.
On average, family migrants immigrated at the age of 35 and faced a local un-
employment rate of 6.14 percent at arrival. They are disproportionally female (63%)
Data 69
Figure 2.2: Countries by dominant mode of migration to the United States
Family-based
Employment
Refugee and diversity
Mixed
USA
Notes: Data from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Department of Homeland Security). The
figure depicts countries by their dominant mode of migration to the United States in 2005. Countries
identified as sending predominantely family migrants in 2005, 2010, and 2015 are Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guyana, Haiti, Laos, Philippines, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Tonga, Vietnam, Yemen.
and have on average 12.9 years of schooling. While this is seven months less than the
average native, family migrants are more likely than natives to hold a college degree
(39% vs. 30%). In comparison, employment-based migrants on average immigrated
at the age of 31 and faced a local unemployment rate of 5.88 percent. Their sex ratio
is more balanced (48% female), and they have considerably higher levels of schooling
(15.8 years).
On average, family migrants are as old as natives at the time of observation (41
years). Employment migrants are considerably younger (36 years). The gap between
age at immigration and observation is larger for employment migrants than for family
migrants. This is consistent with higher rates of return migration for employment
migrants, to which we will return later. In terms of labor market outcomes, family
migrants do worse than natives. Their employment levels (70% vs. 75%), annual wage
income conditional on being employed (USD 25k vs. USD 35k), real hourly wages
conditional on being employed (USD 15 vs. USD 18), and occupational income scores
(12 vs. 14), the log median wage income of a worker in the same occupation, are
lower. Not surprisingly, employment-based migrants have a very strong labor market
performance. They have substantially higher wage incomes (USD 53k), hourly wages
(USD 27), and occupational income scores (19) than family-based migrants or natives.
Family migrants are not more likely to receive public welfare assistance than
natives. This can be explained by the fact that family migrants have no access to
welfare benefits in their first years after arrival. Finally, family migrants are more
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likely to co-reside with their own siblings (6.5% vs. 4.6%) and much less likely to be
household heads (32% vs. 53%) than natives. They are not more likely to have moved
across states within the last year (2.4% vs. 2.7%). By contrast, employment-based
migrants are generally more independent and mobile.
Migrants from the Philippines constitute the largest group of family migrants in
our sample. Their demographic characteristics are comparable to all family migrants.
However, they have significantly higher levels of schooling (14.7 vs. 12.9 years) and
college graduation rates (61% vs. 39%). They also do better in the labor market than
all family migrants, but still somewhat worse than natives.
By definition, college graduates have the highest level of education. They are
also much younger on average and, given their younger age and limited experience,
perform relatively well on the labor market. Out of the different groups, they are most
likely to have moved across states within the last year (6.6%).
2.5 Empirical Approach
We estimate the following model to analyze how local unemployment rates at the time
of arrival shape the economic integration of family migrants over time:
yi,s,t,m = α+
m+10∑
t=m+1
β(t−m) URs,m + γ(t−m) + θs + λt + χm +Xi,t∆+ i,t (2.1)
where yi,s,t,m measures the outcome of interest for family migrant i who immigrated in
year m and was observed in year t in state s. The variable of interest is the state-level
unemployment rate in the year of immigration URs,m. We use a fully flexible model
and allow the effect of URs,m to vary with the number of years in the US (t − m).
We estimate the effect for the first ten years in the US. The coefficients β(t−m) cap-
ture the effect of the unemployment rate in the year of immigration plus the weighted
sum of the effects of unemployment rates in subsequent years. These parameters are
of interest as they capture the overall effect of initial economic conditions for a nor-
mal evolution of state-level unemployment rates afterward (Oreopoulos et al., 2012).
γ(t−m), θs, λt, and χm represent a full set of years-in-the-US, state, year-of-observation,
and year-of-immigration fixed effects. They control for the general path of economic
integration over time (γ(t−m)), persistent differences in economic conditions or immig-
rant characteristics across states (θs), nation-wide economic conditions at the time of
observation (λt), and nation-wide economic conditions at the time of immigration and
changes in the characteristics of immigrant cohorts (χm). Xi,t is a vector of migrant-
level controls. It includes age, age squared, gender, years of schooling, and a full set of
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country-of-origin dummies. i,t is an i.i.d error term.
We also use a second specification where we model the dynamic effects of the
unemployment rate in the year of immigration with a fifth-order polynomial:
yi,s,t,m = α+
5∑
j=1
βj URs,m(t−m)j + γ(t−m) + θs + λt + χm +Xi,t∆+ i,t (2.2)
The polynomial specification is less flexible and introduces more restrictions on
the functional form. However, it generates more precise estimates as there are fewer
parameters to be estimated. For the main results, we present both specifications side
by side. They yield similar results. For the analysis of additional outcomes, we there-
fore mainly use the polynomial specification (2.2) as our preferred specification. We
estimate all models using OLS and cluster standard errors at the state-cohort level.
We also weight observations to account for different sample sizes in different years of
observation.
Our key identifying assumption is that the immigration of family migrants is
independent of state-level unemployment rates in the US in the year of immigration.
As we have argued above, family migrants cannot choose their date of immigration
based on economic conditions. The combination of long waiting times, uncertainty
about the length of waiting times, and the short validity of the visa does not allow
them to synchronize their arrival with labor market condition in the US. In addition,
family migrants typically join their sponsor’s household in the US. Own calculations
using administrate data on the universe of family migrants from the Philippines to the
US indicate that this is the case for 98.5 percent of all family migrants. Hence, family
migrants do not choose the US state based on economic conditions either. We therefore
argue that the local economic conditions family migrants face at arrival in the US are
exogenous.
Our data allows us to conduct an indirect test of this identifying assumption.
If family-based migration is indeed exogenous to local economic conditions, state-level
unemployment rates in the year of immigration should not be correlated with the size
and composition of family migrants in US states. We test this prediction by regressing
the state-level unemployment rate in the year of arrival on (i) individual-level migrant
characteristics and (ii) aggregates of the size and composition of family migrants at the
state-year-of-immigration level. Table 2.2 shows the results.
In the left panel, we restrict the sample to migrants who were interviewed in
the first two years of arrival, thus minimizing the potential of subsequent internal or
return migration. In the right panel, we use our full sample. All regressions include
state and year of immigration fixed effects. For the sample of recent arrivals, none of the
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Table 2.2: Balancing of characteristics by state unemployment rate at arrival
First two years Full sample
Individual Aggregated Individual Aggregated
Age at immigration -0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.003)
Female (0/1) -0.011 0.065 0.018*** 0.098*
(0.013) (0.124) (0.006) (0.056)
Years of schooling -0.000 0.006 -0.003*** -0.008
(0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.005)
Number of migrants (log) -0.067 -0.064***
(0.053) (0.024)
N 16024 849 88357 4143
F-Test 0.260 0.198 7.574 1.803
Notes: Coefficients are from regressions of the state-level unemployment rates in the
year of immigration on the respective variables. The sample for columns (1) and (2)
is restricted to family migrants who immigrated in the two years prior to observation.
The sample for columns (3) and (4) consists of all family migrants. Columns (1) and
(3) use individual level data. Columns (2) and (4) use data aggregated on the state-
cohort level. All regressions includes state and year-of-immigration fixed effects. In
the regressions using individual data also birthplace fixed effects are included. Stand-
ard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05,*** p < 0.01.
coefficients is statistically significant. The F-statistic from a test of joint significance
comes to the same conclusion. For the full sample, gender and years of schooling turn
out to be statistically significant. However, they are far from economically significant.
The coefficients suggest that being female is associated with only a 0.018 pp higher
unemployment rate and an additional year of schooling with only a 0.003 pp lower
unemployment rate. The strength of these associations is negligible. Overall, the
results in Table 2.2 support our argument that migration decisions of family migrants
are not endogenous to economic conditions.
Measuring the unemployment rate at the state rather than the national level
provides us with a more accurate measure of economic conditions at arrival. Figure B.2
shows that there is considerable heterogeneity in unemployment rates between states
over time, even after accounting for state and year fixed effects.
In our data, we only observe the current state of residence and the state of
residence in the previous year. We thus need to proxy for the state of arrival using
the state of residence in the previous year. To the extent that migrants move between
states, however, we measure initial unemployment rates with an error. Figure B.3
shows that family migrants are less likely to move between states than employment-
based migrants. This is likely due to strong family ties. Still, in the first five years
after arrival, more than three percent of family migrants report having moved between
states in the prior year. However, as we show later, family migrants do not seem to
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move in response to initial economic conditions. If interstate migration is independent
of initial economic conditions, measurement error will increase over time. We would
then overestimate the speed of convergence because of potential attenuation bias. Our
results are therefore conservative.
Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are not able to track individuals
over time. Selective return migration could thus potentially bias our results (Dustmann
and Görlach, 2015). For instance, we may wrongly conclude that immigrating into a
recession is not associated with poor labor market outcomes if those immigrants with
poor labor market outcomes decide to leave the US and disappear from our sample.
To test for return migration, Figure B.4 plots the number of migrants observed
in year t relative to the number of migrants in the year of immigration m for different
years of immigration over time. In the case of family migrants, there is no evidence for
return migration. If anything, the number of family migrants observed in the sample
increases over time.7 Previous research documenting that family migrants, and those
with Asian background in particular, are least likely to return (Dustmann and Görlach,
2015) and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) is in line with this conclusion. In the case of
employment-based migrants, the picture looks different. Their number in the sample
substantially decreases over time, suggesting that a high share of migrants return. This
result is consistent with recent evidence from Akee and Jones (2019). They use panel
data and show that almost 40 percent of migrants to the US have returned within ten
years after arrival.
We also conduct a more formal econometric test that combines the informa-
tion from different years of immigration. We first aggregate the data at the year-of-
immigration and years-in-the US level using person weights. We then regress the log
number of family migrants on a full set of year-of-immigration and years-in-the-US
dummies. We restrict the sample to individuals younger or equal to 50 years at the
time of immigration to avoid mechanical censoring at the age of 60. The coefficients
of the years-in-the-US dummies indicate the number of migrants observed in year t
relative to the first year. In the absence of return migration, the coefficients should be
close to zero and stable over time. For family migrants, the coefficients are indeed close
to zero, and there is no trend over time. For employment-based migrants, however, the
coefficients become increasingly negative, suggesting substantial return migration. The
econometric evidence on return migration is hence in line with the descriptive evidence
presented above.
7 Figure B.5 displays the change in cohort size over time aggregated for all years of immigration for
family migrants, Filipinos and employment migrants. It confirms that there is no change in cohort
size for family migrants and Filipinos. However, the cohort size of employment migrants decreases
significantly over time.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 The Long-term Effects of Initial Conditions on Labor Market
Outcomes of Family Migrants
Our main focus is on how unemployment rates at arrival affect the economic integration
of family migrants over the first ten years in the US. Figure 2.3 shows the effect of initial
unemployment rates on four key labor market outcomes: employment, log real annual
wage income, log real hourly wages, and occupational quality as measured by the
occupational income score. The figure shows how much a one pp increase in the initial
unemployment rate affects each outcome. It plots the year-specific coefficient β for the
first ten years after arrival. Red dots refer to the flexible specification (Equation 2.1),
blue dots including the 95 percent confidence interval to the more restrictive polynomial
specification (Equation 2.2). The results for both specifications are very similar. In
the following, we therefore only describe the results from the polynomial specification.
The corresponding regression tables are in Table B.3 in the appendix.
A one pp increase in the initial unemployment rate has only a small and short-
lasting effect on the employment status of family migrants (Panel (a) of Figure 2.3).
In the first year after arrival, family migrants are 0.9 pp less likely to be employed.
Compared to a scenario where family migrants have the same labor force participation
rate (LFPR) and propensity to be employed as the overall working-age population, this
effect is relatively small. In that case, a one pp increase in the initial unemployment
rate should lower the initial employment rate by 1LFPR . With an LFPR of about 0.75,
this effect amounts to about 1.3 pp. Family migrants hence do relatively well in terms
of finding a job. Consistent with this result, employment rates converge quickly and
do not differ by initial unemployment rates after four years in the US.
The picture looks different for annual wage income (Panel (b) of Figure 2.3).
Conditional on being employed, a one pp increase in the initial unemployment rate
decreases annual wage income in the first four years by about four percent. There is
only slow convergence afterward to a persistent and statistically significant negative
effect of about 2.5 percent.
The negative effect on wage income is largely due to lower wage rates (Panel(c)
of Figure 2.3). A one pp increase in the initial unemployment rate decreases hourly
wages by about two percent. The effect is persistent and relatively constant over time,
suggesting that family migrants who arrive at times of high unemployment permanently
face lower wage rates. The gap between the effect on annual wage income and the
effect on hourly wages indicates that family migrants who immigrate into a higher
unemployment work fewer hours.
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Figure 2.3: Persistent effects of unemployment rate at immigration on labor market
outcomes for family migrants
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(b) Annual real wage income (log)
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(c) Real hourly wage (log)
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(d) Occupational income score (log)
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American
Community Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-
US citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individu-
als 22 to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants,
we restrict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. This
leaves us with a sample of 88,357 migrants overall and out of which 65,565 are employed. Obser-
vations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year.
The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-
level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph
shows the result of two different specifications. The red hollow circles show the effect using the
flexible specification from Equation 2.1. The connected blue dots show the marginal effects using
the polynomial specification from Equation 2.2. Both specifications include dummies for years in
the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence. They also include age,
age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval for
the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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There is also evidence for occupational downgrading (Panel (d) of Figure 2.3).
A one pp increase in the initial unemployment rate decreases the occupational income
score, which measures the log median wage income of a worker in the same occupation,
by about 1.5 percent. Family migrants are hence pushed into lower-paid occupations.
The effect is long-lasting. There is only slow convergence towards the end of the ten-
year period under consideration.
To better understand the composition of the negative effect on wage income,
Figure 2.4 decomposes the effect into three components: occupational downgrading as
measured by the occupational income score, reduction in residual hourly wages (i.e.,
beyond the income loss due to occupational downgrading), and reduction in working
hours.
To do so, we first estimate the effect of a one pp increase in the initial unemploy-
ment rate on annual wage income (a). We then calculate the average hours worked
for every year since immigration. We obtain the reduction in annual wage income due
to a reduction in the wage rate by multiplying the effect on annual wage income per
hour times the average annual hours worked (b). Subtracting (b) from (a) gives us the
reduction in wage income due to a reduction in hours worked. We further decompose
(b) into an effect driven by occupational downgrading (c) and an effect on the hourly
wage rate holding constant the occupation (residual hourly wage). We estimate the
reduction due to occupational downgrading by multiplying the effect on occupational
hourly wages times the average annual hours worked. The difference between (c) and
(b) gives us the effect on residual hourly wages.
All three components play a considerable role, but the reduction in working hours
is quantitatively less important than occupational downgrading and the reduction in
residual hourly wages. Overall, a one pp increase in the initial unemployment rate
decreases annual wage income by USD 800-1,000 in the first years and by USD 600
after ten years. The estimated cumulative loss in wage income after ten years amounts
to about USD 8,200. A recession, which roughly corresponds to a three pp increase
in unemployment rates, would hence reduce the ten-year income of the average family
migrant by USD 25,000.
For comparison, Figure 2.5 shows the main results for the subgroup of Filipino
migrants. The results are similar. There are only small effects on employment, and
the effect on wage income is also slightly lower for Filipino migrants.
We also compare the effects to college graduates, who might serve as a natural
benchmark. To do so, we replicate the results for college graduates using the ACS data
and our econometric specification. We restrict the sample to US-born college graduates
and replace the year of immigration with the year of graduation. As Figure 2.5 shows,
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Figure 2.4: Decomposition of the effect of the unemployment rate at immigration
on annual wage income
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Notes: The figure shows the absolute loss in annual wage income as a result of a one pp increase
in unemployment rates. The light blue area depicts the loss due to occupational downgrading, the
dark blue area the loss due to a reduction in residual hourly wage (i.e., beyond the wage reduction
due to occupational downgrading), and the green area the loss due to a reduction in working hours.
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the results obtained using our specification are similar to the results in Kahn (2010),
Oreopoulos et al. (2012), and Altonji et al. (2016). While there are no differences in
the effect on employment between family migrants and college graduates, the effect
on wage income is substantially smaller for college graduates and disappears ten years
after graduation. College graduates are hence more able to cope with adverse initial
conditions than family migrants.
We extend our main results and test for effect heterogeneity by gender and level
of education. There are no systematic differences for male than female family migrants
(Figure B.6). Also the effect for different levels of education look similar (Figure B.7).
If anything, we see more convergence for high educated family migrants in terms of
hourly wages and wage income. Only for occupational downgrading high educated
family migrants seem to respond a bit stronger, which could reflect that the potential
for occupational downgrading is larger for high-skilled than low-skilled individuals. 8
Finally, we check the robustness of our main results to using alternative econo-
metric specifications. First, we account for the possibility that economic conditions
at the time of observation also affects labor market outcomes. To the extent that the
current and initial economic conditions are correlated, our results reflect the effect of
both initial and subsequent conditions. We address this issue by using state-year-of-
observation fixed effects. Our results are almost unchanged (Figure B.9 in the ap-
pendix). Second, we allow for a more comprehensive definition of initial conditions
and define the treatment as the average state-level unemployment rate in the first
three years after arrival. Doing so, we might better capture whether individuals im-
migrate into a recession or a boom. Our results are similar. The effects become even
stronger (Figure B.10 in the appendix). Third, we go beyond wage income and also
investigate the effects on self-employment, labor income (i.e., wage, business, and farm
income), and total earnings (i.e., labor income and all other forms of income including
transfers). Our results are robust to these more comprehensive definitions of income
(Figure B.11 in the appendix). There is only a small and statistically insignificant
effect on self-employment.
8 The level of education is potentially endogenous. Migrants may choose to invest in additional hu-
man capital in response to initial economic conditions. To minimize this possibility, we re-run the
heterogeneity analysis restricting the sample to migrants aged 30 and above. For those migrants,
the level of education should be more exogenous. Our results hold (see Figure B.8 in the appendix).
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of the effects of the unemployment rate at immigration for
family migrants, employment migrants and college graduates
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American
Community Survey. The figure depicts the analysis for four distinct samples: Family migrants (blue
dots), Filipinos (red diamonds), employment migrants (green triangles), and college graduates (grey
squares). Section 2.4 outlines the construction of these samples. The immigrant samples are re-
stricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US citizens and immigrated between
1990 and 2016. The graduation sample is restricted to US college graduates who graduated between
1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60 years old at the time of im-
migration/graduation and of observation. Observations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of per-
son weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis displays the years since migration/gradu-
ation. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level unemployment rate at immigra-
tion on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph shows the marginal effects using
the polynomial specification from Equation 2.2 for the different samples. All specifications include
dummies for years in the US/since graduation, year of immigration/graduation, year of observa-
tion, and state of residence. They also include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling.
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2.6.2 Coping Strategies
Ethnic Networks
A large literature has shown that ethnic (migrant) networks substantially help immig-
rants to find a job (e.g., Munshi, 2003 or Patel and Vella, 2013). The support provided
by ethnic networks might be particularly beneficial in a recession. The scarcity of jobs
will make it more difficult for recent immigrants to compete in the labor market since
they have low levels of destination-specific human capital as well as little destination-
specific experience that can signal their ability.
To test this prediction, we first investigate whether the employment and wage
effects of immigrating into a recession differ by the size of the ethnic network. We do
so by adding interactions between initial conditions and network size to our previous
specification. We define network size as the population share of co-ethnics living in
the same state. We calculate this variable for three points in time: for 1990 and 2000
based on census data and for 2010 based on the aggregate data from the ACS waves
conducted in 2009, 2010, and 2011. The initial network size of each migrant in our
sample is then given by the value of the network variable in the year that predates
the year of immigration. For instance, a migrant who arrived in 2003 is assigned the
network as measured in 2000. We conduct this analysis only for Filipinos, who by far
constitute the largest group of family migrants. The samples are too small for other
countries with predominantly family-based migration, especially for the analysis of
ethnic occupations as introduced below. The following results thus focus on Filipinos.
We use terciles to distinguish between small, medium, and large networks and estimate
the following equation:
yi,s,t,m = α+ β1 URs,m + β2 URs,m ×Netterc2 + β3 URs,m ×Netterc3
+ δ1 Netterc2 + δ3 Netterc3 + γ(t−m) + θs + λt + χm +Xi,t∆+ i,t
(2.3)
To capture the initial effects, we restrict the sample to migrants who have not
spent more than five years in the US. We also look at average effects over this time
period to increase the sample size. Table 2.3 shows the results. In states with small
networks (first tercile), a one pp higher initial unemployment rate lowers employment
by 2.1 pp in the first five years. The effect is about 75 percent smaller (-0.5 pp) in
areas with medium or large networks. Similarly, the effect on wage income is largest
in areas with small networks (-5.2%) and smaller in areas with medium or large net-
works. However, the interactions terms are not or only marginally significant. These
results suggest that ethnic networks can mitigate the negative labor market effects of
adverse economic conditions at arrival. They seem to be particularly helpful for finding
Results 81
employment.
We also investigate whether adverse initial conditions push migrants to enter
occupations with large co-ethnic networks. We follow Patel and Vella (2013) and
construct a measure of the concentration of co-ethnics in different occupations:
concentratione,o,t =
100 ∗mige,o,t
mige,t
where concentratione,o,s,t measures the percent of workers from ethnicity e in year
t that are employed in occupation o. High values of networke,o,t indicate that workers
from a given ethnicity concentrate in these occupations. We distinguish between 86
occupations and calculate the measure again for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010.
Column (3) of Table 2.3 shows that adverse initial conditions do not cause fam-
ily migrants to enter occupations with high concentrations of co-ethnics in areas with
small networks. In areas with medium or large networks, however, family migrants are
considerably more likely to enter such occupations. As a comparison, we conduct the
same analysis with migrants from India, the largest origin country classified as predom-
inantly employment-based (Table B.5). For these migrants we do not expect networks
to matter in the same way since they usually have a job already before arriving. Fur-
thermore, we would expect selection issues to be prevalent as their immigration might
be tied to economic conditions. Indeed, patterns are very different for employment
migrants.
We also run a placebo regression and check whether family migrants are more
likely to enter occupations in which many US-born workers, i.e, generally large oc-
cupation, or other migrant groups are employed. For this exercise, we calculate the
concentration measure for US-born workers and for the two most important countries
of origin, Mexico and China, and use them as outcomes. The last three columns in
Table 2.3 summarize the results. Higher initial unemployment rates do not make fam-
ily migrants more likely to work in occupations with higher concentrations of natives,
Mexicans, or Chinese. The point estimates are close to zero, and only one of the nine
coefficients is marginally significant.
Taken together, these results suggest that ethnic networks play a significant role
in mitigating the negative consequences of immigrating into a recession for family
migrants. Ethnic networks facilitate the job search of arriving family migrants and
thus increase their likelihood to work in occupations with strong ethnic networks.
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Table 2.3: Effect of a one pp increase in initial unemployment rates by network
strength
Effect of initial conditions Placebo
Employ-
ment
Wage
income
% Filipinos
in occ.
% natives
in occ.
% Mexicans
in occ.
% Chinese
in occ.
UR at immigration -0.021*** -0.052*** -0.044 -0.015 0.024 0.042
(0.006) (0.015) (0.044) (0.024) (0.044) (0.044)
× medium network 0.016*** 0.016 0.137*** 0.030* -0.000 0.025
(0.004) (0.010) (0.030) (0.017) (0.031) (0.027)
× large network 0.014** 0.029* 0.279*** 0.008 0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.016) (0.050) (0.025) (0.045) (0.045)
Observations 23967 17896 17896 17896 17896 17896
Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The analysis is restricted to Filipinos that resided in the US for at most five years.
See Section 2.4 for further details on the sample construction. Observations are weighted by year,
i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. All specifications include dum-
mies for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence. They also
include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The outcome variables in columns four to
six are the share of workers in the respective group that works in the occupation (in percent). The
variable is calculated at the national level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Family Support and Welfare Benefits
Family migrants are generally not entitled to welfare benefits for at least five years
after arrival. Sponsors have to sign an affidavit of financial support, which legally
obliges them to support sponsored family members for ten years or until they become
a US citizen. The ACS provides information on welfare receipt and the composition of
household members, which we can use as a proxy for receiving support from the family.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 confirms that adverse economic conditions at arrival have
no effect on receiving welfare assistance. The remaining panels of Figure 2.6 show
that family migrants rely on support from the family instead. A one pp increase in the
initial unemployment rate increases the likelihood of living with a sibling by 0.5 pp and
the likelihood of living with a family member with longer tenure in the US by 1 pp.
It also decreases the likelihood of being a household head by 0.5 pp. These effects
largely disappear over time. But they suggest that adverse economic conditions make
it more difficult for recently arrived family migrants to move out of their sponsors’
households because they depend on support from the family. This interpretation could
also explain why initial unemployment rates have only a small effect on employment,
but relatively large effects on wage income and occupational quality. Family migrants
might try to minimize the burden they place on their sponsors by accepting jobs below
their qualifications.
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The immobile support received from the family could also reduce the geographic
mobility of family migrants. In general, the literature has found that migrants are
more mobile than natives (Green, 1999, Braun and Kvasnicka, 2014, and Cadena and
Kovak, 2016). Figure B.12, however, shows that family migrants do not increase their
geographical mobility in response to local economic conditions at arrival. If anything,
they are less likely to move. The point estimates, however, are small and not statistic-
ally significant. Family migrants thus do not seem to contribute to ’greasing the wheels
of the labor market’ (Borjas, 2001). By contrast, their increased dependence on family
members likely increases their job search frictions.
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Figure 2.6: Effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on receiving welfare
assistance and support from the family
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US cit-
izens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60
years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we restrict to
the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. This leaves us with a
sample of 88,357 migrants. Observations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the
respective observation year. The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect
of a one pp higher state-level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the re-
spective year. The graph shows the result of two different specifications. The red hollow circles show
the effect using the flexible specification from Equation 2.1. The connected blue dots show the mar-
ginal effects using the polynomial specification from Equation 2.2. Both specifications include dummies
for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence. They also in-
clude age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval
for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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2.6.3 Alternative Strategies for Identifying Family Migrants
Our identifying strategy builds on the idea that, due to long waiting times for a visa,
family migrants cannot choose their date of immigration based on economic conditions.
As a result, the local economic conditions family migrants encounter upon arrival in the
US are exogenous. Currently available datasets, however, do not allow us to identify
family migrants precisely. We have therefore restricted the sample to immigrants from
countries for which family-based migration is the dominant mode of migration to the
US. Yet, the sample still includes many employment-based migrants and immediate
relatives who do not face long waiting times (see Table B.1 in the appendix). Their
migration decisions may well be endogenous to economic conditions.
In case of endogenous migration decisions, however, our estimates are likely to be
downward-biased. By definition, employment-based migrants arrive with a job. Their
economic integration should be less susceptible to labor market conditions at the time
of arrival. To test this prediction, we restrict the sample to immigrants from coun-
tries with predominantly employment-based migration and re-run the main analysis.
Figure 2.5 shows that initial unemployment rates have indeed only a small effect on
employment-based migrants. The effects are much smaller than for family migrants.
These results provide a useful benchmark for potential biases. They demonstrate that
the effects for family migrants are potentially larger than our main results suggest.
When it comes to immediate relatives, sponsors might be more likely to select
more productive family members in times of high unemployment. Otherwise, they
might find themselves obliged to offer financial support. A positive selection of im-
mediate relatives would again bias our estimates downwards. Unfortunately, our data
does not allow us to test this argument. In any case, as we have shown in Table 2.2,
initial unemployment rates are not correlated with observable migrant characteristics
such as age, education, and gender. The potential for donors to endogenously sponsor
family members might thus be limited.
We also offer two alternative strategies for identifying family migrants with wait-
ing times. In our first strategy, we use data from the Philippine government that
provide information on the visa type for permanent migrants from the Philippines to
the US since 1988. This administrative data capture the universe of migrants as every
permanent migrant from the Philippines needs to register with the Commission on
Filipinos (CFO) overseas for departure clearance. In addition to the exact admission
category, the data provides migrant-level information on demographic characteristics,
date of migration, and the destination state in the US. We use the information on ad-
mission category, age, gender, education, and destination state to reweigh our sample
of Filipino migrants in the ACS, so they resemble the characteristics of family migrants
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with waiting times. Compared to Filipino migrants in our sample, the age at immig-
ration of family migrants with waiting times in the CFO data is on average higher (39
vs. 35 years), and CFO family migrants are less likely to be female (53% vs. 65%) and
less likely to have a college degree (55% vs. 61%). Nevertheless, our results for the
subsample of Filipino migrants hold. As Figure 2.7 shows, the reweighed results are
similar to the previous results without such weights.
In our second strategy, we try to identify immigrant spouses with waiting times
based on the timing of immigration (similar to the method used by Borjas and Bronars,
1991). We focus on spouses, not other relatives, as they have the highest likelihood of
living in the same household as their sponsor. We can thus capture them in our data.
Spouses of LPRs waited between three to five years for their F2A visas over most of
the period under consideration (Figure 2.1). We identify spouses in the ACS data by
restricting the sample to individuals who live in the same household as their spouse
and sponsor and whose spouse immigrated at least as many years ago as the relevant
waiting period before them and at most ten years later than that.9
As before, the sample only includes individuals who were between 22 and 60 years
old at the time of immigration and the time of observation. This time, however, we
consider immigrants from all countries of origin except Mexico and Central American
countries, where irregular migration plays a large role. We thus have a more even
distribution of countries of origin. The most important countries of origin of LPR
spouses are India (16%), the Philippines (8%), China (8%), and Vietnam (5%).
Figure 2.8 shows our results for the sample of LPR spouses. They are in line with
our main results. Only the effect on the occupational income score is less pronounced for
LPR spouses. We also test our ability to correctly capture LPR spouses by regressing
the difference in the year of immigration between the two spouses on official waiting
times for different types of family visa. Reassuringly, the coefficient for the F2A waiting
time is 0.93. Coefficients for all other types of family visa are substantially lower (see
Table B.4 in the appendix). Overall, the above evidence suggests that our results are
robust to alternative approaches to identifying family migrants.
9 Information on the year of marriage and on citizenship is only available from 2008 onwards. We are
thus not able to exploit this additional information for our analysis.
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Figure 2.7: Labor market effects of the unemployment rate at immigration for im-
migrants from the Philippines with and without weights
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born in the Philippines as non-US
citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60
years old at the time of immigration and of observation. The graph shows the marginal effects using the
polynomial specification from Equation 2.2 using different weights. The blue dots depict coefficients us-
ing year weights, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The red diamonds
display coefficients using weights based on administrative Filipino emigrant data obtained from CFO.
In particular, information on admission category, age, gender, education, and destination state is used
to reweigh our sample of Filipino migrants in the ACS, so they resemble the characteristics of family
migrants with waiting times. The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the ef-
fect of a one pp higher state-level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the
respective year. Both specifications include dummies for years in the US, year of immigration, year of
observation, and state of residence. They also include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling.
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Figure 2.8: Labor market effects of the unemployment rate at immigration for
spouses of legal permanent residents (F2A)
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American
Community Survey. The figure depicts the analysis for two distinct samples: F2As (blue dots),
and Family migrants (red diamonds). Section 2.4 outlines the construction of these samples. The
samples are restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US citizens and immig-
rated between 1990 and 2016. The F2A sample is restricted to spouses of prior migrants. We fur-
ther restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observa-
tion. Observations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation
year. The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher
state-level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The
figure shows the results from estimating Equation 2.2 for the different samples. Both specifications
include dummies for years in the US/since graduation, year of immigration/graduation, year of ob-
servation, and state of residence. They also include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling.
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2.7 Conclusion
The economic integration of immigrants is key to reaping the benefits of international
migration for immigrants and citizens of destination countries alike. Yet, despite con-
siderable policy efforts, immigrant integration is often imperfect and varies substan-
tially across and within migrant cohorts. A large literature has examined the economic
assimilation of immigrants over time, paying particular attention to changes in immig-
rant characteristics and selective return migration.
In this paper, we take a different perspective and analyze how economic condi-
tions at the time of arrival shape the economic integration of immigrants in the US. We
introduce a new identification strategy that exploits the inability of family migrants
to synchronize their arrival with labor market conditions in the US. Long waiting
times resulting from caps on the yearly number of family-sponsored visa decouple the
migration decision from economic conditions at the time of actual migration. As a
consequence, some family migrants happen to immigrate into a recession, others into a
boom. This strategy also allows us to provide the first evidence on the economic integ-
ration of family migrants, who constitute the largest group of permanent immigrants
in the US and the OECD.
We find that a one pp higher unemployment rate at the time of arrival has little
effect on employment, but decreases annual wage income by about four percent in the
short run and by 2.5 percent in the longer run. This is the result of occupational
downgrading. A potential explanation for the persistence of the effects may be the
increase in search frictions as a result of receiving immobile support from the family.
We document that immigrants who arrive at times of high unemployment are more
likely to reside with family members, most likely the sponsor of their visa. They are
hence less likely to engage in subsequent internal migration to better labor markets.
Our results show that the cap on the number of family-sponsored visas has im-
portant consequences for immigrant integration. They suggest that a more flexible cap
that fluctuates pro-cyclically with economic conditions might considerably improve the
economic integration of family migrants. Alternatively, allowing family-sponsored visa
holders to delay their immigration by more than six months might also improve their
ability to integrate into the US economy.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Admission categories of migrants by country type
Family
countries Philippines
Employment
countries
Other
countries
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Panel A: Year 2005
Family 67.0 52.0 4.19 23.0
Immediate relatives 43.5 33.5 3.81 18.0
Family capped 23.6 18.5 0.38 4.99
Employment 11.1 41.2 66.9 23.9
Refugee and diversity 6.17 0.11 0.35 13.9
Other 15.7 6.69 28.6 39.2
Panel B: Year 2010
Family 71.5 60.8 3.53 24.4
Immediate relatives 46.6 39.8 3.20 19.4
Family capped 24.9 21.0 0.33 5.02
Employment 9.60 31.4 60.7 19.4
Refugee and diversity 4.93 0.081 0.38 13.2
Other 13.9 7.75 35.3 43.0
Panel C: Year 2015
Family 68.1 53.7 2.79 23.3
Immediate relatives 44.0 35.2 2.56 18.0
Family capped 24.2 18.5 0.23 5.25
Employment 8.60 32.9 65.1 21.4
Refugee and diversity 3.34 0.033 0.39 12.7
Other 19.9 13.3 31.7 42.6
Notes: Data is obtained from the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (US Department
of Homeland Security). The yearbooks provide information on the number of immig-
rants and aliens who are admitted to the US by admission category, country of origin,
and year. We only consider categories that are likely to be sampled by the census and
the ACS. They include all different types of LPRs (family-based, employment-based,
refugees and diversity migrants and others (including students and exchange visitors
on temporary visas, and temporary workers). They exclude tourists, business travelers,
and diplomats. For each country of origin, we then calculate the share of three different
types of migrants distinguishing between family-based migrants, employment-based mi-
grants, and all other migrants. We define the dominant mode to account for more than
50 percent of yearly admissions in each of the years 2005, 2010, and 2015. Doing so al-
lows us to identify countries for which the dominant mode of migration is stable over
time. We define countries as mixed when no mode of migration accounts for more than
50 percent in all three years. Countries with predominantly family-based migration
include the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Yemen, Guyana, and some small
island states. Countries with predominantly employment-based migration mostly con-
sist of OECD countries. They also include Argentina, South Africa, and India. Other
modes of migration only dominate in a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa. All other
countries have mixed modes of migration to the US.
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Table B.2: Summary statistics
Family
migrants Filipinos
Employm.
migrants Natives Graduates
Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD Mean/SD
Personal characteristics
Female (0/1) 0.63 0.65 0.48 0.51 0.55
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age at immigration 35.1 35.0 31.4 . .
(9.12) (8.95) (7.97) . .
Age 40.7 40.5 36.2 40.9 27.4
(9.25) (9.01) (8.26) (11.2) (2.84)
At least 4 years of college (0/1) 0.39 0.60 0.72 0.30 1
(0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.46) (0)
Years of schooling 12.9 14.7 15.8 13.6 16
(4.16) (2.74) (2.88) (2.59) (0)
Economic conditions
Unemployment rate at arival 6.14 6.15 5.88 . 5.90
(1.94) (1.97) (1.93) . (1.93)
Labor market outcomes
Employed (0/1) 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.75 0.87
(0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.34)
Real wage income in 1000 USD 25.2 28.9 53.1 34.9 31.1
(24.2) (25.6) (51.7) (36.6) (25.2)
Real wage per hour 14.9 16.8 26.6 18.1 16.5
(15.3) (16.3) (24.0) (17.8) (13.5)
Occupational income score 12.1 13.6 19.2 13.9 15.7
(6.46) (6.86) (8.20) (6.13) (5.80)
Self employed (0/1) 0.053 0.037 0.063 0.082 0.041
(0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.20)
Real wage, business and farm income 25.1 28.8 52.7 35.2 31.2
(24.5) (25.8) (52.3) (38.3) (25.9)
Public welfare assistance (0/1) 0.017 0.0066 0.0029 0.017 0.0048
(0.13) (0.081) (0.054) (0.13) (0.069)
Social outcomes
Own siblings in hh (0/1) 0.067 0.059 0.0062 0.046 0.086
(0.25) (0.24) (0.078) (0.21) (0.28)
Person is hh head (0/1) 0.32 0.33 0.48 0.53 0.47
(0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Previous migrant in HH (0/1) 0.48 0.46 0.20 . .
(0.50) (0.50) (0.40) . .
Moved within last year (0/1) 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.31
(0.37) (0.38) (0.43) (0.37) (0.46)
Moved b/w states last year (0/1) 0.024 0.027 0.063 0.027 0.071
(0.15) (0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.26)
Moved within state (0/1) 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.24
(0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.34) (0.43)
Observations 88,357 49,214 196,989 25,442,079 1,401,738
Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Community
Survey. The table depicts five distinct samples: Family migrants, Filipinos, employment migrants, natives, and
college graduates. Section 2.4 outlines the construction of these samples. The immigrant samples are restricted
to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. The
graduation sample is restricted to US college graduates who graduated between 1990 and 2016. We further re-
strict the sample to individuals 22 to 60 years old at the time of immigration/graduation and of observation.
Observations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year.
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Table B.3: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes for family migrants
Employment Wage income Hourly wage Occscore
Panel A: Effects by years in the US (x 100)
Year 1 -0.891*** -4.674*** -1.866*** -1.481***
(0.342) (0.747) (0.544) (0.369)
Year 2 -0.772** -5.168*** -2.381*** -1.709***
(0.317) (0.712) (0.514) (0.349)
Year 3 -0.390 -4.330*** -2.457*** -1.588***
(0.284) (0.722) (0.466) (0.337)
Year 4 -0.125 -3.641*** -2.508*** -1.532***
(0.280) (0.704) (0.440) (0.345)
Year 5 -0.082 -3.570*** -2.606*** -1.614***
(0.279) (0.661) (0.458) (0.339)
Year 6 -0.192 -3.926*** -2.634*** -1.708***
(0.294) (0.704) (0.511) (0.343)
Year 7 -0.304 -4.212*** -2.437*** -1.641***
(0.300) (0.685) (0.482) (0.338)
Year 8 -0.282 -3.979*** -1.980*** -1.334***
(0.315) (0.652) (0.493) (0.366)
Year 9 -0.098 -3.179*** -1.500** -0.947**
(0.353) (0.817) (0.642) (0.425)
Year 10 0.068 -2.517*** -1.659** -1.033**
(0.491) (0.892) (0.710) (0.470)
Panel B: Polynomial coefficients (x 1000)
1st order -17.552** -81.249*** -30.013** -25.602***
(7.267) (16.624) (11.739) (7.938)
2nd order 10.861** 42.870*** 14.239 13.631**
(5.270) (12.928) (8.838) (5.888)
3rd order -2.441* -9.192** -3.212 -3.154**
(1.403) (3.581) (2.458) (1.587)
4th order 0.233 0.864** 0.335 0.325*
(0.157) (0.408) (0.285) (0.179)
5th order -0.008 -0.029* -0.013 -0.012*
(0.006) (0.016) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 88357 65565 65565 65509
Sample MIG MIG MIG MIG
Specification Poly Poly Poly Poly
State x Year FE No No No No
Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001
to 2017 American Community Survey. The sample is restricted to individu-
als who were born outside the US as non-US citizens and immigrated between
1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60 years old
at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we
restrict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in
Section 2.4. The sample size is 88,357 overall out of which 65,565 are employed.
Observations are weighted the mean of person weights in the respective obser-
vation year. The table shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level unemploy-
ment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. Panel
A shows the effect using the flexible specification from Equation (2.1). Panel
B shows the marginal effects using the polynomial specification from Equation
(2.2). Both specifications include dummies for years in the US, year of im-
migration, year of observation and state of residence. They also include age,
age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% con-
fidence interval for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-year-of-immigration-level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Appendix B 93
Table B.4: Correlation between official waiting time and difference in immigration
year between spouses (F2As)
Official waiting time
F1 F2A F2B F3 F4
Observed year difference 0.05 0.93 0.37 0.02 0.06
Notes: Based on repeated cross-section from the 2000 U.S.
Census and 2000 to 2017 ACS. Sample restricted to spouses
of immigrants between 22 and 60 years old at the time of ob-
servation.The coefficients are from a regression of the official
waiting times for different categories on the observed difference
in immigration years of migrant and subsequently immigrating
spouse. The categories are F1 for unmarried sons and daughters
of US citizens, F2A for spouses and children of legal permanent
residents, F2B for unmarried adult children of legal perman-
ent residents, F3 for married sons and daughters of US citizens
and F4 for brothers and sisters of US citizens. The correlation
between F2A and F2B is 0.57, therefore there is also a positive
relationship with this category.
Figure B.1: Waiting times for family migrants from countries where per-country
ceiling is binding by admission category
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Notes: The graph shows waiting times for unmarried sons and daughters of US citizens (F1),
spouses and children of legal permanent residents (F2A), unmarried adult children of legal per-
manent residents (F2B), married sons and daughters of US citizens (F3) and brothers and
sisters of US citizens (F4). Data source: U.S. Department of State, own calculations.
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Figure B.2: State-level unemployment rate for most important migrant-receiving
US states
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Notes: State level unemployment rate is obtained from the Local Area Unemployment Stat-
istics of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The residual unemployment rate is estimated
using state and year of immigration fixed effects. The graph displays the unemployment rate
for the five most important immigration states for family migrants in our sample: California
(CA), New York (NY), Texas (TX), Florida (FL) and New Jersey (NJ).
Table B.5: Effect of a one pp increase in initial unemployment rates by network
strength for migrants from India
Effect of initial conditions Placebo
Employ-
ment
Wage
income
% Indians
in occ.
% natives
in occ.
% Mexicans
in occ.
% Chinese
in occ.
UR at immigration -0.005 0.004 0.192*** 0.015 -0.013 0.068***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.045) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026)
× medium network 0.003 -0.007 -0.088*** -0.016 -0.005 -0.045**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.032) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021)
× large network 0.008*** -0.016* -0.079** -0.009 -0.006 -0.063***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.037) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021)
Observations 49983 34261 34261 34261 34261 34261
Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American
Community Survey. The analysis is restricted to migrants from India that resided in the US for at
most five years. See Section 2.4 for further details on the sample construction. Observations are
weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. All specifica-
tions include dummies for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of res-
idence. They also include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The outcome variables
in columns four to six are the share of workers in the respective group that works in the occupation
(in percent). The variable is calculated at the national level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Figure B.3: Share of individuals that moved between US states within the last year
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Notes: The graph shows the share of individual that have moved between states in the last
year.The analysis is based on a repeated cross-section based on the 2000 Census and the 2001
to 2016 ACS and restricted to individuals between 22 and 60 years old at the time of obser-
vation.It is further restricted to individuals born outside the U.S. or Philippines respectively
who are between 2000 and years old at the time of migration and observed between 1 and
12 years after immigration.
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Figure B.4: Cohort size by years since immigration (individual years)
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(b) Employments migrants
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2001 to 2017 American Community Survey. The fig-
ure depicts the analysis for two distinct samples: Family migrants (Panel a) and employment migrants
(Panel b). Section 2.4 outlines the construction of these samples. The samples are restricted to indi-
viduals who were born outside the US as non-US citizens and immigrated between 2000 and 2016. We
further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 50 years old at the time of immigration and of observa-
tion because these immigrants remain in our sample for the full obseravtion period. Observations are
weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis dis-
plays the observation year. The y-axis the number of migrants in the sample relative to the basis year.
Figure B.5: Cohort size by years since immigration (aggregated)
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Notes: The figure plots the coefficients from a regression of the log number of observed im-
migrants on a full set of year-of-immigration and years-in-the-US dummies. The coefficients
of the years-in-the-US dummies indicate the number of migrants observed in year t relative
to the first year and thus capture potential return migration.
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Figure B.6: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes for family migrants by sex
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 Amer-
ican Community Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as
non-US citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to indi-
viduals 22 to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family mi-
grants, we restrict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section
2.4. Observations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective obser-
vation year. The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one
pp higher state-level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective
year. The graph shows the marginal effects using the polynomial specification from Equation (2.2)
for males (blue dots) and females (red squares). Both specifications include dummies for years in
the US, year of immigration, year of observation and state of residence. They also include age,
age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval for
the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.7: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes for family migrants by education
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US cit-
izens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22 to 60
years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we restrict to the
countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. Observations are weighted
by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis displays the
years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level unemployment rate
at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph shows the marginal effects
using the polynomial specification from Equation (2.2) for individuals with less than four years of col-
lege (blue dots) and four years of college or more (red squares). Both specifications include dummies
for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation and state of residence. They also include
age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval
for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.8: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes for family migrants by education (cond. on age at immigration lar-
ger than 30)
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(d) Occupational income score (log)
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US cit-
izens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 30 to 60
years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we restrict to the
countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. Observations are weighted
by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis displays the
years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level unemployment rate
at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph shows the marginal effects
using the polynomial specification from Equation (2.2) for individuals with less than four years of col-
lege (blue dots) and four years of college or more (red squares). Both specifications include dummies
for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation and state of residence. They also include
age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval
for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.9: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on labor
market outcomes controlling for contemporaneous conditions
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US
citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22
to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we re-
strict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. Observations
are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis
displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level unem-
ployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph shows the
marginal effects using the polynomial specification from Equation (2.2) for the baseline specification
(blue dots) and including state-year fixed effects (red diamonds). Both specifications include dummies
for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation and state of residence. They also include
age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval
for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.10: Persistent effects of the average unemployment rate in the first three
years since immigration on labor market outcomes
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-US
citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individuals 22
to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants, we re-
strict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. This leaves
us with a sample of 88,357 migrants overall and out of which 65,565 are employed. Observations are
weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. The x-axis dis-
plays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-level average
unemployment rate in the first three years since immigration on the outcome variable in the respect-
ive year. The graph shows the result of two different specifications. The red hollow circles show the
effect using the flexible specification from Equation 2.1. The connected blue dots show the marginal
effects using the polynomial specification from Equation 2.2. Both specifications include dummies for
years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence. They also include
age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval
for the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.11: Persistent effects of the unemployment rate at immigration on self
employment, business and farm income, and total earnings
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Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American
Community Survey. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born outside the US as non-
US citizens and immigrated between 1990 and 2016. We further restrict the sample to individu-
als 22 to 60 years old at the time of immigration and of observation. To identify family migrants,
we restrict to the countries of origin with mostly family migration as outlined in Section 2.4. This
leaves us with a sample of 88,357 migrants overall and out of which 65,565 are employed. Obser-
vations are weighted by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year.
The x-axis displays the years since migration. The y-axis shows the effect of a one pp higher state-
level unemployment rate at immigration on the outcome variable in the respective year. The graph
shows the result of two different specifications. The red hollow circles show the effect using the
flexible specification from Equation 2.1. The connected blue dots show the marginal effects using
the polynomial specification from Equation 2.2. Both specifications include dummies for years in
the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence. They also include age,
age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. The thin lines show the 95% confidence interval for
the polynomial specification. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year-of-immigration-level.
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Figure B.12: Effect of the unemployment rate at immigration on geographic mobil-
ity in the first five years after immigration
At all
B/w states
Within states
-.01 -.005 0 .005
Effect on probability of moving
Family migrants Employment migrants College graduates
Notes: The analysis is based on data from the 2000 US Census and the 2001 to 2017 American Com-
munity Survey. The displays the results for family migrants, employment migrants and college gradu-
ates. See Section 2.4 for further details on the sample construction. The outcome variables are whether
individuals moved at all, moved between states and moved within states. Observations are weighted
by year, i.e., the mean of person weights in the respective observation year. All specifications in-
clude dummies for years in the US, year of immigration, year of observation, and state of residence.
They also include age, age-squared, gender, and years of schooling. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Chapter 3
The Political Economy of
Immigrant Legalization:
Evidence from the 1986 IRCA∗
Abstract
What happens to the distribution of public resources when undocumented
migrants obtain legal status through nation-wide amnesty? In this pa-
per, we exploit variation in legal status from the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) to answer this question and find that state gov-
ernors, of whatever party affiliation, allocate more per capita aid to those
counties affected by the IRCA. We posit that this is borne out of rational,
forward-looking governors who allocate resources strategically in pursuit of
the votes of the newly legalized who were eligible to vote five years after
legalization. To support this view, we find that the distribution of state
aid differs significantly according to political context. Counties affected
by the IRCA receive more resources from the state when their governor is
eligible for re-election, faces political competition or enjoys line-item veto
power. Our results also indicate that the transfers were targeted to the
newly legalized, who by and large were of Hispanic origin, and not other
constituents. We find no evidence of anti-migrant sentiment confounding
our results. Counties that received more transfers from the governor also
experienced improvements in Hispanic high school completion rates.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Navid Sabet.
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3.1 Introduction
Undocumented migration has today become a hotly contested issue. This contest is,
perhaps, fiercer nowhere than in the United States where, as of 2016, an estimated 11.3
million migrants reside in the country illegally, up from 5.8 million in 1996.1 Given the
polarized nature of the issue, we ask in this chapter what happens to the distribution of
state and local finances when undocumented migrants are offered legal status through a
nation-wide amnesty. We answer the question by focusing on the actions of incumbent
state governors: how do they respond, in terms of public resource allocation, to the
incentives created by documenting undocumented migrants? Do they allocate more
public resources to the areas affected by amnesty and to what extent is such allocation
intended to capture the votes of the newly documented migrants as opposed to other,
perhaps competing, constituents?
The history of the United States offers a unique opportunity to study these
issues. In 1986, the Reagan Administration passed into law the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) which legalized nearly 3 million undocumented migrants in
the span of some three years and offered them a path to citizenship five years after
legalization. In this study, we combine variation in legal status from the IRCA with
administrative data from the Census of Governments in order to throw light on the
ways in which documenting undocumented migrants affects the distribution of state
and local finances. Our analysis is motivated by a model of distributive politics in
which incumbent politicians react to changes in the electorate by adjusting their budget
allocations to target the preferences of the newly enfranchised group so as to optimize
(a) the welfare of the population and (b) their own re-election chances. Accordingly,
we posit that governors, who play an important role in formulating the state budget,
will allocate resources strategically to those counties most affected by the IRCA in an
effort to win the political support of the newly documented migrants who were eligible
to vote five years after legalization.
Using a difference-in-differences regression framework, we compare the distribu-
tion of public finances—specifically, per capita inter-governmental transfers from state
to local governments—in counties that experienced more per capita legalizations with
those that received less both before and after 1986. Our baseline estimate suggests that
counties with a greater share of IRCA-documented migrants received more per capita
transfers from their state governments than those with a fewer share of such migrants.
The result is not driven by differences in county social, economic or demographic char-
acteristics and is robust to alternative specifications and samples.
1 Pew Research Centre, taken from http://pewrsr.ch/2oWlM93. Accessed 9 February 2018.
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To overcome potential geographical endogeneity associated with where undocu-
mented migrants settle, we follow two approaches: first, we employ propensity score
matching to identify a more comparable control group and second, we use the share
of a county’s 1960 population that is foreign-born as an instrument for the number
of documented migrants per county post-1986. These tests confirm that the baseline
result is not confounded by geographical factors.
Arguably, our result may be driven by mechanical or bureaucratic forces that ob-
lige the state governor to better service the areas where the newly documented migrants
reside rather than, as we posit, discretionary forces borne out of political calculation.
To refute this competing explanation we analyze, in the second part, the sensitivity of
inter-governmental transfers to political constraints. The rationale is straightforward.
If the transfers of the state government are reflective of forces outside the control of
the governor, then the result ought to be insensitive to political constraints faced by
the governor. If, on the other hand, the transfers are politically motivated, the result
ought to exhibit heterogeneity with respect to the various political constraints facing
the incumbent. Consistent with this line of thinking, we find that counties affected
by the IRCA receive more resources from the state when their governor is eligible for
re-election, faces political competition, enjoys line-item veto power over the budget or
is politically aligned with the state legislature. We also uncover heterogeneity along
party lines: although both Republican and Democratic governors allocate significantly
more resources to IRCA-affected counties, the effect increases by about half when the
governor is a Democrat. It is, perhaps, unsurprising, therefore, that we also find that
a governor’s likelihood for re-election increases in the share of newly documented mi-
grants in a state.
Finally, the IRCA provided a path to citizenship five years after legalization.
How plausible is it, then, that governors target their transfers to actually meet the
needs, and win over the future political support, of the newly legalized as opposed to
other, perhaps competing, constituents in a county? To address this issue, we first un-
dertake a number of empirical checks to alleviate concerns that anti-migrant sentiment
may drive our results. In this respect, we exploit data on a prominent anti-migrant
ballot measure in California and find no relationship between state transfers and the
interaction between a county’s share of legalized migrants and its support for the ballot
measure. More generally, we utilize survey data from the entire United States and find
that, if anything, areas more affected by the IRCA actually experience improvements
in attitudes towards both documented and undocumented migrants, further suggest-
ing that anti-migrant sentiment is not confounding our results. Next, we turn our
attention to local expenditure and find that expenditure in education increases in the
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share of newly documented migrants in a county. Hispanic individuals, as opposed to
Caucasian ones, residing in these counties and who entered middle school after 1986
experience improvements in the likelihood of completing high school, suggesting that
the additional resources a county receives on account of the IRCA were in fact targeted
to the newly legalized as opposed to other voting blocs.
Together, these results point to a strong, nuanced political economy facet of
immigrant legalization. Although models of distributive politics generally predict that
the expansion of franchise leads to greater resources being allocated to those who have
a new-found political voice, it is more of an open question to what extent politicians
allocate resources to capture this new “swing” vote as opposed to further solidify a
core constituency. Our results indicate that, at least in the context of undocumented
migration, politicians allocate resources primarily in an effort to capture the political
support of the new swing vote rather than that of other groups.
In this chapter, we offer two contributions. First, we contribute to the literature
that sheds light on the distributional effects of the expansion of voter franchise. Cascio
and Washington (2014), for example, study enfranchisement of African Americans in
the United States through the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They find that counties
that removed literacy tests at voter registration in response to the law experienced
greater voter turnout among black voters which, in turn, increased the share of pub-
lic spending directed towards them. In a similar vein, Miller (2008) shows that the
enfranchisement of women in the United States was followed by immediate changes
in legislative behavior and substantial increases in public health spending at the local
level. Examining the impact of electronic voting technology in Brasil, Fujiwara (2015)
finds that the enfranchisement of lesser educated citizens affected government spend-
ing and increased health care spending, both of which are particularly beneficial for
lower-income people. Naidu (2012), looking at a case of disenfranchisement, analyses
the effects of the introduction of poll taxes and literacy tests in the 19th century United
States and finds that such measures lowered overall voter turnout with the subsequent
effect of worse educational outcomes for black pupils and losses in annual income in the
order of 15 percent for black laborers. We extend this literature to consider the case
of undocumented Hispanic migrants in the United States, one of the largest disenfran-
chised groups in the country. Moreover, because of our rich data on state governors, we
are able to examine some of the political mechanisms that lead governors to allocate
resources in light of a sudden shock to the electorate.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the economics of legal status. In this
respect, the IRCA has been used as a credible policy shock to identify the impact of legal
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status on various social and economic outcomes at the level of the individual migrant.2
For example, Cortes (2013) shows that legal status helps migrants to obtain better
educational outcomes whilst Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) and Pan (2012) use the
IRCA to show that documenting undocumented migrants leads to an improvement in
their wages, employment prospects and ability to speak English. We contribute to this
literature by examining the influence of legal status directly on the distribution of public
resources at the state and local level, bringing to light a dimension of undocumented
migration that is highly debated yet relatively understudied.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 contextualizes the study
by discussing the historical background of the IRCA as well as the demographic charac-
teristics of its applicants. In Section 3.3 we present a simple framework that guides our
empirical analysis and the interpretation of our findings. Section 3.4 describes our data
and explains institutional features associated with the budget-making process at the
state level. Section 3.5 outlines our econometric methodology and, along with sections
3.6 and 3.7, presents our results. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Immigration Reform and Control Act
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was, to date, the most
extensive piece of legislation put forward by the United States government to address
the question of undocumented immigration. The passage of the IRCA was by no means
straightforward. It began in the 1970s when the legislative and executive branches of
government considered various elements of comprehensive immigration reform. These
efforts gained momentum when, in 1977, Congress appointed the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy which presented, in 1981, a proposal for immigration
reform which was ultimately rejected. In the years that followed, several other proposals
were put forward and variants of the IRCA were passed through either the Senate or
the House but none was able to win complete approval until the 99th Congress settled
on and approved the IRCA on 17 October 1986 and which was signed into law on 6
2 Although some studies consider the impact of legal status on more aggregate outcomes. Baker
(2015), for example, finds that counties with greater shares of IRCA applicants experienced a decline
in crime rates.
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November 1986.3
The purpose of the IRCA was to restrict the flow of undocumented migrants into
the United States. It rested on three main pillars: an employer sanctions provision
that made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire unauthorized workers; increased
funding for border security to discourage new people from migrating illegally; and
an amnesty program intended to legalize various unauthorized workers (Chishti and
Kamasaki, 2014).
While each of the components of the law was not without problems (in particular
the employer sanction scheme which led to a great amount of fraud as well as work-
place discrimination), the legalization program is generally regarded as the law’s most
successful provision. It provided two programs for two distinct groups of unauthorized
workers. First, the Legally Authorized Workers (LAWs, also knows as “pre-82s”) under
section 245A of the law enabled undocumented immigrants who resided in the country
for an uninterrupted period from before 1 January 1982 to legalize (DHHS, 1991; Cas-
cio and Lewis, 2017). Second, the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) under Section
210 of the law allowed applications from unauthorized migrants who could show that
they carried out 90 days of work on select USDA defined seasonal crops in the year
leading to 1 May 1986 (DHHS, 1991; Cascio and Lewis, 2017). LAW applicants were
eligible to apply within a 12-month time frame extending from May 1987 to May 1988
whereas SAW applicants had an 18-month application period from 1 June 1987 to 30
November 1988 (DHHS, 1991). On acceptance of their application, applicants were
given temporary legal status under the title of Temporary Resident Aliens which could
last for as long as 18 months. After this period, and upon successful completion of an
English test and a civics test, applicants were given permanent resident status.
At the time of the Act, there were some 3 million undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States, corresponding to nearly 1 percent of the population
(Wasem, 2012). The law stipulated that both application periods (the 12 months for the
LAW program and 18 months for the SAW program) were strictly enforced, which from
an econometric point of view implies a relatively clean identification period. Indeed,
by the end of the application period, roughly 3 million people applied for temporary
resident status, of which 1.7 million comprised LAWs and 1.3 million comprised SAWs
(DHHS, 1991). By 1990, 94.6 percent and 58.7 percent, respectively, of LAW and SAW
3 The timing of the IRCA’s passage in 1986 was indeed sudden and unexpected. Just days before
its passage in Congress, “congressional leaders pronounced it dead, this time after more than fif-
teen months of hearings, legislative negotiations and debate” (Fuchs, 1990). Speaking to this idea,
Representative Daniel E. Lungren (R-California) remarked on the day of the bill’s passage that the
IRCA was “a corpse going to the morgue, and on the way to the morgue a toe began to twitch and
we started CPR again” (Fuchs, 1990). See Table C.1 for details on how Congress voted to pass the
bill.
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Figure 3.1: Stock of IRCA applicants at the county level per 1,000 capita
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applications had received approval and for all intents and purposes, the legalization
program of the IRCA ceased to generate newly legalized citizens after 1990 (DHHS,
1991). Figure 3.1 shows the time trend of the stock of IRCA legalized migrants while
Figure 3.2 shows the geographic distribution of IRCA applicants at the county level
in 1992 for those counties for which data is available.4 As shown, the majority of
legalizations took place between 1986 and 1990 and in the states of California (970,895),
Texas (351,646), Illinois (125,399), Arizona (70,488) and New Jersey (29,012). As
shown in Figure 3.3, undocumented migrants applied for legal status in approximately
330 counties whereas the remaining counties received no such applications.
3.2.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Legalized
Figure 3.4 presents data from the December 1991 report to Congress from the De-
partment of Health and Human Services which documented the characteristics of the
4 Of the 3,142 counties in the United States, our dataset includes IRCA information on 2,760 of them
(and from all states except Alaska and Delaware). However, we do not observe every county in every
year because some of the counties drop out in the later stages of the sample. As such, the actual
number of treated counties varies slightly in the sample from 276 counties in 1999 to 332 in 1991/92.
Restricting the analysis to only those counties that we observe throughout the entirety of the sample
makes no difference to the results.
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Figure 3.2: Number of legalized migrants per 1,000 county inhabitants in 1992
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legalized population. This data indicates that the newly legalized are predominantly of
working age, healthy and with relatively few children. More than half and two-thirds,
respectively, are single and male and the vast majority of applicants were engaged in
full-time work. Fully 22 percent of all applicants reported a household income of over
$600 per week; well over the poverty line, which, in 1989 stood at $6,311 for a single
person ($121 per week) and $12,675 for a family of four ($244 per week) (Mosbacher
and Bryant, 1991).5 In fact, median take-home pay for IRCA applicants stood at $400
per week. Median household income in the population in 1989 stood at $23,745, or $456
per week. The report also makes clear that no more than 5 percent of the migrants
reported not being able to work in the month prior to the survey. As such, IRCA
applicants were, by and large, an economically active and self-reliant group earning
somewhere between the poverty threshold and median income.
5 The National Longitudinal Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests the poverty
thresholds in 1989 were even lower: $5,980 for a single person and $12,100 for a family of four.
Taken from http://bit.ly/2tGnz8V. Accessed in August 2017.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of legalized migrants
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Notes: This graph plots the distribution of the legalized migrants in 1992. The left panel indicates
the number of treated (332) and control (2,047) counties whereas the panel on the right plots the
distribution of treatment within treated counties. On a linear scale, the average treated county
experienced 4.4 applications per 1,000 county inhabitants. The average population size of treated
counties is just over 409,490, implying that on average 1,800 migrants received legal status in treated
counties.
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Figure 3.4: Socio-economic characteristics of the IRCA applicants
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Notes: These are the characteristics of the IRCA migrants as reported by Congress in 1991.
Source: DHHS (1991)
3.3 Incumbent Politicians: A Framework
In this section, we present a simple framework to guide our empirical analysis. In
this framework, an incumbent politician controls the distribution of transfers flowing
from the state budget to the various counties in the state. The politician is concerned
both with the welfare of the population and her own re-election. A sudden change
of legal status in a large and homogeneous group of residents in a county will thus
change the politician’s decision on how to distribute state resources so as to optimize
her re-election chances and the welfare of the population. In our setting, therefore,
we expect that the legalization of a large group of mostly Hispanic people of lower
socio-economic status will prompt politicians to offer policy over public resources so as
to target the preferred outcome of the newly legalized group in the hope of winning
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their future political support.6
3.3.1 Politician Pay-off
We begin by modeling the objective function of an incumbent politician, P . In doing
so, we adapt a model presented by Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) to consider a case
of a state governor. For every county in the state, P transfers an amount of government
assistance, g > 0, to the population at cost C(g). As mentioned above, P is concerned
with the utility of the residents, U , in every county as well as the utility derived from
her expected vote share in elections, Ω.
Each county is composed of two types of inhabitants: already legal citizens, C,
and newly legalized migrants, L. The population in each county is normalized to one
such that the share of the population that is newly legalized is α and the share of
already legal citizens is 1−α. Only citizens can vote and voting decisions are based on
local economic conditions, such as government expenditure on various public services.
Voters base their voting decisions not just on local conditions immediately prior to the
election but throughout P ’s term.
For every county in the state, P has a pay-off, Π, that is composed of three parts,
shown in Equation (3.1):
Π =(1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+E · Ω[φ((1− α)UC(g) + αUL(g))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
−C(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
(3.1)
The politician is concerned with the well being of the population in each county.
This is reflected in the first term of P ’s pay-off, (1 − α)UC(g) + αUL(g). We assume
utility functions are concave such that U ′i(g) > 0 and U ′′i (g) < 0 ∀ i ∈ {C,L}. The
only way in which P can improve the utility of the population is through her allocation
of g. Because the characteristics of the documented migrants presented earlier, we take
it as given that U ′L(g) > U ′C(g) ∀ g.
We assume there are gains to staying in office. Accordingly, the second term,
6 In theory, there are two channels through which a policy shock such as the IRCA can affect the
distribution of public resources (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). On the one hand, it might prompt a
distribution of resources that is broad and general, for example, social benefits to all the members
of some broadly defined group, such as the unemployed or the elderly. On the other, such programs
may be targeted and specific, aiming to benefit a more narrowly defined subgroup of the population.
Broad redistributive programs are those that appeal to the majority of the electorate and reflect their
policy preferences. More targeted programs, by contrast, impose little cost on the majority of the
electorate but offer great incentives for its beneficiaries. Although state tax revenue does increase
with the share of documented migrants in a state, the tax rate does not increase as a function of
IRCA applicants and we show results later in the paper that suggest the transfers IRCA-affected
counties receive from the state are, in fact, used for targeted local expenditures.
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E ·Ω[φ((1−α)UC(g)+αUL(g))], captures the pay-off P obtains from re-election. E is
a binary variable that is one when P is eligible for re-election and zero when P is a lame
duck. In every election for which P is eligible to run, φ captures her expected vote share
in that election which is a function of the well being of the population. We assume that
φ is a linear function bounded between zero and one. The utility P derives from this
expected vote share is captured by Ω. It is assumed that Ω(φ), a strictly increasing,
non-linear function with a negative third order derivative. Figure C.1 provides an
illustration of what such a function might look like. As shown, the marginal utility
derived from the expected vote share is the greatest at the inflection point of Ω(φ = φT )
which represents the winning threshold.
Finally, the last term of Equation 3.1 indicates the costs, C(g), to the incumbent
associated with allocating g to a given county. These capture the opportunity costs
associated with distributing g among the different counties in a given state so as to
remain within the budget constraint. Costs are sufficiently convex such that ∂2ΠP
∂g2 < 0.
A rational incumbent politician thus maximizes her expected pay-off over the
allocation of state grants. That allocation is strongly affected by the share of newly
legalized migrants, α, in a county. From this follows Predictions 1 to 3 which help
guide our empirical analysis.
Prediction 1: The optimal allocation of state aid increases in the share of newly
documented migrants in a county.
Prediction 2: The optimal allocation of state aid is larger when P is eligible
for re-election and less when (s)he is a lame duck.
Prediction 3: The optimal allocation of state aid becomes larger the closer the
P ’s expected vote share is to the winning threshold.
Proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.4 Data and Institutional Context
3.4.1 Data
The key explanatory variable in our study is a measure of the number of IRCA applic-
ants per 1,000 county inhabitants in the United States for the period between 1980 and
2000. In the treated counties (i.e. those counties that received at least 1 application for
legal status), this value ranged from as little as .04 to as many as 50 applications per
1,000 county inhabitants.7 To carry out our analysis, we compiled a new dataset from
a number of different administrative sources. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of
7 By 1992, treated counties received, on average, eight applications per 1,000 county inhabitants which
translates into some 2,800 applications for legal status per treated county.
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the main variables in our study according to whether they are in treated or non-treated
counties.
Our measure of IRCA applications per county comes from Baker (2015) who,
in turn, takes it from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We also take
from Baker (2015) measures of county poverty, population, unemployment and income,
all of which are used as control variables in our analysis.
We aim at understanding the impact of the IRCA on the distribution of state
and local finances and the sensitivity of this impact to political constraints. We thus
add data on state and local finances taken from the US Census of Governments and use
per capita inter-governmental revenues from state governments to local governments
(counties, cities, municipalities) aggregated to the county as our dependent variable.
We also utilize a host of governor related data including party affiliation of the governor,
his or her name, an indicator for whether or not a governor is a lame duck and an
indicator for whether (s)he enjoys line-item veto power in order to better understand
the responsiveness of state politicians to the IRCA. This data is obtained from the
Codebook for State Elections. We apply an instrumental variables strategy to confirm
our OLS estimates, using the share of a county’s 1960 population that is foreign-born
as an instrument for the number of documented migrants per county post-1986. This
variable is taken from the County and City Data Book prepared by the US Department
of Commerce and the Census Bureau and made available by ICSPR under Study No.
7736.
3.4.2 Inter-Governmental Revenue and the Budget-Making Process
Inter-governmental revenue (IGR)
The primary dependent variable is per capita inter-governmental revenue (IGR) re-
ceived by local governments (counties, cities, municipalities, aggregated to the county)
from state governments.8 The Census Government Finance and Employment Clas-
sification Manual defines this variable as “[a]mounts received directly from the state
government, including federal aid passed through the state government and state aid
channeled through intermediate local government (e.g counties) which have no dis-
cretion as to its distribution. [It] includes state grants-in-aid, regardless of basis of
distribution.” Correspondence with staff at the Census Bureau confirms that “each
state determines what specific funding sources (if any) are used for grants to local
governments.” and that “each state determines the nature, amount and distribution of
8 We use inter-governmental revenue, state aid and state transfers interchangeably.
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state grants internally.”9
Local governments have few major sources of local revenue, most notably prop-
erty taxes and, to a much lesser extent, sales taxes. Inter-governmental revenue, there-
fore, is a type of budget support for local governments which comprises, on average, 30
percent of all local government revenue as shown in Figure C.2. Importantly, the local
governments that receive this aid have “no discretion as to its distribution”. State and
federal governments decide to what areas these revenues are directed. For example,
state aid in education is intended to “support of local schools” but excludes “State
grants for libraries”. The variable at our disposal is aggregate inter-governmental rev-
enue at the county level and so it lumps together revenue intended for such areas as
health, highways, education and public welfare.10
The budget-making process
Our main contention is that state governors use their budgetary powers to allocate more
resources to newly documented migrants in the hope of winning their future vote. A
crucial question is thus how much power governors actually exert over the budget-
making process. We take up this question in this section and demonstrate that, in
fact, governors have substantial influence in the formulation and implementation of
the states fiscal priorities.11
For the vast majority of states, the budget-making process takes an entire year:
it begins sometime in July or August and for all but four states, the fiscal year begins
on 1 July.12 The state budget office is responsible for the analysis and preparation of
the budget on behalf of the governor.13 The budget-making process begins when the
state budget office requests proposals from, and provides guidance to, various state-
level agencies. This guidance typically includes state spending targets, assumptions for
inflation and priorities of the governor. In the fall, the various agencies submit their
9 Personal correspondence with Michael Fredericks of the Local Government Finance Statistics Branch
of the Census Bureau on 26 November 2018.
10Although we only observe aggregate revenue, Table C.2 in the appendix details what is and what is
not included in the inter-governmental revenue received from the state and gives an indication as to
what types of local activity these revenues support.
11The information in this section draws from the National Association of State Budget Officers report
on the budget-making process NASBO (2015).
12 In theory, 30 states operate an annual budget cycle and 20 operate a biennial budget cycle. In
practice, however, most states employ a combination of both: in those states that operate a yearly
budget, it is not uncommon for the governor to release spending recommendations for a two-year
time horizon. States on a two-yearly budget cycle, by contrast, often prepare a supplemental budget
which, in many cases, acts as a de facto yearly budget.
13The budget director is appointed directly by the governor in 34 states; in 13 states he or she is appoin-
ted by the department head and in one state the governor and department head share responsibility
for this appointment.
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budget proposals to the governor who reviews them and provides additional direction.
Once the governor’s recommendations are incorporated, he or she presents the proposed
budget to the state legislature in the winter season. After the legislature passes the
budget, it requires the governors signature to become law.
Importantly, governors enjoy a number of powers over the budget-making process,
including being able to spend unanticipated funds without legislative approval or to
withhold appropriations from agencies within the executive, legislative or even judicial
branches of government. Crucially, governors enjoy various forms of veto authority over
the state budget. Depending on the state, governors have the authority to either veto
the entire budget or specific line-items of it, a power which gives them great leverage
over the prioritization of the budget. Later in this chapter, we document heterogeneity
in our results depending on the extent of veto power a governor enjoys.
3.5 Immigrant Legalization and Inter-Governmental Revenue
3.5.1 The Evolution of IGR: Raw Data
Our aim is to understand the impact of documenting undocumented migrants on
the distribution of inter-governmental transfers from state to local governments. The
primary identifying assumption of our econometric model is that no other shocks oc-
curred around the same time as the passage of the IRCA that correlate either with
the number of legalized migrants in a given county or with the amount of inter-
governmental revenue it received from the state. Prior to estimating the parameters of
the model, therefore, it is informative to understand the evolution of IGR over time so
as to lend credence to our identifying assumption. Figure 3.5 shows the trends in IGR
as it appears in the raw data for the period between 1980 to 2000 in those counties that
received applications for legal status with those that did not. As shown, the two county
types developed along similar paths prior to the passage of the IRCA in 1986 and only
after the passage of the law does one observe an appreciable difference between the
two.14
As a more rigorous test for pre-treatment differences, we plot the coefficients of
14 In Figure C.4 we show the evolution of a number of other county covariates that make clear that
the IRCA is not associated with corresponding shocks in such county characteristics as population,
income, tax revenue or public school enrollment. This is because undocumented migrants were (and
still are) included in population estimates, are eligible (especially their children) for basic public
services such as health and education and, to some extent, pay tax as some undocumented migrants
obtain illegal social security documents.
Immigrant Legalization and Inter-Governmental Revenue 121
Figure 3.5: Evolution of IGR
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Figure 3.6: Treatment effect interacted with year dummies
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Notes: This graph plots the regression coefficient on a treatment indicator when it is interacted with
year dummies as specified in Equation 3.2. The regression only includes county fixed effects. The
outcome, like Figure 3.5, is per capita inter-governmental revenue (in USD1999). Standard errors are
clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 43, 868.
an event study as specified in Equation 3.2:
yc,t = δc + αt +
2000∑
j=1980
βj
[
Tc ×Djt
]
+ c,t (3.2)
Where yc,t is per capita inter-governmental revenue from state to local govern-
ments (in 1999 USD) in county c in year t; Tc is a binary variable set to one if a county
received one or more applications for legal status post-1986 and zero otherwise; and Djt
is a dummy set to one when t = j (∀ j 6= 1986). We capture county fixed effects by δc
and time dummies by αt while c,t is an idiosyncratic disturbance term clustered at the
county level. The results are shown in Figure 3.6, which indicate that the difference
in transfers received between treated and non-treated counties shown in Figure 3.5
only becomes positive and significantly different to zero in the years after 1986, further
increasing confidence in the reasonability of our identifying assumption.
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3.5.2 Baseline Estimates
We impose more structure on model 3.2 in order to estimate the parameters of a
difference-in-differences regression specification as detailed in Equation 3.3.
ln(y)c,t = β0 + δc + αt + ζst + β1 · (Tc × Pt) + Θ·Xc,t + c,t (3.3)
Where ln(y)c,t is the natural log of per capita inter-governmental revenue from
state to local governments (in 1999 USD) in county c in year t and δc and αt are defined
as before. The treatment indicator, Tc, is now interacted with a binary variable Pt,
that is one if t ≥ 1986 and zero otherwise. In addition, we include state-by-year fixed
effects, ζst, to account for state-specific time-varying shocks that might affect legaliza-
tions and transfers, including governor specific characteristics or other state-year-level
political or economic shocks. We include a vector of county-level covariates, Xc,t, that
includes poverty and unemployment rates, income and population. As before, c,t is
an idiosyncratic disturbance term clustered at the county level.15
The trends shown in the raw data are borne out in the regressions. Panel A
of Table 3.2 shows our results across a number of variations of the model shown in
Equation 3.3 and we see precisely estimated coefficients of similar magnitude across a
number of specifications. In Panel B, we estimate the same parameters but using a
measure of treatment intensity as specified in Equation 3.4. Here, ln(IRCA+1)c,t is the
natural log of the cumulative number of IRCA applicants per 1000 county inhabitants
(plus one) in county c in year t. The parameter of interest, β1, can be interpreted
as the elasticity of state transfers with respect to the cumulative number of per 1000
capita legalized applicants. All other parameters are defined as before.
ln(y)c,t = β0 + δc + αt + ζst + β1 · ln(IRCA+ 1)c,t +Θ·Xc,t + c,t (3.4)
Column (1) is our baseline estimate and suggests that counties affected by the
IRCA received, on average, 7 percent more in per capita transfers than those that
did not. Given that inter-governmental revenues make up, on average, 30 percent of
local revenue, an increase in the order of 7 percent is significant. It corresponds to
an increase of one and a half percentage points in the share of revenue received from
inter-governmental sources. Using the measure of treatment intensity, the coefficient
implies that a 1 percent increase in the number of per capita legalizations in a county is
15Because our unit of observation is the county and our treatment varies at this level, we cluster
standard errors at the county. The results, however, are robust to clustering at higher levels, most
notably the state. These results are captured in Table C.3 in the appendix.
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associated with an increase in per capita transfers of about 0.06 percent. Within treated
counties, moving from the 25th to 50th percentile of treatment intensity represents a
132 percent increase in per capita legalizations which translates to an increase of about
7 percent in per capita inter-governmental revenue.16 Because treatment intensity is
a much more precise measure of treatment, Equation 3.4 is our preferred specification
and henceforth we will use the cumulative number of per 1000 capita IRCA applicants
(plus one) as our main explanatory variable.
To ensure that our results are not driven by confounding factors, we undertake a
number of sensitivity checks. We begin by re-estimating the parameters of the model in
a sample that omits the five most treated states which, in per capita terms, correspond
to California, Arizona, Florida, New Jersey and Nevada.17 As shown in column (2),
the results not only hold but become slightly larger, suggesting that legal status has a
greater impact on the distribution of state finances in those states that do not absorb
many newly legalized migrants. To alleviate concerns that the results are driven by
very populous cities or counties—some of which may serve as so-called ‘sanctuary
cities’—we rerun the regression, in column (3), on a sample restricted only to those
counties with populations less than average county population size (i.e. 409,490) and
obtain precisely estimated results, albeit of slightly smaller magnitude suggesting that
the effect is strongest in more populated counties.
As shown in Figure 3.3, there are some 330 counties that received applications for
legal status and just over 2,000 that did not. One might wonder, therefore, how com-
parable these two groups of counties are. To address these concerns, we use propensity
score matching to generate a more comparable control group. That is, for every county
in the sample, we generate, on the basis of its observable characteristics, a propensity
score that indicates a given county’s likelihood to be treated. Then, for every treated
county, we match the nearest neighbor from the untreated counties to generate a more
comparable control group. In column (4), we rerun the model in this matched sample
and obtain results almost identical to those of the baseline.18
Finally, in column (5), we rerun the baseline specification, adding to it county
specific linear time trends. The idea here is to capture any differential trends with
16A very similar increase is associated with moving from the 50th to 75th percentile of treatment.
17Dropping the most treated states in terms of the absolute number of legalizations makes no difference
to the results, nor does dropping the four states that border Mexico. These results are not reported.
18Changing the number of neighbors up to 5 does not change the result. Figure C.3 in the appendix
shows the trends in inter-governmental revenue in treatment and control counties in the matched
sample using nearest neighbor matching. The characteristics on which we generated the propensity
score are county income, population, crime, tax revenue, poverty rate and unemployment in 1980.
We drop state-year fixed effects to allow for the possibility that the best-matched control county for
a given treated county may, in fact, lie in a different state. Matching within a state and leaving
state-year fixed effects in the estimation does not change the results.
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respect to the outcome variable that might arise over time for each county, trends which
might render our identifying assumption implausible. This is the most demanding
specification. That the result holds suggests that the relationship between immigrant
legalization and the distribution of state aid is a robust one.
3.5.3 Robustness Checks
In Table 3.3 we carry out a number of further empirical checks to test the strength of the
relationship. In column (1) we run a first-differences estimation using only two years
in the sample: 1982 and 1992. The idea here is to skip intervening years to overcome
issues with respect to timing of various sorts: different electoral cycles in different states,
different budget response times and different IRCA application processing times. As
shown, the legalization variable maintains its predictive power over per capita inter-
governmental revenue.19 In column (2), we use a county’s 1980 population to carry out
all per capita calculations as another way of ensuring population changes are not driving
the results. To understand whether the relationship between immigrant legalization
and the distribution of state aid is linear or quadratic, we include a quadratic term
of the key explanatory variable in column (3). As shown, the linear variable retains
its precision whereas the quadratic term enters imprecisely. In column (4) we include
quadratic year trends and in column (5) we include additional county demographic
controls, including the share of the population that is over 18 year of age, the share
of the population that is Hispanic and the share of county households with children.
Column (6) presents results from an instrumental variables estimation which will be
explained in more detail in subsection 3.5.4.
In Table C.4, we replicate the baseline estimates using a log−linear specification
to demonstrate that the results are insensitive to the logarithmic transformation of the
data. We choose a log−log specification because (a) the legalization variable is unevenly
distributed and (b) an elasticity is easier for interpretation.
3.5.4 Instrumental Variables
As a final empirical test to rule out endogeneity arising out of geographic factors as-
sociated with where the undocumented migrants settle, we use the share of a county’s
foreign-born population in 1960 as an instrument for the number of IRCA applicants
post-1986. In doing so, we follow a number of other studies (Hildebrandt et al., 2005;
Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010) that utilize historical
rates of migration as an instrument for present levels.
19Figure C.5 plots the coefficients from a number of such regressions, each using a different time period
for the difference estimation.
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Because the instrument in question is time-invariant we interact the 1960 foreign-
born variable with year dummies in order to take advantage of the panel structure of
our data. Doing so produces results that are positive and precisely estimated, though
an order of magnitude larger than the baseline as shown in column (6) of Table 3.3.20
3.5.5 Population Considerations
One may wonder whether our results are simply explained by a mechanical effect of
having more people in the population eligible for social programs. We rule out this
possibility for three reasons.
First, while the IRCA legalized approximately 3 million people in some three
years, it did not lead to a corresponding increase in the population. This is because es-
timates of the undocumented population are obtained from a residual of two other pop-
ulation measures: (1) the total foreign-born population (obtained through the Census)
and (2) the legally resident population (known by the INS). The undocumented pop-
ulation estimate is the residual when (2) is subtracted from (1); hence population
estimates undertaken by the Census Bureau are inclusive of undocumented migrants
(Baker and Rytina, 2013). This fact is made evident in Figure C.4 which shows popu-
lation growth in treated and untreated counties. As illustrated, neither type of county
experienced appreciable growth in population in the years before or after the passage
of the IRCA. Accordingly, even if funds were transferred by formula on the basis of a
county’s population, the fact that there is no population growth associated with the
IRCA alleviates our concern that mechanical population forces drive our results.
Second, a feature of the IRCA was that it “barred” the newly legalized “from
participation in programs of financial assistance furnished under federal law on the
basis of financial need for a period of five years from the effective date of each alien’s
lawful temporary resident status” (DHHS, 1991). Moreover, given the demographic
characteristics of the newly legalized discussed previously and that the children of
undocumented migrants were already eligible for public services such as schooling pre-
IRCA, we find it unlikely that our results are explained by mechanical increases as a
20Another option is to run 13 cross-section regressions for each year between 1988 and 2000 where
each variable is differenced from its 1982 value, as shown in specification 3.5, and the differenced
variable is then instrumented in the cross-section. The regression coefficients are plotted in Figure
C.6 and confirm, both in terms of precision and the timing of the effect, the baseline estimates shown
in Figure C.5.
ln(y)c,t−1982 = β0 + βt · ln(IRCA+ 1)c,t−1982 +Θt ·Xc,t−1982 + c,t (3.5)
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result of social assistance eligibility criteria being satisfied at the state level.21
Third, the dependent variable used throughout our study is a measure of per
capita transfers from state to local governments. If the policy was simply associated
with a mechanical increase in transfers, we might expect the overall level of transfers
to increase but there would be no reason, ex-ante, to expect any change in the amount
of per capita transfers. That per capita transfers are a function of the number of
legalizations in a county seems to suggest that the transfer activity we observe is
more than a mechanical increase that might arise out of a transfer formula based on
population considerations.
3.5.6 SUTVA
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) holds that the potential outcome
of a unit of observation is unaffected by the treatment status of other units. In this
particular context, therefore, a question arises as to whether counties affected by the
IRCA receive their transfers at the expense of those counties not affected by the law or
whether these funds come from other sources. To better understand the nature of the
treatment effect, and to understand whether SUTVA holds in this particular setting,
we undertake two exercises.
First, there are four states in the sample that were unaffected by the IRCA. These
are North and South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. As a first step, therefore, we
run the baseline specification using the treated counties from treated states and only
the control counties from these four control states. The idea here is that if the result
is reflective of a distributive politics channel where the governor takes from control
counties in order to give to treated counties, we should see a smaller effect when we
compare treatment and control counties from different states. To compare counties
across state borders, we drop state-year fixed effects (and include year fixed effects
instead) and generate the results presented in Table 3.4. They indicate that, by and
large, the treatment effect is not coming at the expense of control counties.
To probe this question further, we turn to state revenue data from the Census
of Governments. Here we observe a state’s revenues from various tax sources as well
as from the federal government by way of inter-governmental revenue from the federal
government to the state. The coefficient on per capita legalizations at the state level
shown in Table 3.5 indicates that revenue from the state increases as a function of
21Later in the paper, we utilize Census of Government expenditure data to better understand the
impact of legal status on various categories of local expenditure and find that the IRCA does not
have a significant impact on local welfare expenditure (as shown in Figure 3.8).
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Table 3.4: IRCA and SUTVA
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2)
Full Sample Control States
Log legalizations 0.0988∗∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0177)
Control Variables Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 46,826 10,771
Number of Counties 2,686 749
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to
local governments (aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalizations
is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county in a
given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). In column (1) we exploit the
full sample. In column (2) we use only treated counties from treated states and
the control counties from the four control states in the sample. Control variables
include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income,
all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: State revenues and IRCA
Log of State Revenue From...
(1) (2) (3)
Sales Tax Income Tax Federal Gov’t
Log Legalizations, State 0.029∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.013∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.007)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 853 853 916
Number of States 41 41 44
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of state revenue from various
sources. Log legalizations, State is the log of the cumulative number
of IRCA applications in a given state in a given year per 1000 state in-
habitants (plus one). We control for state unemployment, population and
income. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the state
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
IRCA documented migrants in a state.22
3.6 Political Economy Mechanisms
The analysis in the preceding section demonstrated that the relationship between im-
migrant legalization and the distribution of state finances is a robust one. In this
section, we investigate to what extent the relationship is reflective of discretionary,
political choices made by state governors and to what extent it is merely reflective
of mechanical, bureaucratic forces that oblige the governor to better service the areas
where the documented migrants reside. To shed light on these issues, and on the
mechanisms that drive the result, we turn our attention to the political constraints on,
and the political context of, the state governor. The contention here is simple. If, on
the one hand, the increases in per capita transfers associated with the IRCA are the
result of mechanical forces, the results ought to be entirely insensitive to political con-
text or constraints. If, on the other hand, the transfers are the result of discretionary
choices made by state governors in an effort to bolster political support, then it is not
unreasonable to expect state aid to display some sensitivity to political context.
22To alleviate concerns that the result is driven by increased inter-governmental revenue from the
federal government which simply passing through the state, the Census Bureau explains that “federal
aid that is given to the state to then be distributed to local governments is normally considered state
aid because states usually have discretion over the distribution.”
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3.6.1 Political Party Heterogeneity
We begin by investigating the sensitivity of our results to the party affiliation of the
governor. Column (1) of Table 3.6 indicates that the per capita transfers a county
receives in response to the IRCA policy are positive and significant and that this
amount increases by about half when the governor is a Democrat as compared to when
he or she is a Republican.23 In column (2) we test whether state governors give more
to counties that are politically aligned with them, in the sense that a given county’s
political leaning (measured by its Presidential election results) align with those of the
party of the governor.24 As shown, state aid increases to a county affected by the IRCA
regardless of whether the county’s political leaning is aligned with that of the governor.
Accordingly, these results confirm that the distributional impact of the IRCA is driven
more by political factors at the state level.25
3.6.2 Term Limits and Election Cycles
Next, because our data includes the names of state governors, we are able to compare
state-to-county transfers under a single governor over time as he or she faces different
political constraints and election cycles. By way of example, we consider the transfers in
just one state, Georgia, over the political career of one of its governors, Zell Miller (D),
from 14 January 1991 to 11 January 1999. Governor Miller served two terms in office:
from 1990 to 1994 and from 1994 to 1998. Georgia has a two-term limit constraint
on the Governor.26 Therefore Zell Miller was eligible for re-election in his first term
but he was a lame duck in his second. Georgia comprises 159 counties of which we
have data for 137. From among the counties for which we have data, eight received
legalized migrants as a result of the IRCA and 129 did not. Figure 3.7 shows the
trends in transfers during Zell Miller’s tenure as Governor. As shown, the counties
that received no legalizations experienced a steady decline in the amount of per capita
transfers received. The eight counties that received legalizations, by contrast, exhibit
23Figure C.7 and Table C.5 show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the Democratic vote share in Presid-
ential elections increases as the share of IRCA migrants in a county increases.
24We use Presidential election data as a proxy for Gubernatorial electoral returns because the
Gubernatorial election data is available only as of 1990, after the variation in legalizations has
ended. A county’s Presidential election outcomes do follow its Gubernatorial outcomes quite well as
shown in Figure C.8.
25 In Table C.6 we explore whether the partisan composition of Congress has any explanatory power
over the results. To this purpose, we interact the legalization variable with indicators for whether
a given state’s Members of Congress or Senators were majority Democrats or not. As shown, the
party affiliation of a states federal representatives has no explanatory power on the overall manner
in which the state budget is distributed in response to IRCA.
26 In the United States 26 states had term limits from 1980 to 1986, the majority of which were limited
to 2 terms. Thereafter, the number of states with term limits increased to over 30, again the vast
majority with a 2 term limit.
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Table 3.6: Legalization and political heterogeneity
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Party Aligned Incentive Election Cycle
Log legalizations 0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗
(0.0160) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0157)
D-Governor × Log legalizations 0.0234∗
(0.0121)
Aligned -0.000185
(0.00754)
Aligned × Log legalizations 0.0139
(0.00936)
Log legalizations × Incentive 0.0246∗∗
(0.0107)
Log legalizations × Election Year 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.00706)
County Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46,393 46,820 41,807 30,694
Number of Counties 2,686 2,686 2,677 2,381
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local gov-
ernments (aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalizations is the log of the
cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county
inhabitants (plus one). D-Governor is an indicator that is 1 if the party of the governor is
Democratic and 0 if Republican. Aligned is an indicator that is 1 if the county’s election
results in the most recent Presidential election (Democrat or Republican) are aligned with
the party of the Governor and 0 if not. Incentive is an indicator that is 1 if a governor
is not a lame duck and 0 otherwise. Election Year is an indicator according to whether
a governor, who is no lame duck, is in an election year or not. The baseline effects of
D-Governor, Incentive and Election Year are captured by state-year fixed effects and
are thus unable to be estimated. The outcome variable in column (4) is lagged by one
year. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and
log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses)
are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.7: Transfers in Zell Miller’s Georgia
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Notes: This graph plots inter-governmental transfers in 1999 USD in Georgia during Governor Zell
Miller’s time in office. Control counties are those that never received applications for legal status
through the IRCA whereas treated counties did receive applications for legal status through the
IRCA. Georgia comprises 157 counties of which we have data on 137: eight affected by the IRCA
and 129 were not.
a great deal of variation. In Governor Miller’s first term, transfers to these counties
increase only to drop off drastically in his second term when he is no longer eligible for
re-election. The question that arises, therefore, is to what extent inter-governmental
revenue differs as governors face term limits and how much of this difference is driven
by the IRCA policy. Similarly, one wonders to what degree state aid fluctuates in the
face of gubernatorial election cycles.
The regressions in Table 3.6 investigate these questions. In column (3), we in-
teract the legalization variable with a binary variable that is one when the governor is
eligible for re-election and zero when (s)he is a lame duck owing to a term limit and
the result indicates that the difference in transfers between lame duck and non-lame-
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duck governors is indeed positive and significant.27 We carry out a similar analysis in
column (4), this time analyzing sensitivity to the gubernatorial election cycle. Here,
we lag the outcome variable by one year to better understand the dynamics of inter-
governmental revenue in the year prior to an election. The result suggests that counties
affected by the IRCA receive about 35 percent more in inter-governmental revenue in
the year prior to a gubernatorial election.
3.6.3 Electoral Competition
To shed further light on mechanisms, we examine the sensitivity of transfers to electoral
competition. The logic is similar to those of term limits. If the transfers we observe are
discretionary, we would expect more resources to flow into those counties whose previ-
ous electoral races have been more competitive. To test this hypothesis, we generate
the absolute value of the winning margin between Democrats and Republicans in the
1984 and 1988 Presidential election and identify those counties whose win margins are
tighter than the tightest 25, 10 and 5 percent of the distribution in both elections. We
then interact the legalization variable with an indicator for whether a given county is
competitive and compare this interaction across two time periods: 1984 to 1988 when
the IRCA migrants were ineligible to vote and 1988 to 1992 when governors fight for
the votes of the newly legalized. Results are shown in Table 3.7 and indicate that the
impact of legalization on state-to-county transfers is amplified in the post-1988 period
when a given county is more politically contested.
3.6.4 Veto Power and State Legislatures
As mentioned earlier in the paper, governors exercise strong influence over the budget-
making process in a given state. In this subsection, we focus on arguably the most
influential of these powers: the line-item veto.28 This accords with a range of theoretical
and empirical literature that documents the growing importance of the state executive
branch relative to the legislative branch in setting state priorities in general (Clych and
Lauth, 1991) and in shaping the state budget in particular (Kousser and Phillips, 2012;
27The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to trace the evolution of transfers over the
course of a single governors term. However, one might be concerned that this specification does not
allow us to estimate a governor’s electoral incentive arising from the IRCA since the IRCA ceases
to produce meaningful variation in the number of documented migrants after 1992. To address this,
we re-estimate the parameter of interest, limiting the sample to the period only between 1989 and
1994 and compare governors who are lame ducks in this period with those who are not. Results
are shown in Table C.7 and indicate that governors with an electoral incentive allocate significantly
more resources than their lame duck counterparts as the share of documented migrants in a county
increase.
28Figure C.9 illustrates how this power has grown stronger over time.
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Table 3.7: Legalization and tightness-of-the-race
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Tightest 25% Tightest 10% Tightest 5%
Log legalizations 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0954∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0324) (0.0322)
Log legalizations × Tight25 × Post-1988 0.0698∗
(0.0364)
Log legalizations × Tight10 × Post-1988 0.0736∗
(0.0377)
Log legalizations × Tight5 × Post-1988 0.0688∗∗
(0.0350)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,585 18,585 18,585
Number of Counties 2,561 2,561 2,561
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments
(aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalizations is the log of the cumulative
number of IRCA applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants
(plus one). Tight25, Tight10 and Tight5 indicate, respectively, whether the outcome of the
1984 and 1988 Presidential election in a given county was more competitive (defined as the
absolute difference between votes for the Republican and Democratic candidate) than those
in the 25th, 10th and 5th percentile of the competitiveness distribution. Post-1988 is 1 for
the period between 1988 and 1992 and 0 for the period from 1984 to 1988. The baseline
effects of Tight25, Tight10, Tight5 are captured by county fixed effects. Control variables
include poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated
to the county level. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Barrilleaux and Berkman, 2003).
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.8, we split the sample according to whether
or not the state governor enjoys line-item veto power and estimate the parameters of
our baseline specification.29 As shown, the legalization variable has strong predictive
power over inter-governmental revenue in those states where the governor has line item
veto power.
In column (3) of Table 3.8, we test the sensitivity of transfers to the relationship
between the state governor and the state legislature. Although governors do enjoy
increasing power over the state budget, legislatures still play a role. And if the result
is discretionary, as opposed to mechanical, we might expect it to display important
heterogeneities depending on the relationship between the executive and legislative
branches of state government. Accordingly, we generate an indicator that is one when
the party of the governor is aligned with the partisan majority of the state legislature
and zero otherwise.30 The result indicates that, although transfers increase as the share
of IRCA applicants in a county increases when there is no political alignment between
the governor and the legislature, the result increases by about 50 percent when there
is political alignment, further underscoring the politically discretionary nature of these
transfers.
3.6.5 Re-election Considerations
How might these political economy results impact a governors re-election chances?
Our data includes an indicator for whether a particular governor was re-elected and
we exploit this variable to understand whether the share of documented migrants in a
state affects re-election chances in any way. Because this outcome varies at the state
level over time, we can only include state and year fixed effects separately, denoted
by γs and αt respectively, but not jointly. Moreover, Post1992 indicates the period in
which the documented migrants likely earn the right to vote.31 Our specification is
thus expressed in equation 3.6, where Rs,t is an indicator for whether the governor in
state s has been re-elected in year t.
Rs,t = β0 + γs + αt + β1 · ln(IRCA+ 1)s,1992 · Post1992 +Θ·Xs,t + s,t (3.6)
The result is presented in column (4) of Table 3.8. It suggests that as the share
of documented migrants in a state increases, so too does the governors chances for
29Specifically, we compare states where the governor has line-item veto power to states where the
governor has a simple veto, but not line-item veto.
30This includes when the state legislature is split or has a majority of the opposite party to the governor.
31Figure C.10 displays the trends in legalization and naturalization.
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Table 3.8: Veto, state legislatures and re-election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Veto No Veto Alignment Re-elected
Log legalizations 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.00709 0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0301) (0.0139)
Log legalizations × Alignment 0.0245∗∗
(0.0109)
Log legalizations1992 x Post1992 0.217∗∗∗
(0.0623)
County controls Yes Yes Yes No
State controls No No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No
State Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 41449 5356 46820 181
Number of Counties 2,555 670 2,686 -
Number of States - - - 43
Notes: In columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from
state to local governments (aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. In column (4), the
outcome is a binary variable that is 1 if the governor is re-elected and 0 otherwise. Log
legalizations is the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given county
in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) and Log legalizations1992 is the
log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in 1992 aggregated at the state level.
Column (1) restricts the sample to those Governors who enjoy line-item veto power and
column (2) restricts the sample to those Governors who enjoy no such power. Alignment
is an indicator that is one when the party of the Governor is aligned with the partisan
majority of the state legislature and 0 when it is not. The baseline effects of Aligned is
captured by state-year fixed effects and thus cannot be estimated. Control variables include
poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to
the county level. State controls are the same, but aggregated to the state level for the
specification in column (4) and also include the party of the governor. Standard errors
(shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level in columns (1) to (3) and at the
state level in column (4). ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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re-election after documented migrants are eligible to vote, lending further credence to
the political economy nature of our baseline results.32
3.7 Capturing the Vote of the Newly Legalized
Thus far, we have demonstrated a robust relationship between immigrant legalization
and the distribution of public resources. Governors allocate more resources to counties
as the share of newly documented migrants in those counties increase, an allocation
which is particularly sensitive to the political context of the incumbent. Until now,
however, we have implicitly assumed that the inter-governmental revenue is intended
to capture the vote of the migrants who obtained legal status through the IRCA.
Of course, because the inter-governmental revenue we observe is aggregated at the
county level, we are unable to verify with certainty which constituents these monies
are actually intended to reach.33 In this section, therefore, we present a number of
pieces of evidence that demonstrate that it is indeed the IRCA migrants who motivate
the state governor.
3.7.1 Attitudes Towards Migrants
Like today, undocumented migration was a politically charged issue at the time of
the IRCA. A notable opponent of the IRCA, and of undocumented migration more
generally, was Governor Pete Wilson, Republican governor of California, who ran a
campaign of fear and anti-migrant propaganda. In his 1994 re-election campaign,
Governor Wilson pinned his hopes onto Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” bal-
lot initiative, and the Republican Party offered ideological and financial backing to
32One question that might arise is how visible these transfers are in the sense of their ability to influence
public opinion about the incumbent. In this respect, an assumption in our conceptual framework
is that voting decisions in a county are based on local economic conditions and that voters base
their decision not just on local conditions immediately prior to the election but rather throughout
the term of the governor. In the terminology of Elinder et al. (2015), voters in our framework base
their decisions retrospectively (i.e. based on the implemented policies of the incumbent) rather than
prospectively (i.e. based on the promises candidates make). In Table C.8 we investigate how the
allocation on state aid affects local spending and the coefficient suggests that across all categories
of local spending, the elasticity of such spending with respect to state aid is positive and precisely
estimated, indicating that these transfers are visibly felt at the local level.
33Moreover, because this revenue is dedicated to such purposes as health and road improvements,
the governor can use it to win over several constituents and not just a single one. Indeed, a key
difference between the governor and his or her legislative counterparts is that the governor can
shape a states fiscal priorities so as to build winning coalitions from among otherwise competing
constituents; legislators on the other hand often vote over single issues, increasing the likelihood of
generating ’winners’ and ’losers’ from any given vote (Cascio and Washington, 2014).
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see the proposition go through.34 Proposition 187 prohibited undocumented migrants
from using non-emergency public services and required the providers of such services to
immediately report undocumented migrants for deportation. It was passed by Califor-
nia’s voters only to be struck down by a federal court. The proposition, and Wilson’s
campaign to support it, was highly controversial and left somewhat of an enduring
legacy. Bowler et al. (2006), for example, find that racially charged ballot initiatives in
California—and specifically Proposition 187—are significantly associated with a shift
in political support away from the Republican party and towards the Democratic party
on behalf of non-Hispanic white voters as well as Latino voters.
In light of this political context, it seems reasonable to ask to what degree our
results are actually driven by governors catering to anti-migrant sentiment arising out of
the IRCA rather than to the needs of the documented migrants themselves. We examine
this question first by quantifying the impact of Governor Wilson’s term in office and
of Proposition 187 on state aid. In column (1) of Table 3.9, therefore, we restrict the
sample to consider only California during the eight years for which Governor Wilson
was in power (1991 to 1998) and exploit variation in county-level voting outcomes
for Proposition 187. Forty-seven of California’s 55 counties voted for the Proposition
and eight rejected it and the results varied from as little as 29 percent in favor to
as much as 77 percent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, counties more affected by the IRCA
received less inter-governmental revenue during Governor Wilson’s tenure. However,
this result wiped away and made positive for counties with a vote share of 49.5 percent
or higher. However, neither of the coefficients are precisely estimated, which suggests
that the impact of immigrant legalization on state aid is not, in California at least,
confounded by anti-migrant sentiment. In column (2) we estimate the parameters of
the baseline specification excluding California, the state with the strongest expression
of anti-migrant sentiment at the time and the results hold. In the years following
proposition 187, ten other states passed ballot initiatives or laws similar to that of
Proposition 187.35 Dropping these states from the analysis—presumably the states
where governors had the strongest incentives to cater to anti-migrant sentiment—does
not alter the results in any meaningful way.
As a more general check, we merge the legalization variable with data from
the General Social Survey (GSS), which includes a range of questions on attitudes
34 In a dramatic re-election advertisement, Governor Wilson states “I’m suing to force the Fed-
eral Government to control the border and I’m working to deny state services to illegal im-
migrants. Enough is enough.” (Transcribed from the Television Ad which can be found at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lLIzzs2HHgY.. Accessed 8 March 2018.
35These are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ok-
lahoma and Texas as reported by Richard Lacayo (December 19, 2004) in the following report:
https://ti.me/2PbD7YE. Accessed 8 March 2018.
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Table 3.9: IRCA and anti-migrant sentiment
Log of Inter-governmental Revenue (per capita)
(1) (2) (3)
Wilson No Cali No Anti-Migrant States
Log legalizations -1.844 0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗
(1.601) (0.0182) (0.0238)
Log legalizations × Prop 187 VS 0.0372
(0.0241)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 428 45,690 32,232
Number of Counties 54 2,632 1,864
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to local governments
(aggregated to the county) in 1999 USD. Log legalizations is the log of the cumulative
number of IRCA applications in a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants
(plus one). Prop187 VS is the county vote share for Proposition 187. Control variables include
poverty and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the
county level. Column (3) excludes the 10 states (plus California) that passed ballot initiatives
or laws similar in spirit to those of Proposition 187. Standard errors (shown in parentheses)
are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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towards migration. As indicated in the various columns of Table 3.10, a higher share of
legalized migrants in a region tends to be positively correlated with positive attitudes
towards documented and undocumented migrants. Individuals residing in such regions
tend to think undocumented migrants work hard, deserve work permits and ought
to be protected against deportation. Such individuals are also of the opinion that
documented migrants neither increase crime nor take jobs away from native citizens.
Given these attitudes, and given the fact that the IRCA was not associated with an
influx of migration but rather a change in the legal status of already resident migrants,
we find it unlikely that state aid in IRCA-affected counties is intended to satisfy nativist
sentiment or general opposition to the amnesty.
3.7.2 The IRCA, Local Expenditure and Hispanic Outcomes
Finally, we turn our attention from county revenue to county expenditure in an effort to
better understand in which areas and, potentially, on which constituents county revenue
is spent.36 Figure 3.8 plots event study estimates when the legalization intensity in
1992 is interacted with year dummies in regressions with various categories of local
expenditure as the outcome. These figures suggest that the IRCA led to increases in
local expenditure in the areas of health, education and welfare but that these increases
are estimated with precision for education expenditure beginning in 1991.
36Figure C.11 displays various categories of local government expenditure as a share of total local
expenditure.
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Figure 3.8: Event study estimates of local expenditure on legalization
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Notes: This graph plots the regression coefficient on the log of the cumulative number of IRCA ap-
plications in a given county per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) in 1992 when it is interacted with
year dummies. The outcome variables are the log of per capita county expenditure in health, educa-
tion, welfare and highways and roads. The regressions control for poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level as well as county and state-
by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are
drawn at 95 percent. N = 34, 840 for all regressions.
To understand whether these educational expenditures were intended to benefit
the newly documented migrants and/or their families, we calculate race-specific high
school completion rates to test whether the counties that were affected by the IRCA
also experienced improvements in Hispanic high school completion. To carry out this
exercise, we obtain data from the 2010 decennial census in order to estimate the impact
of the IRCA on an individual’s educational outcomes. Rather than compare individuals
in treated and non-treated counties before and after the passage of the IRCA, we
now compare individuals in treated and non-treated counties in cohorts that entered
middle school before the passage of the IRCA (and hence were less likely to benefit
from additional educational expenditure) with those cohorts that entered middle school
after the IRCA passed (and hence were more likely to benefit from additional funds).
Accordingly, we construct 20 middle school entry cohorts from 1980 to 2000. An
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individual in the 2010 census is placed in a middle school entry cohort depending on
which year he or she was 12 years of age. The specification is detailed in equation
3.7, where Hi,c,mse is an indicator if individual i in county c and in middle school entry
cohort mse has 12 years of education or more. To get more precise estimates, we
combine cohorts to pairs of two. County and middle school entry cohort fixed effects
are captured by δc and ψmse, respectively and Djmse is an indicator that is one when
j = mse and zero otherwise ∀ j 6= 7. All other terms are defined as before.
Hi,c,mse = β0 + δc + ψmse +
10∑
j=1
βj
[
ln(IRCA+ 1)c,1992 ×Djmse
]
+ c,mse (3.7)
We first run the specification on a sample of only Hispanic individuals and then
on a sample of only Caucasian persons and plot the corresponding coefficient, βj ,
as shown in Figure 3.9. This coefficient estimates the change in the slope of high
school completion between individuals in high and low treatment intensity counties
across various middle school entry cohorts. The event study estimates indicate that
for Hispanic persons, residing in a county affected by the IRCA led to a positive and
significant impact on that person’s likelihood of completing high school, provided they
entered middle school after 1990. Indeed, there is no distinguishable difference in
the likelihood of completing high school between individuals in high-treated and low-
treated counties if they began middle school prior to this time. The timing of this
effect suggests that the increased high school completion rates arise not just from
legal status but from additional resources that these counties receive for education.
For Caucasians individuals, by contrast, residing in an IRCA-affected county has no
distinguishable impact on high school completion probability, regardless of when they
began middle school. These results lend further credence to our hypothesis that state
politicians targeted newly documented migrants.37
37 In the appendix, we also try to understand the electoral relevance of the IRCA. To address this,
we obtain individual-level data from the November voter supplement of the CPS which includes
indicators for whether a person voted in the November election. Our aim is to understand how
individual voting is affected by both the IRCA and inter-governmental revenue. We thus plot the
marginal effect of the IRCA on the propensity of an individual to vote along the distribution of
inter-governmental revenue as shown in Figure C.12. Importantly, though, we have data for only
three periods: 1996, 1998 and 2000 because the CPS does not include county identifiers for earlier
time periods. As such, these results include no pre-treatment observations and ought to be taken as
suggestive. Table C.9 presents the results of the margins plot in table form along with other results
from the CPS.
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Figure 3.9: Event study estimates of high school completion on legalization
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Notes: This graph plots the regression coefficient on legalization intensity in 1992 when it is inter-
acted with middle school entry cohort dummies as shown in equation 3.7. A person is placed in a
middle school entry cohort depending on the year in which they were 12 years of age. The outcome
variable, taken from the 2010 decennial census, is an indicator that is one if an individual in a given
county and middle school entry cohort completed high school or more and zero otherwise. The re-
gressions include county and cohort fixed effects. The panel on the left plots coefficients when the
sample is restricted only to Hispanic individuals whereas the figure on the right estimates the coef-
ficients on a sample of only Caucasian individuals. Standard errors are clustered at the county level
and confidence intervals are drawn at 99 percent. For the Hispanic sample, N = 52, 222 whereas for
the Caucasian sample N = 133, 907.
3.8 Conclusion
Undocumented migration in the United States has become a deeply polarized issue.
In this chapter, we set out to investigate the distributional consequences of giving
undocumented migrants legal status through a nation-wide amnesty program. Our
contention has been that state governors allocate more resources to those counties
where the newly documented migrants reside in an effort to win over their future
political support. We substantiated this hypothesis in parts.
First, we found that documenting migrants does indeed have a significant dis-
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tributional component. Across a number of specifications, our results consistently
demonstrate that as the share of documented migrants in a county increases, so too
does the amount of per capita aid received by that county from its respective state
government.
Second, in trying to understand why legal status affects the distribution of public
finances, we uncovered political economy forces at work. We presented evidence that
the allocation of state aid that arises out of the IRCA varies significantly according to
the political context in which an incumbent governor finds him or herself. Governors
transfer more resources to IRCA-affected counties when the governor is eligible for re-
election, when the county is more politically contested, when the governor enjoys line-
item veto power over the state budget and when the legislative and executive branches
of state government are politically aligned. These results are especially noteworthy as
it suggests that the relationship between legal status and the distribution of public
resources is one of discretionary political choice rather than one of economic necessity
or mechanical welfare increases.
In the final part of our analysis, we addressed the question of whether—and to
what extent—state governors actually targeted resources to capture the political sup-
port of the newly documented migrants rather than that of other, perhaps competing,
voting groups. In this respect, we exploited data from a key anti-migrant ballot meas-
ure as well as from survey data on attitudes and found little evidence of anti-migrant
sentiment confounding our results. Lastly, we found that county expenditure in educa-
tion increases significantly in IRCA-affected counties and that, consequently, Hispanic
individuals, as compared to Caucasian ones, residing in those same counties experience
significant improvements in educational outcomes, further suggesting that the resource
allocation arising out of the IRCA is intended to service the needs, and win the political
support, of the newly documented migrants.
On the whole, then, our findings point to a significant political economy dimen-
sion to immigrant legalization. Offering legal status not only leads to various social
and economic improvements at the local level but also provides politicians with strong
electoral incentives to see that it does so.
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Appendix C
C.1 Analysis of the Model
Our analysis begins by taking first order conditions of Equation 3.1 with respect to g:
∂Π
∂g
∣∣∣∣
g=g∗
= (1− α)U ′C(g∗) + αU ′L(g∗) + E ·
∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂φ
∂g∗
− C ′(g∗) != 0 (3.8)
To understand how g∗ responds to a sudden shock in legal status, α, we maximize
3.8 and this is implicitly given by the following:
∂g∗
∂α
= −U
′
L(g∗)− U ′C(g∗) + E ·
∂ ∂Ω
∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂α
∂2Π
∂g2
∣∣∣
g=g∗
(3.9)
Because ∂2Π
∂g2 < 0 the sign in front of Equation 3.9 becomes positive. Moreover,
we have assumed that U ′L(g) > U ′C(g) ∀ g; accordingly, the first term in the numerator,
U ′L(g∗) − U ′C(g∗) > 0. The overall sign of Equation 3.9 thus hinges on the sign of the
second term in the numerator which can be expressed as follows:
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂φ
∂g
∂α
=
∂ ∂Ω∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
+ ∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂
∂φ
∂g
∂α
(3.10)
Rewriting ∂
∂Ω
∂φ
∂α =
∂ ∂Ω
∂φ
∂α · ∂φ∂φ = ∂
2Ω
∂φ2 · ∂φ∂α , and
∂ ∂φ
∂g
∂α =
∂ ∂φ
∂g
∂α · ∂g∂g = ∂
2φ
∂g2 · ∂g∂α we can
substitute these back into Equation 3.10 to obtain:
= ∂
2Ω
∂φ2
· ∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
+ ∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂
2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
= ∂
2Ω
∂φ2
· ∂φ
∂α
· ∂φ
∂g
· ∂g
∂g
+ ∂Ω
∂φ
· ∂
2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
= ∂
2φ
∂g2
· ∂g
∂α
· (∂2Ω
∂φ2
+ ∂Ω
∂φ
)
Under the assumption that ∂Ω∂φ > |∂
2Ω
∂φ2 |, the overall sign of Equation 3.10 is thus
positive. This in turn allows us to state that ∂g∗∂α > 0.38
38Although we have used a general functional form for Ω, for illustrative purposes, we set Ω(φ) = 11+e−φ
and plot the various derivatives of Ω(φ), shown in Figure C.1, to provide some intuition behind this
assumption.
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Prediction 1: The optimal allocation of state aid increases in the share of newly
documented migrants in a county.
Given that the second term in the numerator in Equation 3.9 is positive, we can
state that ∂g∗∂α
∣∣∣
E=1
> ∂g
∗
∂α
∣∣∣
E=0
.
Prediction 2: The optimal allocation of state aid is larger when P is eligible
for re-election and less when (s)he is a lame duck.
Finally, the functional form of Ω(φ) leads us to a final testable prediction. Be-
cause φ = φT represents an inflection point (where φT represents the winning threshold
of an election), it follows that ∂Ω∂φ is maximized as φ→ φT .
Prediction 3: The optimal allocation of state aid becomes larger the closer the
P ’s expected vote share is to the winning threshold.
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C.2 Additional Figures
Figure C.1: Functional form of Ω(φ), its first and second derivative and their sum
Ω(φ)
Ω'(φ)
Ω''(φ)
φT
Expected Vote Share
Ω'(φ) + Ω''(φ)
φT
Expected Vote Share
Notes: This graph plots, clockwise from top-left: Ω(φ); Ω′(φ); Ω′′(φ); and Ω′(φ) + Ω′′(φ)
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Figure C.2: Sources of local government revenue
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Notes: This graph plots the share of local government revenue (cities, municipalities and counties
aggregated to the county) coming from state transfers and state and federal transfers.
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Figure C.3: Evolution of inter-governmental revenues in matched sample
100
150
200
250
300
P
er
 C
ap
it
a 
T
ra
n
sf
er
s 
(U
SD
19
99
)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Year
Control Counties Treated Counties
Notes: This graph compares per capita inter-governmental revenues (in USD1999) in those counties
that never received applications for legal status (control) with those counties that did receive ap-
plications for legal status (treated) through the IRCA in a sample of treated and control counties
matched on the basis of propensity scores using the nearest neighbour. The county characteristics
on which we base the propensity score matching are county income, population, crime, tax revenue,
poverty rate and unemployment in 1980.
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Figure C.4: Trends in county socio-economic characteristics
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Notes: This graph compares the evolution of various county characteristics in those counties that
never received applications for legal status (control) with those counties that did receive applications
for legal status (treated) through the IRCA.
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Figure C.5: First-difference coefficient estimates
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Notes: This graph plots the coefficients from various first-difference regressions from 1988 to 2000
using 1982 as the base year. The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to
local governments (in 1999 USD) and β is the coefficient on the natural log of the cumulative num-
ber of IRCA applicants per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Control variables include poverty
and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level.
County fixed effects and state-year fixed effects are also included in the estimations. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.
Appendix C 155
Figure C.6: Instrumental variables regression coefficients
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Notes: This graph plots β from 13 cross section regressions as specified in Equation 3.5, one regres-
sion each for the years between 1988 and 2000. For each year, the value of the covariates is differ-
enced from their 1982 value. The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state to
county governments (in 1999 USD) and β is the coefficient on the natural log of the cumulative num-
ber of IRCA applicants per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one) when it is instrumented by the 1960
share of a county that is foreign-born. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.
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Figure C.7: The IRCA and the Democratic vote share
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Notes: The panel on left plots the Democratic vote share at the county level in Presidential elections
in counties affected by the IRCA against those not affected by the IRCA. The panel on the right
shows coefficients from a regression where Democratic vote share (in Presidential elections) is re-
gressed on an interaction between a treatment indicator and year. Control variables include poverty
and unemployment rates, log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level
as well as county fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
county level and confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 12, 754
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Figure C.8: Presidential and gubernatorial election results
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Notes: These figures plot the Democratic vote share at the county level in Presidential and
Gubernatorial elections beginning in 1992. The scatter on the left plots the raw data while the scat-
ter on the right plots the variables once state-year fixed effects and county fixed effects have been
accounted for.
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Figure C.9: Governor veto power index over time
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Notes: This graph plots an index of veto power enjoyed by state governors over time. The index
is interpreted as follows: 5 Governor has item veto and a special majority vote of the legislature
is needed to override a veto [three-fifths of the legislators elected or two-thirds of the legislators
present]; 4.5 Governor has item veto, with a majority of legislators elected needed to override, except
for appropriations bills when votes of two-thirds of those elected are needed to override; 4 Governor
has item veto with a majority of legislators elected needed to override; 3 Governor has item veto
with only a majority of legislators present needed to override; 2 Governor has no item veto, with a
special legislative majority needed to override; 1 Governor has no item veto, with only a simple ma-
jority needed to override; 0 Governor has no veto of any kind.
Source: Data on the institutional power ratings for the governorships in the U.S are provided by
Thad L. Byele: https://www.unc.edu/polisci_old/beyle/gubnewpwr.html. Accessed 16 April
2018.
Appendix C 159
Figure C.10: Naturalization and legalization at the state level
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Notes: This graph plots trends in naturalizations and legalizations at the state level. Lines drawn
at 1986 (the passage of the IRCA), 1992 (first cohort of naturalizations arising from the IRCA) and
1996.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Services, own data.
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Figure C.11: Share of local expenditure on...
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Notes: This graph plots various categories of local government expenditure as a share of total local
expenditure.
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Figure C.12: Marginal effect of the IRCA on the propensity to vote
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Notes: This graph plots the marginal effect of immigrant legalization on the propensity to vote when
immigrant legalization is interacted with inter-governmental revenue from the state. In other words,
it plots ∂vote
∂IRCA = βIRCA + βIRCA×transfers ∗ transfers along the distribution of inter-governmental rev-
enue. βIRCA is the coefficient on the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applications in a given
county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). The regression draws on individual
data from the 1996, 1998 and 2000 November Voter Supplement of the CPS. The outcome variable
is an indicator that is one if an individual voted in that year’s November election and zero otherwise.
Control variables include individual race, sex, family income, marital status, education and age as
well as year dummies and county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level and
confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent. N = 41, 968.
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C.3 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Congressional vote record on the IRCA bill
House Senate
Yes 274 63
(204-D; 70-R) (34-D; 29-R)
No
132 24
(33-D; 99-R) (5-D; 8-R)
Abstain 26 13
Notes: This table shows how the 99th Con-
gress voted for the IRCA Bill on 17 October
1986.
Source: Congressional Votes Database
accessed at govtrack.us. Accessed 20
October 2018.
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Table C.3: Baseline results with alternative clustering and inference
(1) (2)
Treatment × Post Legalization Intensity
β̂ 0.0709 0.0610
p-values:
A. Analytical values
(clustered at the state level) 0.0325 0.0149
B. Wild Bootstrap values
(clustered at the state level) 0.0521 0.0390
Observations 46,820 46,820
Number of States 46 46
Notes: This table presents the baseline estimates (column (1) of Table 3.2) clustering
the standard errors at the state level. p-values are derived both analytically, using
Stata’s conventional vce(cluster state) command as well as through Wild cluster
bootstrapping generated using Roodman et al. (2018) boottest command.
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Table C.5: Democratic vote share on IRCA legalizations
Democratic Vote Share
(1) (2) (3)
All States D State R State
Log legalizationst−5 0.0204∗∗∗ 0.0223∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗
(0.00175) (0.00333) (0.00206)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7789 4203 3586
Number of Counties 2141 1127 1014
Notes: The dependent variable is the Democratic vote share, at the
county level, in Presidential elections. Log legalizationst−5 is a
five year lag of the log of the cumulative number of IRCA applica-
tions from a given county in a given year per 1000 county inhabitants
(plus one). In columns (2) and (3) we split the sample and look
at the relationship only in Democratic (column (2)) or Republican
(column (3)) states defined by the party of the Governor in the year
1990. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates, log
of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county
level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Legalization and term limits
Log of IGR (per capita)
Incentive
Log legalizations 0.254
(0.197)
Log legalizations × Electoral Incentive 0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0241)
Control Variables Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 12,134
Number of Counties 2,384
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per capita transfers from state
to county governments in 1999 USD. Log legalizations is the log of the
cumulative number of IRCA applications from a given county in a given
year per 1000 county inhabitants (plus one). Electoral Incentive is an
indicator that is 1 if a governor is not a lame duck in the period between
1989 and 1994 and zero otherwise. The baseline effect of Electoral
Incentive is captured by state-year fixed effects and is thus unable to
be estimated. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level.
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.8: Local spending and IRCA legalizations
Log of Per Capita Local Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Health Education Welfare Highway
Log of Transfers 0.254∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.0435∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0228) (0.0113) (0.0199) (0.0193)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,869 36,869 36,869 36,869 36,869
Number of Counties 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638 2,638
Notes: This table presents regression results using various categories of per capita
local government expenditure as the outcome variable. Log of Transfers is the per
capita inter-governmental revenue from the state to local governments aggregated to
the county in 1999 USD. Control variables include poverty and unemployment rates,
log of population and log of income, all aggregated to the county level. Standard
errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: IRCA, citizenship and voter turnout using CPS
(1) (2) (3)
Naturalized Voted in Nov Voted in Nov
Log legalizations 0.0221∗∗∗ -0.0060 -0.0770∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0207)
Log of Transfers, pc 1999 -0.0086
(0.0085)
Log Legalizations × Log Transfers 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0036)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50206 46210 41968
Notes: This table presents regression results using individual data from the 1996, 1998
and 2000 November Voter Supplement of the CPS. Log legalizations is the log of the
cumulative number of IRCA applications from a given county in a given year per 1000 county
inhabitants (plus one). Log Transfers is the per capita inter-governmental revenue from
the state government to the county in 1999 USD. Column (1) has an outcome variable that
is 1 if an individual is a naturalized citizen and 0 if (s)he is a native citizen. Columns (2)
and (3) have as outcome variables indicators that are 1 if an individual voted in that year’s
November election and 0 if (s)he did not. The years for which we have data include three
major gubernatorial election cycles as well as two Presidential elections but we cannot
distinguish which election an individual voted for. Control variables include individual
race, sex, family income, marital status, education and age. Standard errors (shown in
parentheses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants (SLIAG)
Section 204 of the IRCA outlines the details associated with the State Legalization Im-
pact Assistance Grants (SLIAG)—a $1B per year federal funding program for four years
which could be spent over seven years until 1994. SLIAG was designed to compensate
states for the extra costs they would incur as a result of the legalization program of the
IRCA. Specifically, SLIAG funds were intended to assist states to defray expenses in
the areas of public health, public assistance and education (Liu, 1991; DHHS, 1991).
It is unlikely that the SLIAG funds are confounding our results for the simple reason
that SLIAG was administered through an entirely separate institutional set-up and is
not part of the inter-governmental revenue outcome variable that we exploit.39 Nev-
ertheless, we obtain the amount of funding states received from SLIAG and deduct it
from our main outcome variable to create an ‘inter-governmental revenue net of SLIAG’
variable. Results are shown in Table C.10 and confirm that the resource allocation to
affected counties is not being confounded by SLIAG funds.
39As part of the IRCA, The federal government instituted the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) sys-
tem, whereby every state designated its own SPOC so as to create “state-level lead implementation
agencies to manage the [SLIAG] program according to the unique needs and arrangements of the
individuals states” Liu (1991). At the federal level, it was the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices that received applications for and disbursed the SLIAG funds but SLIAG required that SPOCs
coordinate directly with state and local public health, public assistance and education organizations
to receive the funds Liu (1991).
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Table C.10: Transfers on IRCA legalizations net of SLIAG funds
(1)
Net Transfers PC
Log legalizations 0.398∗∗∗
(0.0807)
Control Variables Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6,490
Number of Counties 2238
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of per cap-
ita transfers from state to county governments in
1999 USD net of SLIAG funds received from the fed-
eral government. Log legalizations is the log of
the cumulative number of IRCA legalized migrants
in a given county in a given year per 1000 county
inhabitants (plus one). SLIAG was made available
until 1991 and so our net transfers variable is defined
only until that period which explains the smaller
number of county-year observations. Control vari-
ables include poverty and unemployment rates, log
of population and log of income, all aggregated to
the county level. Standard errors (shown in paren-
theses) are clustered at the county level. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Chapter 4
Price Transparency Against
Market Power∗
Abstract
We study under what conditions mandatory price disclosure is pro- or anti-
competitive. Using a theoretical search model with collusion and imper-
fectly informed consumers and producers, we characterize the circumstances
under which increasing price transparency benefits consumers. We show
that the level of ex ante consumer and producer transparency, as well as
the number of consumers adopting the mandatory price information, de-
termine whether the policy is pro- or anti-competitive. To examine the
theoretical predictions, we construct a unique data set to study the effect
of mandatory price disclosure in the German petrol market. We find that
the policy led to a decrease in retail margins by 13 percent. We also find
that the theoretical model is better at explaining the relationship between
the treatment effect and ex ante consumer transparency than other models
in the literature. Our results inform policymakers by highlighting how the
effect of mandatory price disclosure depends on market characteristics.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Felix Montag.
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4.1 Introduction
Many firms derive their market power, and thus their ability to price above the perfectly
competitive level, from informational frictions. At the same time, modern information
technologies allow the collection and diffusion of vast amounts of information at low
costs. In some markets, price comparison platforms have formed, while in others they
have not. One obstacle for the creation of price comparison platforms is the cost of
collecting prices. If policymakers want to foster the creation of such platforms, they
can help overcome this issue by mandating firms to disclose prices. However, the
existing theoretical literature shows that in markets prone to collusion increasing price
transparency among consumers and producers can harm consumers.1
In this paper, we ask under what conditions mandatory price disclosure is likely
to be pro- or anti-competitive. The theoretical literature shows that small changes
to the underlying assumptions often lead to very different relationships between price
transparency and the stability of collusive behavior. The empirical literature on man-
datory price disclosure also found different results in different contexts.2 Understanding
how different market conditions affect the effect of mandatory price disclosure is thus
crucial for the successful design of future policies.
To answer our research question, we begin by setting up a theoretical model of
collusion, which builds on the homogeneous goods models by Petrikaite (2016) and
Schultz (2017).3 Using this model, we derive predictions on how increasing price trans-
parency on both sides of the market affects the stability of collusive behavior and
contrast these with the predictions of other candidate models.4 Next, we study the
introduction of mandatory price disclosure in the German retail petrol market empir-
ically and assess the suitability of the theoretical model. We begin by constructing
a novel data set of station-level retail margins in Germany and France before and
after the introduction of mandatory price disclosure. We also use administrative data
on the universe of commuters in Germany to construct a proxy for the ex ante level
of consumer transparency. Then, we estimate the average effect of mandatory price
disclosure in Germany. Thereafter, we study how an increase in the intensity of the
treatment for consumers due to follow-on local media reports affects retail margins.
Finally, we analyze heterogeneities in the treatment effect according to the ex ante
1 See, for example, Kühn and Vives (1995), Schultz (2017) or Luco (2019).
2 See, for example, Luco (2019), who finds that mandatory price disclosure increased retail margins
in the Chilean petrol market and Ater and Rigbi (2018), who find that mandatory price disclosure
decreased prices in the Israeli supermarket industry.
3 Other theoretical models, such as by Luco (2019), rely on modeling goods as heterogeneous.
4 We focus on other theoretical models of imperfectly informed producers and consumers that allow
for collusionary behavior, namely the models by Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019).
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level of consumer transparency to assess the suitability of various models discussed in
the literature.
In the theoretical model, we assume that producers and consumers are imper-
fectly informed and producers may engage in collusive behavior. In contrast to Pet-
rikaite (2016), we allow producers to be imperfectly informed. In contrast to Schultz
(2017), we allow uninformed consumers to search sequentially. These assumptions
tailor the model to the dynamics of the petrol market, whilst making it more general,
since both models are nested within the model in this paper. In line with the literature,
we find that the effect of mandatory price disclosure depends on how much this changes
the levels of producer and consumer transparency. In contrast to existing models with
imperfect information on both sides of the market but without sequential search, we
show that whether a marginal increase in transparency is pro- or anti-competitive is
determined by the ex ante levels of transparency. Our framework allows us to ana-
lyze how increasing a common factor of transparency, affecting consumer and producer
transparency, affects the stability of collusionary behavior.
Since the assumptions of the different models affect the mechanisms and policy
recommendations, it is important to assess which model best fits a particular market.
We therefore derive theoretical predictions of the model that we can verify empirically
and contrast these with the predictions of other candidate models.5 In particular, we
highlight how the different models have different predictions about the marginal treat-
ment effect, which depend on the level of ex ante consumer and producer transparency.
To validate the predictions of the model, we study the introduction of the Mar-
ket Transparency Unit for Petrol (MTU) in Germany. Since September 2013, a law
forces petrol stations in Germany to disclose all price changes in real-time to a central
database that allows information service providers to diffuse this information to con-
sumers. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we causally estimate the effect of
mandatory price disclosure on retail margins. We do this by comparing retail margins
for the universe of petrol stations in France and Germany for the years 2013 and 2014.
This setting is particularly suitable because it allows us to overcome two import-
ant empirical challenges: Firstly, using 11 million price notifications to a smartphone
application collecting consumer-reported petrol prices allows us to observe prices be-
fore the introduction of mandatory price disclosure.6 We combine this with price data
5 We focus on other theoretical models of imperfectly informed producers and consumers that allow
for collusionary behavior, namely the models by Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019).
6 There already existed some apps that allowed users to self-report petrol prices, which were then
collected and diffused to users in a similar fashion to the price information from the MTU. However,
the usage of these apps before the MTU was considerably lower than after its introduction. This is
why the introduction of the MTU led to an important change in the the information set of market
participants.
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from the MTU after its introduction. We complement the data with station-level retail
margins for France over the full observation period. Secondly, we can provide empirical
evidence on the predictions of the theoretical model and assess which of the candidate
models best explains the empirical evidence. To do so, we construct a proxy of the
ex ante level of consumer transparency using administrative data on the universe of
commuters, following the approach by Pennerstorfer et al. (2019). This allows us to
study the treatment effect for different levels of ex ante consumer transparency. Ad-
ditionally, we construct a dataset on radio reports by local radio stations about petrol
prices. Using geocoded reception areas, we can identify whether a petrol station lies
within the reception area of a radio station. This allows us to study whether follow-on
information campaigns led to a further decrease in retail margins.
Overall, we find that the introduction of mandatory price disclosure in Germany
led to a decrease in retail margins by approximately 1 Eurocent, or 13 percent of retail
margins.7 We also find that average retail margins decrease by a further 0.6 Eurocent
if a complementary information campaign, proxied by local radio reports about pet-
rol prices, accompanies mandatory price disclosure. As predicted by the theoretical
model, we find that the level of ex ante consumer transparency leads to significant
heterogeneities in the marginal treatment effect. The empirical evidence suggests a
downward-sloping relationship between the level of ex ante consumer transparency
and the treatment effect, which means that the higher the level of ex ante consumer
transparency, the larger the magnitude of the treatment effect. This result is consist-
ent with predictions of the theoretical model and at odds with predictions of other
candidate models.
The paper makes three main contributions. Firstly, we extend the theoretical
literature on price transparency when there is imperfect information on both sides of
the market and firms may engage in collusive behavior.8 There is a rich theoretical
literature on collusion under imperfect information on the side of producers (e.g. Green
and Porter, 1984 or Kühn and Vives, 1995) and consumers (e.g. Schultz, 2005, Rasch
7 According to German Statistical Office, private households consumed 46 billion liters of
fuel in Germany in 2016. A crude back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the de-
crease in margins caused by mandatory price disclosure in the German petrol market
could thus lead to savings of 460 million Euro to private households every year. Data
available at https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Gesellschaft-Umwelt/Umwelt/Materialfluesse-
Energiefluesse/Tabellen/fahrleistungen-haushalte.html. Accessed 26 October 2018.
8 Although the data shows frequent price changes, we focus on models of collusion on a stable price.
In practice, practice firms in the retail petrol industry are likely to use more sophisticated strategies
to coordinate tacitly on focal points (see Byrne and de Roos, 2019) for an empirical documentation
of such a strategy). Other factors not included in the model may also affect whether collusion takes
place, but a decrease in the critical discount factor makes it easier to collude. Changes in the critical
discount factor should thus be seen as changes in the likelihood of collusion (similar to Cabral et al.,
2019).
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and Herre, 2013 and Petrikaite, 2016). This literature shows that slightly changing as-
sumptions on the search protocol, the nature of goods or the elasticity of demand can
have a great influence on whether increasing consumer information about prices is pro-
or anti-competitive. Luco (2019) assumes firms to be imperfectly informed about the
prices of their rivals, but does not allow consumers to search sequentially and only stud-
ies the case of differentiated goods. Schultz (2017) also assumes firms to be imperfectly
informed and uninformed consumers not to search sequentially, but also studies ho-
mogeneous goods markets. He finds that under these conditions, increasing a common
factor of transparency, affecting producers and consumers, is always anti-competitive in
homogeneous goods markets. We derive a more general model for homogeneous goods
by allowing consumers to search sequentially, as in Petrikaite (2016). In contrast to
Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019), we find that the marginal effect of increasing trans-
parency depends on the ex ante level of transparency and can also be pro-competitive
in homogeneous goods markets.
Secondly, because mandatory price disclosure can have very different effects on
prices theoretically, one might be worried about the external validity of the conclusions
from a particular study. We therefore extend the empirical literature on the effect of
mandatory price disclosure on prices. Albæk et al. (1997) and Luco (2019) find that
increasing price transparency in homogeneous goods markets, namely the cement in-
dustry in Denmark and the petrol industry in Chile, led to an increase in prices. In
contrast, we provide causal evidence of a mandatory price disclosure policy in a homo-
geneous goods market leading to a decrease in retail margins. The differences in results
are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model given the policy design. In
particular, two results of the theoretical model in this paper help explain the differences
that we find: Firstly, if producers are well informed about prices before mandatory price
disclosure, it is less likely that such a policy is anti-competitive. Secondly, in some cases
a marginal increase in consumer transparency can be anti-competitive, whereas a large
increase is pro-competitive. Thus, it is important that competition authorities do not
only provide the information, but also push for its large-scale adoption.
Thirdly, we study how different market conditions affect the effect of mandatory
price disclosure empirically and use these results to assess the suitability of different
theoretical models. Ater and Rigbi (2018) show that newspapers play an important role
in diffusing information from mandatory price disclosure for Israeli supermarkets. In
contrast to their setting, we study a homogeneous goods market where the information
adoption of price information by consumers is already high. We show, that even in this
context follow-on local radio reports about petrol prices can lead to a further reduction
in average prices. Next, we estimate heterogeneities in the treatment effect based on
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the ex ante level of consumer transparency. We follow Pennerstorfer et al. (2019) in
assuming that commuters are perfectly informed about petrol prices on their daily way
to work to construct a proxy for the ex ante level of consumer transparency. Our
empirical results are in line with predictions of the theoretical model in this paper and
at odds with predictions of the theoretical models by Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019).9
We thus conclude that the policy recommendations from the model in this paper are
more suitable in this context than the recommendations from other candidate models.
Finally, the paper relates to the empirical literature on the optimal design of
mandatory price disclosure policies. Martin (2018) uses price data from the MTU for
petrol stations in Bavaria in 2017 to estimate a structural model and simulate the effect
of limiting price transparency to only a few petrol stations. He finds that restricting
transparency to showing only below-median prices, as opposed to full transparency,
decreases consumer expenditures and increases consumer welfare. His findings are
complementary to our study, as they highlight further possibilities to optimize the
design of mandatory price disclosure policies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 describes the
specificities of the German petrol market and the introduction of the MTU. Section
4.3 outlines the theoretical model. Section 4.4 presents the data used in this paper.
Section 4.5 explains the empirical methodology and findings. Section 4.6 analyses
potential mechanisms, Section 4.7 discusses the results and Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Background
Retail fuels are products with a very high degree of homogeneity within their product
category. Although petrol filling stations also sell other products, we focus our attention
on the sale of fuel. The two main fuel categories are diesel and petrol. Consumers
cannot substitute between the two in the short-term, as vehicles can only either run on
one or the other type. Within petrol, there is differentiation according to the octane
rating and the share of ethanol. Even between these sub-categories, there is only very
limited substitution. In our analysis, we, therefore, focus on petrol with an octane
rating of 95 and an ethanol share of 5 percent, which had a market share of 82 percent
in Germany in 2017 (Bundesverband der deutschen Bioethanolwirtschaft, 2018).
Examining the vertical structure is important to understand competitive dynam-
ics in the petrol industry. In the upstream market, crude oil is directly transported
to oil refineries, which then process the crude oil into retail products. These are sold
9 This does not mean that the theoretical model in this paper is more suitable in other contexts.
However, the predictions of the different theoretical models allow assessing the suitability of the
different models also in other contexts.
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and distributed to the downstream market, where petrol filling stations sell the retail
product to motorists.
According to the GFCO (2011), both the upstream and downstream markets are
highly concentrated. The main firms active in the German upstream market are BP,
ConocoPhillips, ENI, ExxonMobil, Rosneft, Shell and Total. In the downstream mar-
ket, all of these firms with the exception of ENI and Rosneft also have a large network
of petrol filling stations spread across Germany.10 Access to refinery capacities is an
important competitive advantage in the downstream market for petrol and therefore
these five vertically integrated firms form an oligopoly with significant market power
towards outside competitors, although there are also many other petrol filling stations.
In 2011, the five oligopolists had an aggregate market share of around 47 percent
in retail petrol from petrol stations that they owned directly. However, this is an
underestimate of the share of the market they control. A further 18 percent of the
market is served by petrol stations that are owned and operated by independent dealers
which usually operate under the brand of the oligopolists (see GMEAE, 2018). In its
market investigation, the German Federal Cartel Office (GFCO) found that contractual
relationships between the oligopolists and these independent dealers oftentimes allow
the oligopolists to set prices for the independent dealers. It therefore seems plausible
to consider all petrol stations belonging to one brand to act as an integrated firm.
The remaining 35 percent are made up of other vertically integrated competitors
(mainly ENI, Orlen, OMV and Tamoil) and independently owned filling stations, which
often buy their petrol from the oligopolists. Although independent stations not selling
under the brand of the oligopolists can be considered less bound to pricing decision of
the oligopoly, the GFCO found evidence that these are sometimes also constrained in
their pricing decisions by contracts with the oligopolists.
Before the introduction of the MTU, price transparency among producers was
high, but not perfect. Since the oligopolists have price discretion over their stations
and, to some degree, about their partner petrol stations, they observed these prices
before the MTU. Additionally, employees of company-owned stations, as well as dealer-
owned partner stations, were often contractually bound to report prices of neighboring
stations to the oligopolist several times a day (GFCO, 2011). Finally, some oligopolists
also posted prices of their petrol stations on their website, which allowed other oligopoly
members to observe these prices. However, many stations, in particular independent
stations and small chains, did not follow the practice of posting prices online and only
had limited knowledge of rivals’ prices. In sum, there was considerable, but far from
10ENI also has a small network of petrol filling stations in Germany, but its smaller size and reduced
geographic reach gives it less clout.
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perfect transparency on the producer side.
Before the MTU, consumers were much less informed about prices than firms
and hence found it difficult to assess the competitiveness of a particular petrol price.
In the absence of an information clearinghouse, there are significant search costs for
consumers. To find the prices of all potential sellers, they would need to drive to all
stations.11
A market investigation ending in 2011 led the GFCO to find that the oligopolists
have a dominant position in regional petrol markets and that prices are higher than
under functioning competition. Although the GFCO (2011) does not provide evidence
of the existence of a hardcore cartel, there is significant evidence for tacitly collusive
behavior. The GFCO found that a price increase at most stations of one of the oli-
gopolists in a region usually starts a price cycle, which is an indication of collusive
behavior. Aral and Shell are commonly found to be the price leader. Following a price
increase, the other price leader (i.e. either Shell or Aral) reacts in 90% of cases by
also increasing prices within 3 hours. This is usually followed by a price increase by
Total, Jet or Esso only a few hours later. These price movements lead to price cycles
with repeating patterns, which are primarily reflected in retail margins and thus not
cost-driven. This is in line with findings by Byrne and de Roos (2019), who describe
how dominant firms use price leadership and price experiments to create focal points
that coordinate market prices, soften price competition and increase retail margins in
the Australian petrol market.
After the market investigation, the GFCO and the German Monopolies Com-
mission concluded that a lack of price transparency on the consumer side caused the
lack of competition and therefore called for an increase in price transparency in the
downstream market. In 2012, parliament passed a law which set out the creation of the
market transparency unit under the management of the GFCO and on 12 September
2013 the operation of the MTU began. The MTU is an information clearinghouse that
collects prices in real-time and allows app creators to diffuse the information to users.
It hence provides consumers and producers access to live price data and increases price
transparency on both sides of the market.
4.3 Theoretical Model
In this Section, we outline a theoretical model, which allows us to conceptualize how
mandatory price disclosure affects collusionary behavior. We derive theoretical results
11There were already some apps that allowed users to self-report petrol prices, which were then collected
and diffused to users in a similar fashion to the price information from the MTU, but the usage of
these apps before the MTU was considerably lower than after its introduction.
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on the effect of increasing price transparency (e.g. through mandatory price disclosure)
on the critical discount factor and thus the likelihood of collusive behavior.
In the model, a homogeneous good is sold by a small number of firms that
could potentially engage in collusive behavior. At the same time, some consumers
are perfectly informed about prices, whereas others are not.12 Producers are also
imperfectly informed about prices of their rivals, which means that it is possible for
deviations from the collusionary agreement to remain undetected. These assumptions
plausibly describe the competitive dynamics in the retail petrol market prior to the
MTU and allow us to analyze how prices are affected when mandatory price disclosure
affects the information sets of producers and consumers.
4.3.1 Setup
There is a finite number of n symmetric price-setting firms competing in an infinitely
repeated game and producing at a normalized marginal cost of zero.
There is a unit-mass of consumers. Each consumer has the same valuation υ
for the good and inelastically demands ξ > 0 units of the product. ξ is distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function ψ(ξ) with mean equal to one. It is
constant within a period but varies between periods. Firms thus do not perfectly know
aggregate demand in a particular period.
A fraction φ of consumers consists of fully informed shoppers and 1−φ are non-
shoppers, who can search sequentially. Shoppers know prices of all sellers and therefore
always buy from the lowest price seller. Non-shoppers only know the distribution of
prices and draw a first price for free. They can then choose to randomly draw prices
of additional sellers at an incremental search cost s, in the hope of finding a lower
price. Non-shoppers buy the good as soon as the price they draw is weakly below the
reservation price pr, at which non-shoppers are indifferent between accepting the price
and drawing a new price at search cost s, because the expected price savings of drawing
another price are equal to the search cost s.13
4.3.2 Static Equilibrium
In the static Nash equilibrium, all firms play mixed strategies in which they draw a price
from the interval [p, pr] according to the distribution G(p), where pr is the reservation
price of non-shoppers and p is the minimum price a firm will charge. Shoppers always
12 In modeling consumer information, our model builds on the collusion model for homogeneous goods
markets proposed by Petrikaite (2016). However, in contrast to her model, we allow for imperfectly
informed producers. She models consumer search as in the unit-demand version by Janssen et al.
(2005) of the Stahl (1989) model.
13The model is solved in detail in Appendix D.1.
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buy from the lowest price firm, whereas non-shoppers draw a single price and buy at
this price. In equilibrium, non-shoppers hence do not search sequentially, because any
price they draw is below their reservation price. In Appendix D.1, we derive expressions
for the equilibrium objects pr, p, G(p) and pi∗i .
4.3.3 Dynamic Equilibrium
After analyzing the equilibrium of the one-shot game, we now look at an infinitely
repeated version of this game, in which firms are allowed to collude and where deviations
may remain undetected.
We assume that the price of a firm is observed by its rivals with probability
η. Since aggregate demand is stochastic, firms cannot infer the prices of their rivals
based on their own price and their quantities sold. A deviation from the collusionary
agreement by a firm will therefore only be detected by its rivals with probability η.14
We assume that collusionary agreements are enforced by playing the grim-trigger
strategy proposed by Friedman (1971). This means that if a deviation from the collu-
sionary price is observed, all firms enter the punishment phase and charge the static
equilibrium price forever.
A firm will charge the collusionary price as long as its expected discounted profit
from collusion is at least as high as its expected discounted profit from deviation. This
is the case if and only if:
1
1− δpi
c ≥ pid + δ1− δ (ηpi
∗ + (1− η)pic) , (4.1)
where δ is the discount factor, pic is the expected profit under collusion, pid is the
expected deviation profit and pi∗ is the expected competitive profit in the static game.
In case a firm deviates from the collusionary agreement, it expects to receive the
deviation profit pid in the deviation period. In future periods, it expects to receive the
competitive profits if its rivals detect its deviation and the collusionary profits if its
deviation remains undetected.
To see what determines whether collusive behavior is profitable, we need to ana-
lyze the critical discount factor δ. If the discount factor of a firm is above δ, it values
the future sufficiently to make a deviation, and thus the possibility of future punish-
ment, unprofitable. If δ < δ, a firm finds it profitable to deviate from the collusionary
price. The critical discount factor is hence the discount factor at which Equation 4.1
14Note, that allowing collusion and imperfect information on the producer side has no effect in the
static game, because in a one-shot game deviation is always profitable since it can never be punished
in a subsequent period.
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holds strictly and can be written as:
δ = pi
d − pic
pid − ηpi∗ − (1− η)pic . (4.2)
The profit in punishment periods, pi∗, corresponds to the competitive profits in
the static game and the punishment price to the competitive price. In collusionary
periods, firms charge the monopoly price, which, because consumers are perfectly in-
elastic, is equal to the valuation of the good by consumers, i.e. pc = υ. Since all firms
charge the same price in collusionary periods, they all have an equal share of demand
and the expected collusionary profits of a firm are piC = υn .15 When a firm undercuts
the collusionary price by charging pd = υ− , where  is a very small positive number,
it attracts all shoppers and keeps its share of non-shoppers. The expected deviation
payoff is, therefore, approximately pid = υ(1−φn + φ).
4.3.4 Comparative Statics
Now that we know what determines prices, profits, and the incentives to collude, we
can analyze how these are affected by changes in transparency and search costs.
Two special cases are worth analyzing. If η = 0, deviations from the collusionary
agreement will never be detected. The critical discount factor to sustain collusion
becomes 1. Firms will never adhere to the collusionary agreement, because a deviation
is never detected and hence never punished. If η = 1, a deviation from the collusionary
agreement will always be detected. In this case, mandatory price disclosure would only
have an effect on the degree of price transparency on the consumer side. We will,
therefore, analyze this special case in the context of a change in the share of shoppers,
φ. For the rest of the analysis, we focus on the case where η is strictly between zero
and one.
Proposition 1. A marginal increase in producer transparency, η, decreases the critical
discount factor δ.
If producer transparency increases, the likelihood that a rival detects a deviation
from the collusionary agreement increases. Since the punishment phase starts only after
detection of a deviation, an increase in producer transparency leads to an increase in
the likelihood of punishment and thus makes deviation less attractive.16
Proposition 2. A marginal increase in consumer transparency, φ, weakly decreases
15Sometimes, collusion on prices below the monopoly price is stable when collusion on the monopoly
price is not. For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to collusion on the monopoly price.
16We prove this Proposition in Appendix D.2.
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the critical discount factor δ for small values of φ, φ ≤ φ¯, and increases the critical
discount factor δ for values of φ, φ ≥ φ¯, for n = 2.
Consumer transparency is modeled as the share of perfectly informed shoppers.
If the market becomes more transparent for consumers, the share of shoppers increases.
Analysing the effect of a change in φ is more complicated than a change in η because
φ enters the deviation and punishment profits.
An increase in the share of shoppers, φ, increases the number of consumers that
would buy from a firm that marginally undercuts the collusive price and hence makes
a deviation more attractive. To illustrate this point, let us focus on two extreme cases:
If the share of shoppers is close to zero, then if φ converges towards zero, the deviation
profit converges towards the collusive profit. This is because if no consumer observes
the deviation, then as many consumers randomly see the price of the producer and buy
its good as under the collusive price. Producers thus have no incentive to deviate from
the collusive agreement in the absence of informed shoppers and the critical discount
factor becomes zero. If the share of shoppers is close to one, then if φ converges towards
one, the deviation profit converges towards the monopoly profit. This maximizes the
incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement driven by the deviation profits.
At the same time, a higher share of shoppers decreases expected profits in the
static Nash equilibrium, i.e. the punishment profit. This is because the higher the share
of shoppers, the more consumers will go to the lowest price producer in a punishment
phase. Furthermore, if the share of shoppers increases, the domain of prices over which
firms mix moves towards lower prices.
The deviation profits increase linearly in the share of shoppers, whereas the
punishment profits decrease in φ but do this more strongly for small values of φ than
for larger ones. For very low values of φ, the reservation price is higher than the
valuation that consumers have for the good. In this case, the reservation price does
not bind firm pricing and the critical discount factor does not change in case of a
marginal increase in φ. Overall, marginally increasing consumer transparency weakly
decreases the critical discount factor δ for small values of φ, φ ≤ φ¯, and increases the
critical discount factor δ for values of φ, φ ≥ φ¯. 17
So far, we treated consumer and producer transparency as dichotomous. In
reality, unless producers are already perfectly informed ex ante, an increase in consumer
transparency often also comes with an increase in transparency on the producer side.
Therefore, we introduce a common factor of transparency α such that φ = φ(α) with
φ′(α) > 0 and η = η(α) with η′(α) > 0. Before analyzing the effect of a change in
17We prove this for n = 2 in Appendix D.2 and illustrate this using a numerical example in Figure 4.1.
Petrikaite (2016) shows numerically that this is also the case for n = 3, n = 4 and n = 6.
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α on the profitability of engaging in collusive behavior, it is helpful to introduce the
elasticity of η with respect to α:
eη,α ≡ ∂η
∂α
α
η
, (4.3)
and the elasticity of φ with respect to α:
eφ,α ≡ ∂φ
∂α
α
φ
. (4.4)
Proposition 3. A marginal increase in common transparency α can increase or de-
crease the critical discount factor δ, depending on the ex ante levels of transparency η
and φ, as well as the elasticities of η and φ with respect to α.
If a common factor of transparency α increases, for example through mandatory
price disclosure, then η and φ both increase so long as neither producers nor consumers
are perfectly informed ex ante. To understand how the marginal increase of a common
factor of transparency affects the critical discount factor, we must thus analyze its
effect through the channels described in Propositions 1 and 2. We do this separately
for the two cases introduced in Proposition 2.
For low values of consumer transparency φ, φ ≤ φ¯, a marginal increase in φ
decreases the critical discount factor. At the same time, a marginal increase in producer
transparency decreases the critical discount factor. Thus, for low values of φ, φ ≤ φ¯,
a marginal increase in common transparency α always decreases the critical discount
factor and is hence anti-competitive.
For high values of consumer transparency φ, φ ≥ φ¯, a marginal increase in
φ increases the critical discount factor. However, a marginal increase in producer
transparency continues to decrease the critical discount factor. In this case, whether
a marginal increase in a common factor of transparency is pro- or anti-competitive
thus depends on the relative size of these two countervailing effects. In Appendix D.1,
we derive conditions under which increasing common transparency makes collusive
behavior less stable and is thus pro-competitive.
4.3.5 Theoretical Predictions
There are two other types of theoretical models that allow for changes in producer
and consumer transparency at the same time. Firstly, Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019)
show that for differentiated products increasing a common factor of price transparency
can be pro- or anti-competitive. Secondly, Schultz (2017) shows that for homogeneous
goods, increasing a common factor of price transparency is always anti-competitive
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and increasing consumer transparency has no effect on the critical discount factor if
producers are already perfectly informed. Our results are thus in strong contrast to
previous findings in the theoretical literature, as we are, to the best of our knowledge,
the first to show that increasing common transparency can increase the critical discount
factor in homogeneous goods markets.18 This difference in results is caused by our
assumption to allow non-shoppers to search sequentially. Our results have important
policy implications because if increasing price transparency on both sides of the market
was always anti-competitive, such a policy should never be considered by a consumer-
centric policymaker.
At the same time, Proposition 2 shows that even if producers are perfectly in-
formed ex ante (i.e. η = 1), a marginal increase in consumer transparency can be pro-
or anti-competitive. Thus, even if firms are perfectly informed ex ante, the direction
of the effect of mandatory price disclosure on prices remains an empirical question.
The predicted effect of a marginal increase in consumer transparency is very dif-
ferent depending on the ex ante levels of transparency. In Figure 4.1, we illustrate how
a change in transparency affects the critical discount factor for a given set of parameter
values.19 Note, that when the reservation price, which depends on the sequential search
cost and the share of informed consumers, is greater than the valuation of the good by
consumers, the reservation price does not restrict pricing of the firms anymore. In this
case, the critical discount factor is independent of the share of informed consumers.
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between consumer transparency and the critical
discount factor for different levels of producer transparency. An increase in producer
transparency leads to a shift in the curve and always results in a decrease of the critical
discount factor. If mandatory price disclosure affects consumer and producer transpar-
ency, this therefore leads to a shift of the curve (increase in producer transparency), as
well as a move along the curve (increase in consumer transparency). Depending on the
ex ante levels of consumer and producer transparency, as well as the magnitude of the
change in consumer and producer transparency, mandatory price disclosure can thus
increase or decrease the critical discount factor.
Some of these predicted effects are in line with predictions from other models,
whereas others are not. To contrast predictions of the different theoretical models,
we focus on the effect of changes in consumer transparency. For very low levels of
consumer transparency, a marginal increase in φ does not affect the critical discount
18Petrikaite (2016) shows that increasing consumer transparency can be pro- or anti-competitive in
homogeneous goods markets and we extend her model by allowing producers to be imperfectly
informed and analyzing changes in common transparency.
19We set the number of firms to n = 2, the sequential search cost s = 1 and the valuation of the good
υ = 10, according to the values chosen by Petrikaite (2016) in her simulations. The pattern looks
similar for other parameter values.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of transparency on the critical discount factor
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Notes: Each line shows how the critical discount factor changes with the level of consumer transparency
for a given level of producer transparency. The different lines show this relationship for different levels
of producer transparency. All simulations use the following parameter values: n = 2, s = 1 and υ = 10.
factor. This is observationally equivalent to how a change in consumer transparency
affects the critical discount factor in the homogeneous goods models of Schultz (2017).
When φ is sufficiently high such that the reservation price is below the valuation
of the good by consumers, but φ ≤ φ¯, a marginal increase in φ decreases the critical
discount factor. Observing such a pattern is never consistent with the models in Schultz
(2017) or Luco (2019).
For intermediate levels of φ, a marginal increase in consumer transparency in-
creases the critical discount factor and the absolute value of the marginal effect in-
creases in the ex ante level of consumer transparency. Observing such a pattern is
never consistent with the models in Schultz (2017) or Luco (2019).
For high levels of φ, a marginal increase in consumer transparency increases the
critical discount factor and the absolute value of the marginal effect decreases. This is
observationally equivalent to the effect of an increase in consumer transparency in the
differentiated goods models in Schultz (2017) or Luco (2019).
In the model described in this paper, for intermediate levels of consumer trans-
parency a marginal increase in φ thus leads to an effect on the critical discount factor
which is inconsistent with other candidate models. Empirical evidence may hence allow
to assess which model best fits a particular market.
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Finally, an interesting result of the theoretical model is the U-shaped relationship
between consumer information and the profitability of collusive behavior. This implies
that, under certain circumstances, it is possible that a marginal increase in consumer
information is anti-competitive, whereas a large increase is pro-competitive. However,
if a marginal increase in consumer information is pro-competitive, then a large increase
is always pro-competitive. Therefore, if a competition authority finds that the market
is in a situation where a marginal increase in consumer information induces collusive
behavior, it should nevertheless assess how large of an increase in consumer information
would be necessary to make it pro-competitive and whether this is feasible.
4.4 Data
To analyze the effect of mandatory price disclosure, we combine data from multiple
sources. Our core data set contains station-level retail margins for the universe of
petrol stations in Germany and France for the years 2013 and 2014. We supplement
this with information on local media reports about local petrol prices by radio stations
and a proxy for the station-level share of ex ante perfectly informed consumers based
on commuter data.
4.4.1 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics
We construct our primary data set containing station-level retail margins for E5 petrol
on weekdays at 9 am and 5 pm between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2014 in Ger-
many.20 To calculate retail margins, we subtract the daily average ex-refinery wholesale
price across refineries in Germany from the station-level retail petrol prices. Station-
level retail margins are complemented by station characteristics such as information on
the firm name, brand, address and geographic coordinates.
The price panel after the MTU introduction is constructed based on all station-
level notifications of price changes to the MTU since 1 October 2013. Each time a new
price for a station is notified, we update the price of the station in our panel data set.
A novel and unique feature of our data is that, to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to use rich station-level price information before the introduction of
the MTU. Before the introduction of the MTU, some smartphone apps existed that
allowed their users to self-report station-level petrol prices. Although the usage of
these apps was only a fraction of the usage of price comparison apps after the MTU
introduction and the publicity that came with it, the pre-MTU apps contain rich price
20E5 is standard petrol with an octane grade of 95 and an ethanol share of up to 5%.
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information.21 We use price data for the pre-MTU period supplied by one of the leading
apps collecting self-reported prices. This data set comprises 17 million price reports for
more than 13, 500 stations between 1 January and 12 September 2013. Although the
MTU went into operation on 12 September 2013, we only have access to its data from
the 1 October 2013 onwards. Since our self-reported pre-MTU data only goes until the
12 September 2013, the period in between is not subject of our analysis.
For most days in the pre-MTU period, we have prices for more than 80% of
petrol stations.22 In case the reporting of prices is not random, selection could harm
the validity of our estimation results. The most natural selection mechanism is that
petrol stations themselves report prices onto the apps when they are low to attract
shoppers. At the same time, they could refrain from posting prices when they are high
in order not to discourage consumers from driving to their petrol station and discover
the price. In this case, prices in our sample before the MTU introduction should be
downward-biased. However, since we find that prices decreased after the introduction
of the MTU, this selection mechanism would work against us, and our estimates can
be seen as a lower bound.
Another concern could be that the composition of petrol stations changed in our
sample before and after the introduction of the MTU. Table 4.1 presents summary
statistics of our data. As can be seen in Panel A, the composition of petrol stations
in our data does not change significantly between the pre- and post-MTU periods
concerning the share of integrated stations, the share of oligopoly stations, the share
of commuters or the number of competitors in local petrol markets. A detailed split
of petrol stations by brand before and after the MTU introduction can be found in
Table D.1 of Appendix D.3. Overall, the composition of brands is very similar.23
The largest share of the retail price for petrol in Germany consists of taxes and
input costs. To analyze the share of the petrol price that can be influenced by petrol
stations, we focus on retail margins. Firstly, we subtract taxes and levies to compute
net petrol prices. Thereafter, we subtract the daily average ex-refinery price of E5 at
German oil refineries to obtain retail margins. Daily ex-refinery prices are taken from
21Figure D.7 shows for three mobile price comparison applications for which data is available in 2014,
that the number of page impressions increased strongly over the course of the year 2014.
22The daily number of petrol stations with price reports and the number of daily price changes are
reported in Figures D.2 and D.3 . We exclude days after the MTU introduction from our analysis,
where the number of price changes compared to the previous day drop by more than 40%. Since we
observe the universe of price changes after the introduction of the MTU, and the average number of
daily price changes is usually stable, we conclude that these days are affected by technical difficulties.
In total, this affects ten days during the 15 months of data used from the MTU.
23To exclude the possibility that small changes in the brand composition drive our results, we repeat
the analysis for different sub-samples such as integrated and non-integrated stations, as well as for
the two largest brands, Aral and Shell, in Appendix D.11. These additional analyses show that our
results are robust to changes in the sample.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
A. Station characteristics
DE pre-MTU DE post-MTU France
Number of stations 13,704 14,414 7,240
Share of integrated stations 59% 58%
Share of oligopoly stations 48% 47%
Median # comp. (5 km catchments) 4 3 2
Share of local monopolists 15% 15% 22%
Mean share of commuters 34% 34%
B. Prices and margins
DE pre-MTU DE post-MTU DE pre-MTU DE post-MTU France
at 9 am at 9 am at 5 pm at 5 pm at 5 pm
Mean price 1.62 1.55 1.59 1.50 1.54
Mean retail margin 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.19
Mean daily spread 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.15
Notes: “DE pre-MTU” and “DE post-MTU” refer to petrol stations in Germany before and after
the introduction of the MTU, respectively. The pre-MTU phase goes from 1 January 2013 until
12 September 2013. The post-MTU phase goes from 1 October 2013 until 31 December 2014. For
France, all figures are for the full period 1 January 2013 until 31 December 2014. The average daily
spread is measured as the average of the difference between the retail margin at the 95th percentile
and the 5th on each day.
Oil Market Reports, a business intelligence firm, generally regarded as the most reliable
source for refinery prices and used as a data source by the GFCO.
Since January 2007, all petrol stations in France selling more than 500m3 of
petrol per year have to report all price changes to a government agency similar to
the MTU in Germany. Regular checks are carried out and fines imposed on petrol
stations that do not comply with this rule. To the best of our knowledge, France is the
only other European country for which station-level petrol prices are available during
this period.24 The French government makes all price information since 2007 publicly
available on a government website.25 We thus observe the universe of price changes of
these petrol stations in France for our observation period. The data is regarded to be
of very high quality and has previously been used by other researchers.26
The data set contains a list of notifications with the price, the type of fuel, the
address and geographic coordinates of the petrol stations and the opening times. In
24Austria introduced mandatory price disclosure in 2011, however only published the five lowest prices
in a local market. In addition, daily average prices at the state level are available for Austria. We,
therefore, show descriptive results of the effect of the MTU introduction using Austria as a control
group in Appendix D.8. These results are consistent with our main results.
25https://www.prix-carburants.gouv.fr/rubrique/opendata/. Accessed 3 February 2019.
26Gautier and Saout (2015), for example, use this data to study the speed at which market prices of
refined oil are transmitted to retail petrol prices.
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contrast to the data of the MTU in Germany, it does not contain any information on
the brand of the station or any other company-related information.
To compute retail margins, we also need a measure for input prices in France.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no comparable data to the ex-refinery prices for
Germany by Oil Market Reports available for France. We thus use daily market prices
for refined oil at the port of Rotterdam as a proxy for ex-refinery prices in France.
4.4.2 Exogenous Information Shocks
To study the effect of a follow-on information campaign, we analyze the impact of local
radio reports about petrol prices in the radio station’s reception area. The creation of
the MTU made it easy for local radio stations to access real-time information on the
distribution of petrol prices in their reception area. Although the MTU introduction
changed the information sets of consumers, this does not mean that all consumers
suddenly knew all prices. Follow-on radio reports thus constitute additional shocks
to consumer information. At the same time, it seems plausible that petrol stations
immediately incorporated the price information by the MTU and hence were unaffected
by additional radio reports. We, therefore, consider these reports to be pure shocks to
φ in our theoretical model.
To study the impact of local radio reports, we hand-collected data on regular
broadcasts of local petrol prices by local radio stations in Bavaria, the largest region in
Germany. By contacting program directors of around 60 radio stations, we collected
information on which radio stations broadcasted petrol prices at which point in time
between 2012 and 2017. There are two local radio stations regularly broadcasting petrol
prices after the introduction of the MTU. Radio Arabella, which started its broadcast
on 25 April 2014, and Extra-Radio, which started its broadcasts on 2 February 2014.
Using geocoded reception areas for these radio stations provided by fmlist.org and
combining this with the geocoded location of petrol stations, we know for which petrol
station potential customers were affected by these broadcasts on which day.27
4.4.3 Consumer Search and Information
The theoretical model suggests that the effect of an increase in transparency depends
on the ex ante share of informed consumers. We follow Pennerstorfer et al. (2019) to
compute the share of ex ante informed consumers at the petrol station level. Out-of-
municipality commuters are assumed to be perfectly informed about petrol stations
which they drive past on their daily commute. Drivers that do not leave their muni-
27A detailed description of the radio station reports can be found in Appendix D.5.
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cipality on their way to work are uninformed about prices and have to search. The
share of ex ante informed consumers is thus the share of commuters among potential
customers of a station.
To calculate this, we use administrative data on the universe of commuters,
collected by the German Federal Employment Agency. The data includes the number of
commuters from one municipality to another for all 11, 197 municipalities in Germany.
To calculate how many out-of-municipality commuters drive by a particular petrol
station, we use a shortest-path algorithm to calculate the driving distance between two
municipality centroids via the road network. We then calculate the driving distance
between the two municipality centroids and a petrol station. If the sum of the distances
between the municipality centroids and the petrol station are less than 250 meters
longer than the shortest path between the two centroids, we assume that commuters
on this route drive by the particular petrol station. Since we are interested in the ex
ante level of information, we use commuter data on 30 June 2013, which is less than
three months before the introduction of the MTU.28
4.5 Empirical Analysis
We begin by studying the average effect of mandatory price disclosure. We do this by
comparing the evolution of retail margins of petrol stations in Germany and France
before and after the introduction of the MTU. In terms of the theoretical model, the
MTU introduction is a shock to α, since both, producers and consumers, are affected.
In Section 4.6 we disentangle the mechanisms underlying this average effect.
4.5.1 Setup
The introduction of the MTU in Germany led to the creation of a large number of new
websites and smartphone applications diffusing petrol price information and was ac-
companied by numerous reports in the press. In the months following the introduction
of the MTU, the number of drivers using price information services strongly increased,
and petrol station managers universally had easy access to real-time price information
of their rivals.29
To causally study the average effect of the MTU on retail margins, we use a
difference-in-differences (DiD) framework in which we compare retail margins of petrol
28The methodology to compute the share of ex ante informed consumers is described in Appendix D.6.
29We present evidence on the evolution of monthly page impressions for three smartphone applications
in Appendix D.3. Although the applications already had a combined number of 9 million monthly
page impressions in April 2014, this increased to more than 70 million monthly page impressions
in December 2014.Monthly page impression data for the smartphone applications is only available
starting in April 2014.
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stations in Germany to those in France, before and after the introduction of the MTU.
Specifically, we estimate the following fixed effects regression:
Yit = β0 + β1MTUit + µi + γt + it (4.5)
where Yit corresponds to the retail margin of station i at date t and MTUit is
a dummy equal to one, if petrol station i has to report its prices to the MTU at date
t. This affects all petrol stations in Germany after the 1 October 2013. µi are petrol
station fixed effects, and γt are date fixed effects.
France as a Control Group
To identify the causal effect of the introduction of the MTU, we use the evolution
of retail margins at petrol stations in France as a comparison. To the best of our
knowledge, France is the only other country for which station-level petrol prices and
retail margins are available for most stations for the full observation period.
Two assumptions need to be met to identify the causal effect of the MTU in
our framework: The first assumption is that there cannot be any other transitory
shocks affecting petrol stations in France and Germany differently before and after the
introduction of the MTU other than the introduction of the MTU itself. The second
assumption is that there are no spillovers from the treatment onto the control group.
Subsequently, we provide evidence that suggests that both assumptions hold.
The station fixed effects capture time-invariant differences between petrol sta-
tions in France and Germany. The date fixed effects capture transitory shocks that
affect French and German petrol stations equally. Due to its similarities in size, wealth
and geographic location, as well as our narrow observation period, there should not be
any additional transitory demand and supply shocks that affect France and Germany
differently. We nevertheless discuss the most obvious candidates.
Important transitory demand shocks in the petrol market are school and public
holidays, as well as local economic shocks. School and public holidays in France and
Germany are highly correlated. In addition, since holidaymakers in Europe often cross
several countries on the way to their holiday destination and France and Germany
are popular holiday destinations and important transit countries, they are usually hit
similarly and at the same time by these demand shocks. A second concern could be
local economic shocks affecting cargo shipping and thus the demand for petrol. Since
commercial vehicles, such as trucks transporting cargo and company cars usually run
on diesel, our analysis of the effects of the MTU on prices of E5 (i.e. regular petrol)
should be unaffected by transitory local shocks to the economy.
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Transitory supply shocks affect petrol stations much in the same way. Due to
their geographic proximity, petrol stations in France and Germany procure most of
their petrol from similar sources. Furthermore, the European Single Market and the
Schengen Agreement mean customs, border controls or other regulatory hurdles do not
restrict arbitrage possibilities between the two countries. To nevertheless ensure the
elimination of any transitory shocks to input prices and to restrict our analysis to the
share of the petrol price that can be affected by petrol stations, we use retail margins
as outcome variables instead of prices. These retail margins are net of taxes, levies and
ex-refinery petrol prices on a given day.30
Also, petrol stations in France constitute a good control group because there
were no important regulatory changes in the French petrol market over our observation
period. The impact of the introduction of mandatory price disclosure in 2007 should
have stabilized by 2013 and thus not affect different French petrol stations differently
over our observation period. In contrast to other countries, France, like Germany, did
not restrict its petrol stations in their price-setting behavior other than by imposing
mandatory price disclosure.31
One might be worried that there may still be idiosyncratic developments, which
add random noise to the data and thus lead to an underestimation of the absolute value
of the effects. We, therefore, re-run our analysis for a subsample of the data around
the Franco-German border, for which the economic conditions should be similar due
to geographic proximity. Firstly, we restrict our analysis to petrol stations that are 40
kilometers left and right to the border. Petrol stations in the treatment and control
groups are thus in the same economic area and only exposed to common transitory
shocks. Secondly, to eliminate any potential spillover effects, we drop all petrol stations
that are less than 20 kilometers left and right of the border. We are left with a Donut-
DiD, where stations on both sides of the border are geographically close, but stations
that are potentially subject to spillover effects are dropped.
Finally, we re-run our analysis comparing retail margins in Germany and France
after excluding local monopolists. If mandatory price disclosure has an effect on retail
margins, we expect the size of the treatment effect to be larger after excluding local
monopolists, because their customers are unaffected by the information treatment,
since they have no competitor to switch to. Driving to another petrol station is costly
and hence retail petrol markets are usually segmented geographically. In the following,
30Since we do not have ex-refinery prices for France, we use the wholesale price of Brent oil in Rotterdam
as a proxy. The station fixed effects should capture time-invariant differences between ex-refinery
prices and the wholesale price in Rotterdam.
31 In 2011, Austria, for example, introduced a rule banning petrol stations from raising prices more
than once a day.
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we define local markets as 5 kilometers driving distance catchment areas around a focal
station.32
In the appendix, we report results of using further identification strategies to
test the robustness of our estimates. These include comparing retail margins between
Germany and Austria, analyzing differences between local monopolists and other petrol
stations in Germany, and using a triple-difference strategy, in which we compare local
monopolists to other petrol stations, in Germany and France, before and after the
introduction of the MTU. All of our findings are in line with our main findings and
suggest that our estimated average treatment effect is robust.
Retail Margins at 5 pm
Although there are no restrictions on the number of times petrol stations can change
prices in France or Germany, there are strong differences in the number of times they
do. Whereas petrol stations in Germany change their prices on average four times a
day over our observation period, French petrol stations change prices less than once
a day.33 Since we do not observe volume data, we cannot compute volume-weighted
average retail margins over the day. We could thus either pick a particular time of day
at which to measure retail margins or calculate a simple average of margins at different
times of the day. Since petrol prices in France stay fairly constant during the day,
either approach should lead to a similar result for France. The frequent price changes
in Germany however, make it important to select the right time for which to calculate
retail margins.
We choose to use prices at 5 pm to construct retail margins for our analysis. A
representative survey among motorists commissioned by the GMEAE (2018) in 2016
found that around 60 percent of respondents buy petrol between 4 pm and 7 pm, of
which two-thirds buy petrol between 5 pm and 6 pm. At the same time, less than 5
percent of respondents buy petrol before 10 am.34 The GMEAE (2018) furthermore
documents daily price cycles with high prices in the morning, which fall over the day
and rise again in the evening at around 8 pm.35 This suggests that consumers are
aware of these price cycles and fuel during the low price period in the late afternoon.36
32The empirical literature analyzing price dispersion in retail petrol markets considers different geo-
graphic market definitions. For example, Chandra and Tappata (2011) consider a 1 mile as well as
a 2 miles radius, while Barron et al. (2004), Hosken et al. (2008) and Lewis (2008) consider a radius
of 1.5 miles. We use different catchment sizes in further results in Appendix D.9.
33This is consistent with findings by Haucap et al. (2017) for Germany and Gautier and Saout (2015)
for France.
34The daily fueling patterns are described in detail in Figure D.5 in Appendix D.3.
35This is consistent with pricing patterns in the data described in Figure D.6 in Appendix D.3.
36There are numerous newspaper articles on intertemporal price dispersion during our observation
period, which suggest that consumers are aware of these patterns.
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To gauge the effect of introducing mandatory price disclosure on consumers, it is there-
fore sensible to focus on retail margins at times where consumers buy petrol in large
volumes.
4.5.2 Results
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of indexed retail margins in France and Germany
between April 2013 and December 2014. Since the MTU was introduced on the 12
September 2013, our observation period begins 5 months before its introduction.37 At
first, the MTU was in a test phase, which lasted until 1 December 2013, after which
the MTU was fully launched. The beginning of the test phase is represented by the
solid line and the beginning of the full-scale phase by the dashed line. We index the
retail margins in France and Germany by their level on the first day of our observation
period, to account for differences in the levels of retail margins.38
We see that before the introduction of mandatory price disclosure in Germany,
the relative evolution of retail margins in both countries was similar. The parallel
evolution of retail margins continues until December 2013, after which indexed retail
margins in Germany fall significantly below indexed retail margins in France. This
difference remains until the end of our observation period. It suggests that the effect of
the MTU did not set in immediately, but caused a persistent decrease in retail margins.
In particular, indexed retail margins only separate substantially after the beginning of
the full-scale phase of the MTU.39
Between 12 September and 1 December 2013, the MTU was in a test phase.
During this time, petrol stations, the competition authority and information providers
diffusing the price information were experimenting with the technical implementation.
We therefore exclude the test phase from our analysis and compare retail margins
before the beginning of the test phase to after the MTU was fully implemented.
Table 4.2 shows the results of estimating the regression model presented in Equa-
37 Including March 2013 would significantly add noise to our estimations. There is a large, short-term
drop in retail margins in Germany at the beginning of March, which increases and a reversion to
previous levels during the second half of the month. This is not an artifact of our data, since the
same spike can be seen in the Weekly Oil Bulletin by the European Commission for Germany only,
but cannot be observed in ex-refinery prices.
38Note, that we are using ex-refinery prices as input costs for Germany (i.e. after transportation to
the refinery and refining), whereas we use the wholesale Brent oil price as input costs for France
(i.e. without transportation and refining costs). We would therefore expect estimated margins to be
higher for France, which is what we observe.
39There is a strong temporary increase in relative retail margins shortly before the introduction of the
MTU in September 2013. To show that our results are not driven by this temporary increase in
Germany relative to France, we re-estimate our main results dropping September 2013. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table D.7 in Appendix D.13 and are in line with our main results
in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of retail margins
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Notes: The solid line shows the evolution of the eleven-day moving average indexed daily average retail
margin of petrol stations at 5 pm in Germany between April 2013 and December 2014. The dashed
line shows the evolution of the eleven-day moving average indexed daily average retail margin of petrol
stations in France at 5 pm over the same period. The average retail margins at the beginning of the
observation period, on 12 April 2013, are indexed to one. The solid vertical line shows the beginning
of the test phase of the MTU, on 12 September 2013. The dashed vertical line shows the beginning of
the full-scale phase of the MTU, on 1 December 2013.
tion 4.5. To allow for the treatment effect to take some time to set in, we estimate
the model for two different lengths in time after the introduction of the MTU. Column
(1) shows the estimates using data until 30 September 2014 and column (2) until 31
December 2014. In columns (3) and (4), we re-estimate the model for the different
time-periods only using a sub-sample of petrol stations 20 to 40 kilometers away from
the Franco-German border. In columns (5) and (6), we re-estimate the model for the
different time-periods using all petrol stations in France except for local monopolists
defined on 5 kilometers catchment areas.
The results in columns (1) and (2) show that the MTU led to a statistically and
economically significant decrease in retail margins and that this effect grew over time.
Considering data until September 2014, we find that the MTU decreased retail margins
by 0.89 Eurocent. This effect increases to 1.63 Eurocent if we consider the period until
December 2014.
These results suggest a slow onset of the effect of the MTU, which becomes
stronger over time. The findings are in line with evidence on the evolution of monthly
page impressions for three smartphone applications presented in Appendix D.3. Al-
though the applications already had a combined number of 9 million monthly page
impressions in April 2014, this increased to more than 70 million monthly page impres-
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Table 4.2: The effect of the MTU on retail margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MTU introduction -0.89∗∗∗ -1.63∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.23) (0.02) (0.03)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,219,476 7,573,649 111,319 136,561 5,196,002 6,323,512
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.904 0.904 0.886 0.919 0.902
Mean retail margin 10.90 11.15 10.42 10.71 10.56 10.80
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30 November 2013) is dropped in
all specifications. Column (1) uses data for all stations in Germany and France until 30 Septem-
ber 2014. Column (2) uses data for all stations in Germany and France until 31 December 2014.
Column (3) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from the Franco-German border until
30 September 2014. Column (4) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from the Franco-
German border until 31 December 2014. Column (5) uses data for all petrol stations except those
without a competitor within a 5 km catchement area in Germany and France until 30 September
2014. Column (6) uses data for all petrol stations except those without a competitor within a 5 km
catchement area in Germany and France until 31 December 2014.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
sions in December 2014.40
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the Donut-DiD regression, using only
the sub-sample of petrol stations 20 to 40 kilometers away from the Franco-German
border.41 As expected, the absolute values of the coefficients are larger than those in
columns (1) and (2). As explained before, this is likely due to idiosyncratic changes
in retail margins, which are independent of the MTU and the treatment and control
groups, but add random noise to the data and thus lead to an underestimation of the
absolute value of the treatment effect.
Finally, when comparing results in columns (5) and (6) to the baseline results
in columns (1) and (2), we find that if we exclude local monopolists on both sides
of the border from the analysis, this increases the size of the magnitude. This is
consistent with the treatment effect being attributed to mandatory price disclosure
because we expect its effect to be zero on local monopolists and thus including these
in the treatment group should bias the results towards zero.
Overall, the results suggest that mandatory price disclosure led to a significant
and persistent decrease in average retail margins in Germany. Considering that retail
40Monthly page impression data for the smartphone applications is only available starting in April
2014.
41The results are robust to changes to the distance thresholds. We provide estimates for alternative
thresholds in Appendix D.7.
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margins in Germany were 7.9 Eurocent on average during our observation period, the
estimated effects of the MTU are economically significant. With a treatment effect of
approximately 1 Eurocent, the MTU led to a decrease in retail margins by 13 percent.
4.6 Mechanisms
A key question is what determines whether mandatory price disclosure is beneficial for
consumers or not. The theoretical model in Section 4.3 showed that two factors drive
the effect of mandatory price disclosure: The number of consumers adopting the in-
formation from mandatory price disclosure and the share of consumers that are already
informed about prices before the information shock. In the following, we provide evid-
ence on these mechanisms.
4.6.1 Effect of a Follow-on Shock to Consumer Transparency
Using local radio reports about petrol prices, we study empirically how follow-on in-
formation campaigns affect retail margins. A few months after mandatory price dis-
closure was introduced, some local radio stations started broadcasting the lowest petrol
prices in their reception area. Although only some consumers adopted the information
of the MTU directly, it is reasonable to assume that producers immediately adopted
the available price information. Thus, local radio reports affect the information sets
of consumers, but not producers and can be considered as pure shocks to consumer
transparency, φ.
Petrol prices are an often discussed topic amongst drivers, of which many listen
to local radio stations on their daily commute. Petrol prices have therefore always been
a recurring segment for local radio stations, but only after the introduction of the MTU
did they have a tool to view the distribution of petrol prices in their reception area at
low cost. Some of these radio stations, therefore, started diffusing the cheapest petrol
prices in their reception area and their respective prices several times a day. Although
for some listeners the listed stations might not be sufficiently close by, the broadcasts
nevertheless inform them about the current lower end of the price distribution in their
region.
To estimate the effect of local radio reports on petrol prices, we collected in-
formation for all radio stations in Bavaria whether they started regular broadcasts of
petrol prices after the introduction of the MTU and which petrol stations lie within
their reception area.42 We identify four radio stations that reported the lowest petrol
prices in their reception area regularly. Two of these radio stations allowed listeners
42We define “regularly” as at least once a day over a period of more than a month.
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to call in petrol prices before the MTU and then reported the lowest called in prices.
We exclude all petrol stations in their reception areas from the analysis, as they are
treated throughout the observation period. Using a DiD framework, we estimate the
following fixed effects regression model:
Yit = β0 + β1Radioit + µi + γt + it (4.6)
where Yit corresponds to the retail margin of station i at time t and Radioit is
a dummy equal to one, if petrol station i lies in the reception area of a radio station
broadcasting local petrol prices at date t. µi are petrol station fixed effects, and γt are
date fixed effects.
Since we only have information on radio reports in Bavaria, we restrict our ana-
lysis to petrol stations in Bavaria. We can thus exclude that petrol stations in the
control group are affected by reports of radio stations we have not surveyed. We re-
strict our analysis to the period October 2013 until September 2014, which is the twelve
months after the beginning of the test phase of the MTU.
To estimate the causal effects of radio reports on retail margins, we need to ensure
that there are no spillovers of radio reports onto petrol stations in the control group and
that the decision of radio stations to report was not because they anticipated evolutions
in their local market that would also affect petrol prices. As we will see below, radio
stations starting reports about petrol prices in Bavaria are located in urban areas.
Although we control for differences in levels between the petrol stations using petrol
station fixed effects, we are estimating an average treatment effect on the treated.
There are two possibilities which could lead to spillover effects between the treat-
ment and control groups: Firstly, motorists outside of the reception area of the radio
station could listen to the radio station via the internet. Secondly, commuters driv-
ing through the reception area of the radio station could update their information
set by listening to the broadcasts and change their behavior accordingly after leaving
the reception area. Both of these threats to identification are unlikely to be strong.
Radio stations were still predominantly listened to via short-wave in 2013 and 2014.
In particular, in more rural areas, mobile internet reception was still weak, making it
difficult to listen to radio via the internet when on the road. Furthermore, although
commuters learn something about the distribution of prices by listening to the radio,
which may still be valuable outside the reception area, the value of this information is
likely decreasing with distance to the reception area. In any event, both concerns lead
to the control group being partially treated and would thus lead us to underestimate
the treatment effect.
Another potential threat to identification could be that radio stations anticipated
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a trend that would create local demand for reports about petrol prices and that also
affected petrol prices. However, this seems unlikely. After multiple interviews, we
learned from program directors that the decision of broadcasting petrol prices was not
made based on a market analysis, but rather on the fit of such a segment to the existing
program.
We now turn to the radio stations that define our treatment group. We consider
radio reports about petrol prices by Extra-Radio, which broadcasts in and around Hof,
a city in North-Eastern Bavaria, close to the Czech border, and Radio Arabella, which is
a radio station broadcasting in and around Munich. Whereas Extra-Radio broadcasted
the lowest petrol prices in its reception area daily between 2 February 2014 and 5
March 2017, Radio Arabella started reporting the lowest prices several times a day on
25 April 2014 and reports are still ongoing at the time of writing.
Similar to our discussion in Section 4.5, the presence of a country border is
important. In particular, the reception area of Extra-Radio is very close to the border
with the Czech Republic, the focal city Hof being less than 10 kilometers away from
the border. Since Germany and the Czech Republic are both members of the Schengen
Area, there are no border controls and shopping in the neighboring country is frequent.
Due to lower taxes and levies, petrol prices are consistently 20 Eurocent lower in the
Czech Republic. It therefore seems plausible that independent of price reports by radio
stations or the MTU, price-sensitive shoppers always buy petrol in the Czech Republic,
whereas only inelastic consumers buy from petrol stations treated by Extra-Radio. We
would therefore expect that reports by Extra-Radio have little to no effect on retail
margins. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the regression model for both radio
stations separately. In each of these regressions we exclude petrol stations within the
reception area of the other radio station from the control group.
Table 4.3 shows the results from the regression analysis. The regression in
column (1) classifies petrol stations in the reception area of Extra-Radio and Radio
Arabella as treated. Using this identification strategy, we find that radio reports on av-
erage decreased retail margins by 0.4 Eurocent. This effect is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of regressions only classifying
petrol stations in the reception areas of Extra-Radio and Radio Arabella respectively as
treated. For Extra-Radio we find a positive coefficient, but which is statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. For Radio Arabella, we find a statistically significant decrease
in retail margins of 0.6 Eurocent. This suggests that, as expected, consumers and
petrol stations in the reception area of Extra-Radio did not react to radio broadcasts
of petrol prices, whereas consumers and petrol stations in the reception area of Radio
Arabella did.
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Table 4.3: The effect of radio reports on retail margins
Treatment group: Both Extra-Radio Radio Arabella
Radio reports -0.42∗∗∗ 0.56 -0.56∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.35) (0.05)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 516,416 455,801 502,269
Adjusted R2 0.515 0.509 0.523
Mean retail margin 6.54 6.65 6.51
Notes: There are 71 petrol stations in the reception area of Extra-Radio
and 279 petrol stations in the reception area of Radio Arabella. Column
(1) compares retail margins of petrol stations in the reception areas of
Radio Arabella and Extra-Radio to retail margins of other petrol sta-
tions in Bavaria before and after the beginning of petrol price reports.
Column (2) compares the retail margins of petrol stations in the recep-
tion area of Extra-Radio to retail margins of other petrol stations in
Bavaria before and after the beginning of petrol price reports. Column
(3) compares the retail margins of petrol stations in the reception area
of Radio Arabella to retail margins of other petrol stations in Bavaria
before and after the beginning of petrol price reports.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6.2 The Role of Ex Ante Consumer Transparency
The second result of our theoretical framework is that the level of ex ante consumer
transparency plays an important role in whether a marginal increase in transparency
makes collusive behavior more or less profitable. In particular, we found that there is a
U-shaped relationship between consumer transparency and the profitability of collusive
behavior. At the same time, increasing producer transparency always makes collusive
behavior more profitable.
Furthermore, we showed in Section 4.3 that the candidate theoretical models to
explain the effect of mandatory price disclosure differ in their predictions of how the
marginal effect of consumer information changes with the level of ex ante informed
consumers. Providing empirical evidence on the effect of the MTU conditional on the
share of ex ante informed consumers may thus help assess how well the different models
fit a particular market.
An important empirical challenge is how to measure the share of informed con-
sumers among potential customers of a petrol station. One possibility is to estimate
the spatial distribution of the intensity of the use of smartphone applications, as does
for example Luco (2019). There are three reasons why this is not appropriate in our
setting: Firstly, we are interested in the share of ex ante informed consumers and thus
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want a measure of consumer information before mandatory price disclosure was intro-
duced. Secondly, the use of price comparison applications is likely endogenous, as it
could be driven by the price level or the amount of price dispersion in a market. Fi-
nally, since there are many popular price comparison applications in Germany, getting
a full picture of the spatial distribution of search would require to get search data from
many different smartphone applications.
We therefore construct a measure of ex ante consumer information that is determ-
ined before the introduction of the MTU and that is exogenous to local petrol prices.
We do this by using the share of commuters among potential customers of a petrol
station on 30 June 2013 as the share of ex ante informed consumers. In this respect,
we follow Pennerstorfer et al. (2019), who study the effect of the share of commuters
on petrol prices in Austria. The underlying assumption is that out-of-municipality
commuters are perfectly informed about prices of petrol stations along their daily way
to work, whereas motorists that live in a municipality, but do not commute outside
of their municipality, are uninformed potential customers of petrol stations in their
municipality.43
In an ideal scenario, we would re-estimate the regression model in Section 4.5
and introduce interactions between the MTU introduction and the share of commuters.
Unfortunately, commuter data for France is not available and we must thus resort to
an alternative identification strategy. To this end, we exploit the daily price cycles and
consumption patterns to identify times of the day which are treated by the introduction
of mandatory price disclosure and others that are not.
Price cycles with low demand and high prices in the morning and high demand
and low prices in the late afternoon suggest that petrol stations are practicing third-
degree price discrimination using intertemporal differences in price.44 In general, the
demand for petrol is low and inelastic in the morning, because most motorists are on
their way to work and have little time to spare to shop for petrol. They therefore only
buy petrol if it is absolutely necessary. In contrast, in the late afternoon, motorists
are on their way back from work, have more time to fuel and shop for low prices and
demand is thus higher and more elastic. A profit maximizing oligopolist that can charge
different groups different prices would charge the low elasticity group a higher price.45
In our case, the different groups are consumers buying petrol at different times of the
43We follow Pennerstorfer et al. (2019) and exclude petrol stations in municipalities with more than 1
million inhabitants in 2013 (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne). In Germany, like in Austria,
cities are treated as a single municipality. Using out-of-municipality commuters as a proxy for
informed consumers is therefore more precise outside of very large cities.
44Figures D.5 and D.6 in Appendix D.3 describe daily fueling patterns and price patterns.
45Holmes (1989) extends the literature on third-degree price discrimination from the monopoly to the
oligopoly case and shows that oligopolists would also want to engage in such behavior.
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day. We should thus observe higher prices in the morning than in the late afternoon
if consumers in the morning react less elastically to price changes. This is in line with
the data and validates the assumption that demand in the morning is less elastic than
in the afternoon. From this, we derive our identifying assumption that retail margins
at 9 am are not affected by the introduction of the MTU, whereas retail margins at 5
pm are, and thus can serve as a control group.
We hence estimate the effect that mandatory price disclosure has on petrol prices
at 5 pm using this alternative identification strategy. Doing so also allows us to check
whether the estimated effect is in line with the results in Section 4.5. Specifically, we
estimate the following fixed effects regression:
Yith = β0 + β1MTUth + µih + γt + ith (4.7)
where Yith corresponds to the retail margin of station i at date t at hour h and
MTUth is a dummy equal to one, if petrol stations have to report prices to the MTU at
date t and the price under consideration is reported at 5 pm. µih are petrol station-hour
fixed effects, and γt are date fixed effects.
To estimate heterogeneities in the treatment effect driven by differences in the
ex ante share of informed consumers, we interact the treatment effect with the share of
commuters among potential customers of a station. We hence estimate the following
model:
Yith = α0+α1MTUth+α2MTUth×commi+α3MTUth×comm2i +µih+γt+ith (4.8)
where commi is the share of commuters among potential customers of a petrol
station and all other variables are specified as in Equation 4.7.
Table 4.4 contains the results of the different estimations. In column (1), we find
that the effect of mandatory price disclosure on retail margins is 1.8 Eurocent if we
split treatment and control group according to the time of day. The estimate may be
slightly upward biased, because if some elastic consumers switched from buying fuel in
the morning to buying fuel in the evening after having the additional information from
the MTU, this would further decrease the absolute value of the average price elasticity
of demand in the morning and thus lead to a higher optimal price in equilibrium. In
any event, the estimated effect of the introduction of mandatory price disclosure in
column (1) is in line with the findings in Section 4.5.
In column (2), the treatment effect is interacted with the first- and second-order
polynomial of the share of commuters among potential customers of a petrol station.
The results suggest that in the case of the MTU, mandatory price disclosure is always
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Table 4.4: The effect of the MTU on retail margins by commuter share
(1) (2)
MTU introduction -1.82∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
MTU × commuter share -1.09∗∗∗
(0.21)
MTU × commuter share2 1.04∗∗∗
(0.31)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes
Station-hour fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 7,448,175 7,448,175
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.643
Mean retail margin 8.67 8.67
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013
until 30 November 2013) is dropped in all specifications.
Petrol stations in municipalities with more than 1 mil-
lion inhabitants in 2013 (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and
Cologne) are dropped in all specifications. Column (1)
considers margins at 5 pm as the treatment and margins
at 9 am as the control group, using data until 30 Septem-
ber 2014. Column (2) interacts the treatment dummy
with the share of commuters among potential custom-
ers, using data until 30 September 2014. The commuter
share is measured between 0 and 1.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are
in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 4.3: Treatment effect of the MTU by share of commuters
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Notes: We exclude petrol stations in municipalities with more than 1 million inhabitants in 2013 (Ber-
lin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne) and split petrol stations into 15 quantiles of equal size according
to the commuter share. Each point shows the average effect of mandatory price disclosure for a par-
ticular quantile. The solid line plots the estimated treatment effect of the MTU depending on the
percentage share of commuters of a petrol station based on the regression coefficients in column (2) of
Table 4.4. The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
pro-competitive, but more so for higher levels of ex ante informed consumers.
To allow for a more flexible relationship, we split petrol stations into 15 quantiles
of equal size according to the share of commuters among potential customers. We
then estimate the treatment effect of the MTU separately for each quantile. Figure 4.3
plots the treatment effects for the different commuter share quantiles. Furthermore,
the solid line plots the estimated effect of the MTU by commuter share from column
(2) in Table 4.4. The results indicate that there is a downward-sloping relationship
between the commuter share and the treatment effect.
Relating these results to predictions of different theoretical models allows us to
assess the suitability of these theoretical models in our setting. Unless we assume
that marginal consumers become more easy to inform the more consumers are already
informed, we would expect to see an upward-sloping relationship between the commuter
share and the treatment effect in the absence of collusive behavior. The results therefore
suggest that incorporating collusive behavior into the theoretical model is necessary.
Next, we can relate the empirical results to the predictions about the effect of
mandatory price disclosure in the different theoretical models that include collusive
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behavior. If we assume that the effect of mandatory price disclosure on producer
transparency is orthogonal to the commuter share, then we can interpret the hetero-
geneity in the treatment effect as heterogeneity of the effect of increasing consumer
transparency depending on different levels of ex ante consumer information. In Section
4.3, we discuss how the different theoretical models give rise to different predictions
for the effect of increasing consumer transparency depending on the ex ante level of
consumer transparency.
Unless we assume that the share of new consumers becoming informed after
mandatory price disclosure increases in the share of ex ante consumer transparency,
the empirical results suggest that for most petrol stations, the absolute value of the
marginal effect of increasing consumer transparency increases with the share of ex ante
consumer transparency. This is in line with the predictions of the theoretical model in
Section 4.3 for intermediate levels of ex ante consumer transparency. It is at odds with
the predictions in the theoretical model for homogeneous goods of Schultz (2017) or for
differentiated goods of Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019). At the same time, the empirical
results suggest that for high levels of ex ante consumer transparency the magnitude of
the treatment effect decreases again. This is also consistent with the predictions for
high levels of ex ante consumer transparency in the theoretical model in Section 4.3.
4.7 Discussion
When evaluating the effect of mandatory price disclosure, it is crucial to understand
how it affects consumer and producer information, as well as how a marginal increase
of producer and consumer information affects prices. The results in this paper suggest
that the levels of ex ante consumer and producer information are important to assess
the effect of a marginal increase in information on prices. The theoretical model in
Section 4.3 shows how changes in consumer, producer and common information affect
the stability of collusive behavior. It can thus guide policymakers in assessing the effect
of mandatory price disclosure under different market conditions.
To be confident in the predictions of the theoretical model, we need to assess
how well it fits the particular market. We can do this in two ways: Firstly, by as-
sessing whether the assumptions of the model fit the qualitative description of the
market. Secondly, by evaluating whether the theoretical predictions of the model fit
the empirical evidence. We follow both of these approaches.
In Section 4.2, we describe the German retail petrol market and assess the as-
sumptions of the model qualitatively. This suggests that retail petrol is a homogeneous
good and that there are informational frictions on both sides of the market. Although
some consumers are imperfectly informed, they still have the possibility to search for
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price information by driving to different stations. Furthermore, there is evidence col-
lected by the GFCO suggesting that firms engage in collusive behavior. Like in the
theoretical models by Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019), we therefore consider a model
where both sides of the market are imperfectly informed and collusive behavior is
possible. In contrast to these models, we allow uninformed consumers to search se-
quentially.46 In contrast to Luco (2019), we model retail petrol as a homogeneous
good.
Despite the qualitative evidence of collusive behavior, one might nevertheless
be worried that focusing on models with stable collusion above the critical discount
factor is not suitable because we observe frequent price changes in the data. However,
although collusion on the critical discount factor does not capture all the dynamics
present in the market, there is abundant evidence suggesting that collusive behavior
plays an important role in the retail petrol market. Firstly, as outlined in Section 4.2,
the market investigation by the GFCO found substantial evidence consistent with col-
lusive behavior. Secondly, our results regarding the effect of mandatory price disclosure
and the ex ante share of informed consumers are in line with collusive behavior rather
than competition. Thirdly, as shown by Byrne and de Roos, 2019, tacit collusion in
the retail petrol market often involves complex pricing strategies and learning to co-
ordinate on a focal price. Observing frequent price changes is hence not evidence of
the absence of collusive behavior.
Alternatively, one could look at different models of collusive behavior which gen-
erate price cycles, as in Maskin and Tirole (1988), or price wars, as in Green and Porter
(1984). Although these models allow for richer collusive strategies, they are more re-
strictive in the modeling of information and search. Since information and search are
crucial when studying mandatory price disclosure, we thus choose to be more flexible
in modeling these aspects. Like in Cabral et al. (2019), comparative statics with re-
spect to the critical discount factor should thus be seen as changes in the likelihood of
collusive behavior. Although the model cannot exactly predict how equilibrium pricing
changes after the introduction of mandatory price disclosure, it allows inferring how
mandatory price disclosure changes the likelihood of being in a high price phase.
In Section 4.6, we assess whether the empirical evidence is consistent with the
predictions of the theoretical model. We find that the size of the marginal treatment
effect increases with the level of ex ante consumer transparency for low and medium
levels of ex ante consumer transparency, and decreases for high levels. This is consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model in Section 4.3, but does not match the
46Petrikaite (2016) also allows for uninformed consumers to search sequentially, but assumes that firms
are perfectly informed.
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predictions in the models by Schultz (2017) and Luco (2019). One might be worried
about not observing price increases for low commuter shares, since the theoretical model
predicts that for low levels of consumer transparency a marginal increase in consumer
transparency stabilizes collusion. There are two potential explanations for this: Firstly,
the commuter share is an imperfect proxy for consumer transparency and thus even
if the share of commuters is zero, there are likely to be some informed consumers.
Secondly, the change in consumer information caused by mandatory price disclosure
is unlikely to be marginal. Thus, even if a marginal increase in consumer information
stabilizes collusion, the increase in consumer information caused by mandatory price
disclosure can be pro-competitive. In this case, our empirical results remain consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model in Section 4.3, and at odds with the
predictions of other candidate models.
Although the model in Section 4.3 seems a better fit for the German retail petrol
market than other candidate models, this does not have to be the case for other markets.
The predictions in Section 4.3 can guide future researchers in distinguishing whether
this model or models for differentiated products, such as in Schultz (2017) or Luco
(2019), are more suitable. Other candidate models for homogeneous goods are nested
within the model in this paper. By setting η = 1, the model corresponds to the
homogeneous goods model by Petrikaite (2016). If s = 0, the model corresponds to the
homogeneous goods model by Schultz (2017). By setting η = 1 and s = 0, the model
corresponds to the homogeneous goods model by Schultz (2005).
Empirically, we find robust evidence that mandatory price disclosure benefited
consumers and led to a decrease in retail margins by 13 percent. A key feature of
studying the introduction of the MTU is that price information is salient, the homo-
geneity of the good allows for an easy comparison of prices and the price information
was adopted by many consumers. As shown in Figure D.7, by December 2014, three
mobile price comparison applications for which we have usage data already had more
than 70 million monthly page impressions.47 We thus estimate the effect of mandatory
price disclosure conditional on the disclosed information being adopted by consumers.
A potential concern could be that the drop in the price of crude oil in the second
half of 2014 could bias our results. Since we analyze retail margins, which are net
of input prices, and control for station and date fixed effects, this would require the
pass-through of input prices to change differently for the treatment and the control
group over time. This is unlikely to be a concern because most of our analysis only
uses data until 30 September 2014, whereas the largest share of the decrease in the
47This is a lower-bound and likely to be a strong understatement of the actual usage of price comparison
applications, since there were approximately 120 information service providers registered with the
GFCO by the end of 2014.
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price of crude oil occurred between October and December 2014. Furthermore, our
data set allows us to robustly estimate the treatment effect using different treatment
groups and different identification strategies. In particular, the effect found when only
using data for Germany and exploiting third-degree price discrimination according to
the time of day to identify treatment and control groups cannot be explained by this.
The high adoption rate of information from the MTU by consumers also sets this
analysis apart from the setting in other studies. This is likely to be an important driver
of the difference in results found in contrast to the empirical results by Luco (2019).
He shows that mandatory price disclosure in the Chilean petrol industry led to an
increase in retail margins by 9 percent. However, he also finds that only few consumers
in Chile accessed this information. The vastly different empirical results highlight the
importance of obtaining a distribution of estimates of the effect of mandatory price
disclosure in different settings. The average effect found in one setting often does not
inform about the effect in another setting. Understanding the underlying mechanisms
that drive the effect is thus indispensable.
Our data allow us to go further than the existing literature in studying these dif-
ferent mechanisms empirically. In particular, the information about local radio reports
allows us to study the effect of media reports about petrol prices after mandatory price
disclosure is introduced. The administrative data on commuter streams allows us to
construct a proxy for the ex ante share of informed consumers which is determined
before the introduction of mandatory price disclosure and exogenous to prices.
There are three main findings, which are relevant for policymakers. Firstly, the
model unambiguously predicts that, if nothing else changes, increasing price trans-
parency among producers is anti-competitive. Since we do not observe differences in
producer transparency in the German retail petrol market before the introduction of
mandatory price disclosure, we cannot study this mechanism empirically. Contrasting
the setting and results in our study to the literature can provide some helpful insights.
Whereas Luco (2019) notes that mandatory price disclosure likely improved the inform-
ation set of producers significantly, there is a lot of evidence suggesting that producers
were already well informed before the introduction of the MTU in Germany and thus
its introduction had little effect on producer transparency.48
Secondly, another important result of the theoretical model is that even if firms
are perfectly informed ex ante, an increase in price transparency can stabilize collusive
behavior. In particular, we find that the marginal effect of increasing consumer trans-
parency depends on the share of consumers that are perfectly informed about prices
ex ante. The empirical evidence supports these predictions.
48This is discussed in depth by the GFCO (2011).
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Finally, the model predicts that, holding everything else equal, if a small increase
in consumer price transparency is pro-competitive, then a large increase will be even
more so. We provide empirical evidence on the effect of increasing the share of in-
formed consumers whilst holding everything else constant, by studying the effect of
radio stations reporting petrol prices after the introduction of the MTU. Our results
suggest that media reports and information campaigns can play a crucial role in raising
the share of informed consumers. This is in line with results by Ater and Rigbi (2018),
who find that whilst consumers only made little use of price comparison sites for su-
permarkets after mandatory price disclosure was introduced in Israel, a key driver for
the pro-competitive effects of this policy were media reports ranking chains according
to the results of price comparisons.
4.8 Conclusion
As we have shown for the case of the MTU in Germany, introducing mandatory price
disclosure in homogeneous goods markets can be beneficial to consumers. By disen-
tangling the mechanisms, both theoretically and empirically, we have also shown, that
this is not a one-size-fits-all solution to remedy competition concerns in markets with
informational frictions. Under certain conditions mandatory price disclosure has a
pro-competitive effect, whereas under other conditions its effect is anti-competitive.
Based on our analysis, we offer two recommendations for policymakers: Firstly,
policymakers should assess the level of information of producers before introducing
mandatory price disclosure. If producer information is low ex ante, then mandatory
price disclosure could potentially lead to higher prices. If this is already very high ex
ante, then mandatory price disclosure is unlikely to harm consumers further through
this channel. It may, however, still do so through changes in consumer transparency.
Secondly, if policymakers decide to mandate price disclosure, they should not only
make price information available, but also push for large-scale adoption by consumers
to fully reap the pro-competitive effects. This could, for example, be done through
public information campaigns or media reports.
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Appendix D
D.1 Static Equilibrium
Since all firms are symmetric, we solve the static game by looking for the symmet-
ric Nash-equilibrium in mixed strategies. As we will see, the solution fulfilling the
equilibrium conditions is unique.
Using an optimal stopping rule, the reservation price is such that the marginal
gain of search for non-shoppers equals their marginal cost and must therefore solve:∫ pr
p
(pr − p)dG(p) = s . (4.9)
It is increasing in s, because the higher the incremental search cost, the higher
is the price above which it is not profitable for non-shoppers to engage in sequential
search. For the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the case where the search cost
s is such that the reservation price does not exceed the valuation, i.e. pr ≤ υ. When
this condition does not hold, it is not the reservation price that binds firm pricing but
the valuation υ.
Non-shoppers are homogeneous in their valuation of the good and search costs
and therefore have the same reservation price. Since sellers never choose a price above
the reservation price, non-shoppers never search in equilibrium and always go to the
shop they know the price of already.
To derive the equilibrium price distribution G(p), we take advantage of the equi-
profit condition, by which in a Nash equilibrium, all prices that are played with posi-
tive probability must yield the same expected profit. Shoppers will always buy at the
cheapest firm, whereas non-shoppers buy at the firm they randomly draw a price from.
The probability that a firm setting price pi attracts shoppers is (1−G(pi))n−1, which
is the probability that all other firms set a higher price than firm i.49 The expected
profit of firm i is therefore:
pii =
(
φ(1−G(pi))n−1 + 1− φ
n
)
pi . (4.10)
The first part of the equation is the sum of the share of shoppers in the population
multiplied by the probability that firm i attracts these shoppers and the share of
non-shoppers in the population divided by the number of firms (i.e. the share of non-
shoppers shopping at firm i). This is multiplied by the price chosen by firm i and the
expected market size of one. For firms selling at the reservation price pr this boils down
49Note, that since prices are continuously distributed and the distribution has no mass point, the
probability of two firms setting exactly the same price and sharing shoppers is zero.
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to pi(pr) = pr 1−φn , because the probability that no other firm chooses a lower price is
zero and thus G(pr) = 1.
Since by the equiprofit condition the expected profits of firm i have to be constant
for all prices it chooses with positive probability, in equilibrium pi(p) = pi(pr). Solving
this equation for the distribution of prices yields:
G(p) = 1−
((pr − p)(1− φ)
npφ
) 1
n−1
. (4.11)
Finally, we can also use the equiprofit condition to derive the lower-bound price
p. Expected profits of charging pr or p must, again, be equal. This time we can exploit
the fact that the likelihood that any firm chooses a price below the lower-bound price
is zero and thus the likelihood that a firm charging p attracts all shoppers is G(p) = 1.
Setting pi(p) = pi(pr) and solving for p yields:
p = pr(1− φ)1 + (n− 1)φ . (4.12)
The competitive profit pi∗ in the dynamic model is therefore the expression in
Equation 4.10, where pi is drawn from a distribution G(p) over the domain [p, pr].
G(p), p and pr are the unique solution to Equations 4.9, 4.11 and 4.12. Together, the
optimal stopping rule of non-shoppers and the equiprofit conditions are thus sufficient
to characterize the unique equilibrium of the one-shot Nash equilibrium game.
D.2 Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Producer transparency is modeled as the likelihood that a de-
viation from the collusionary agreement is detected by rivals. η does not enter the
profit function and only increases the likelihood of entering a punishment phase in the
next period if the firm deviates. It hence follows that increasing transparency on the
producer side always fosters collusive behavior:
∂δ
∂η
= − pi
c − pi∗
(pid − ηpi∗ − (1− η)pic)2 < 0 . (4.13)
Proof of Proposition 2. In a first step, we differentiate the critical discount factor with
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respect to φ and get:
dδ
dφ
=
(∂pid∂φ − ∂pi
c
∂φ )(pid − ηpi∗ − (1− η)pic)− (∂pi
d
∂φ − η ∂pi
∗
∂φ − (1− η)∂pi
c
∂φ )(pid − pic)
(pid − ηpi∗ − (1− η)pic)2 .
(4.14)
To prove Proposition 2, we need to determine the sign of Equation 4.14. Since the
denominator is always positive, we can focus our attention on the numerator. After
some simplifications the numerator becomes:
[∂pid
∂φ
(pic − pi∗) + ∂pi
∗
∂φ
(pid − pic)
]
η . (4.15)
We focus on the case where η > 0, i.e. a deviation from the collusive price is
observed by rivals with a strictly positive probability. If this was not the case, then
increasing the share of shoppers φ would have no effect on the critical discount factor.
With η > 0, we do not need to consider η further to determine the sign of Equation
4.15. Instead, we analyze the rest of the expression, which becomes:
∂pid
∂φ
(pic − pi∗) + ∂pi
∗
∂φ
(pid − pic) =
υ
(
1− 1
n
)(υ
n
− pr(1− φ)
n
)
+ υ
(∂pr
∂φ
1− φ
n
− pr
n
)(
φ− φ
n
)
=
υ
n2
(n− 1)
[
υ − pr + ∂pr
∂φ
(1− φ)φ
]
.
(4.16)
To determine the sign of this expression, we need an expression for the reservation
price and its derivative with respect to the share of shoppers φ.50 In equilibrium,
Equation 4.9 becomes:
1
n− 1
(1− φ
nφ
) 1
n−1
∫ pr
pr(1−φ)
1+(n−1)φ
(pr
p
− 1
) 1
n−1 pr
p
dp =
1
n− 1
(1− φ
nφ
) 1
n−1
pr
∫ 1
1(1−φ)
1+(n−1)φ
(1
t
− 1
) 1
n−1 1
t
dt .
(4.17)
If n = 2, then Equation 4.17 simplifies to:
1− φ
2φ pr
∫ 1
1−φ
1+φ
(1
t
− 1
)1
t
dt = pr
(1− φ
2φ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
)
+ 1
)
= s . (4.18)
50The remainder of the proof closely follows Petrikaite (2016).
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The reservation price therefore becomes:
pr = s
(1− φ
2φ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
)
+ 1
)−1
, (4.19)
and the derivative of the reservation price with respect to the share of shoppers
is:
∂pr
∂φ
= s
(1− φ
2φ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
)
+ 1
)−2 × (2φ+ (φ+ 1)ln(1−φ1+φ)2φ2(φ+ 1)
)
. (4.20)
We can also show that the reservation price decreases in the share of shoppers.
The search cost s, the first bracket and the denominator of the second bracket are
always positive. Furthermore, we can show that the derivative of 2φ+ (φ+ 1)ln(1−φ1+φ)
with respect to φ is negative:
−2φ− (φ− 1)ln(
1−φ
1+φ)
1− φ < 0 . (4.21)
Therefore, since φ is defined on the domain [0, 1]
2φ+ (φ+ 1)ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
)
≤ lim
φ→0
(
2φ+ (φ+ 1)ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
))
= 0 , (4.22)
and the derivative ∂pr∂φ is always negative.
Next, we plug the expression for ∂pr∂φ and s into Equation 4.16, set n = 2 and
multiply everything by 4υ . As a result we obtain the following expression:
υ − pr +
( 2φ+(φ+1)ln( 1−φ1+φ )
2φ2(φ+1)
1−φ
2φ ln(
1−φ
1+φ) + 1
)
(1− φ)pr =
υ − pr 4φ
2
(1 + φ)((1− φ)ln(1−φ1+φ) + 2φ)
.
(4.23)
In line with Proposition 2, we now show how the sign of this expression depends
on φ. As shown above, ∂pr∂φ is always negative. Furthermore
∂
∂φ
( 4φ2
(1 + φ)((1− φ)ln(1−φ1+φ) + 2φ)
)
=
8φ(2φ+ ln(1−φ1+φ))
(1 + φ)2((1− φ)ln(1−φ1+φ) + 2φ)2
< 0 , (4.24)
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where the inequality is obtained from the fact that
∂
∂φ
(
2φ+ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
))
= 2− 21− φ2 < 0 (4.25)
and thus since φ is defined on the domain [0, 1]
2φ+ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
)
≤ lim
φ→0
(
2φ+ ln
(1− φ
1 + φ
))
= 0 . (4.26)
We can therefore conclude that Equation 4.24 increases in φ. By replacing pr by
its value, we can analyze how the second part of Equation 4.23 behaves in the limits
of φ:
lim
φ→0
(
pr
4φ2
(1 + φ)((1− φ)ln(1−φ1+φ) + 2φ)
)
=∞ (4.27)
lim
φ→1
(
pr
4φ2
(1 + φ)((1− φ)ln(1−φ1+φ) + 2φ)
)
= s . (4.28)
Since we focus on cases where the search cost s ≤ pr, this means that
s ≤
∫ υ
p(υ)
(υ − p)dG(p) . (4.29)
Analogous to the steps to obtain Equation 4.19, for n = 2 this inequality simplifies
to
s ≤
(1− φ
2φ ln
(1− φ
φ+ 1
)
+ 1
)
< υ . (4.30)
Since s < υ, the derivative of the critical discount factor with respect to the share
of shoppers φ is negative for values of φ ≤ φ¯ and positive for values of φ > φ¯.
Proof of Proposition 3. The effect of a change in α on the profitability of engaging in
collusive behavior can be decomposed in the following way:
dδ
dα
= ∂δ
∂η
∂η
∂α
+ ∂δ
∂φ
∂φ
∂α
. (4.31)
Since a change in α increases the critical discount factor if, and only if, dδdα > 0, it
follows that a marginal increase in α is pro-competitive if, and only if:
eη,α
eφ,α
< −
∂δ
∂φ
∂δ
∂η
φ
η
. (4.32)
Appendix D 217
φ, η, eη,α and eφ,α are always positive and ∂δ∂η is always negative.
If ∂δ∂φ < 0, then increasing α is anti-competitive. We showed in the proof of
Proposition 2 that this is the case for φ ≤ φ¯.
For an increase in common information α to be pro-competitive, it is necessary
that ∂δ∂φ > 0, which is the case for φ ≤ φ¯. Finally, the elasticity of φ with respect to α
must be sufficiently large compared to the elasticity of η with respect to α.
D.3 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics in Germany
Figure D.1 shows the distribution of petrol stations in Germany over our sample period.
Petrol stations are spread across the country and clustered around urban areas.
Table D.1 shows the share of the vertically integrated firms, as well as the share
of non-integrated firms before and after the MTU introduction. Overall, the brand
composition is very similar before and after the introduction of the MTU.
Figure D.2 shows the daily number of petrol stations for which the price panel
contains a price entry at 5 pm. There is no structural break in the daily number of
petrol stations for which there is an entry in the price panel before and after the MTU
introduction. For most days in the pre-MTU period, we have prices for approximately
12, 000 petrol stations in our panel. This number stays approximately the same after
the introduction of the MTU and only increases to around 13, 500 at the end of February
2014, when reporting issues of Total and Esso stop.51 At any point in time over the
observation period, our panel therefore includes prices for most of the approximately
14, 700 petrol stations in Germany.
Figure D.3 shows that there are fewer price changes per day in our data prior to
the MTU introduction than after the MTU was introduced. This is because whereas
after the introduction of the MTU we observe the universe of price changes in Germany,
before the introduction of the MTU we only observe the subset of prices that was
reported by users to the app.
Figure D.4 shows the number of notifications of price changes over the day, before
and after the introduction of the MTU. Whereas before the introduction of the MTU
there is a notification every time a user of the app reports a price, after the MTU there
is a notification every time that there is a price change.
Figure D.5 shows the hourly fueling patterns as reported in a representative
survey among drivers commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Economic
51Total and Esso report normally in October 2013. Esso reports only a very limited amount of prices
between November 2013 and mid-February 2014. Total only reports a very limited amount of prices
between December 2013 and mid-February 2014. Both experienced reporting issues in April 2014,
after which they returned to full reporting.
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Figure D.1: Distribution of petrol stations across Germany
Note: The figure shows the geographic distribution of petrol stations in Germany.
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Table D.1: Share of stations in percent by brand
Pre-MTU Post-MTU
Aral 20.1 18.1
Shell 14.2 14.2
Esso 5.7 5.4
Total 7.0 4.7
Jet 5.0 4.6
Orlen 4.7 4.2
Agip 2.0 3.1
Hem 3.0 2.8
OMV 2.6 2.3
Non-integrated 35.8 40.6
Notes: The “Pre-MTU” column shows the share of petrol
stations by brand in the sample for Germany before the in-
troduction of the MTU. The “Post-MTU” column shows the
share of petrol stations by brand in the sample for Germany
after the introduction of the MTU. We consider all petrol
station that have at least one price entry in the sample be-
fore or after the MTU introduction, respectively.
Figure D.2: Number of petrol stations with positive price reports at 5pm
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Notes: The Figure shows the average daily number of petrol stations with a positive price report at 5
pm in Germany in our sample.
220 Price Transparency Against Market Power
Figure D.3: Number of daily price changes
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Notes: The Figure shows the average daily number of price changes in Germany in our data. In the
pre-MTU period consecutive reports of the same price are not considered a price change.
Figure D.4: Notification patterns over the day
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(a) Pre-MTU
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(b) Post-MTU
Notes: Panel (a) shows the share of price notifications in our data set for every hour of the day for the
pre-MTU period. Panel (b) shows the share of price notifications in our data set for every hour of the
day for the post-MTU period. Pre-MTU, each price report by users notifying a price change to the
information service provider is a price notification. Post-MTU, each price change notified by petrol
stations to the MTU is a price notification.
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Figure D.5: Daily fuelling patterns
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Notes: The figure shows the average fueling patterns by German motorists over the day. Data is based
on a representative survey among drivers commissioned by the German Federal Ministry of Economic
Affairs.
Affairs. As discussed in Section 4.6, the majority of drivers buy fuel between 5 pm and
7 pm, whereas only very few drivers buy petrol in the morning.
The fueling patterns are also consistent with price patterns reported in Figure
D.6. Whereas prices are highest in the morning, they fall during the day until the early
evening and start rising again at around 8 pm.
Figure D.7 shows the evolution of monthly page impressions for three mobile
price comparison applications for which data is available in 2014. Although these three
mobile applications are only a fraction of the German mobile petrol price comparison
market, they together have more than 70 million page impressions in December 2014.
This shows that mobile price comparison applications were widely used by the end of
2014.
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Figure D.6: Daily price patterns
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Notes: The Figure shows the average petrol price for every hour between 7 am and 20 pm in Germany
between 2013 and 2014.
Figure D.7: Monthly page impressions
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Notes: The Figure shows the evolution of monthly page impressions for three popular mobile price
comparison applications. Each line begins when data for the particular app becomes available and
ends at the end of our sample period, in December 2014.
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D.4 Retail Margins and Petrol Station Characteristics in France
Figure D.8 shows the distribution of petrol stations in France over our sample period.
As expected, petrol stations are spread across the country and clustered around urban
areas.
Figure D.8: Distribution of petrol stations across France
Note: The Figure shows the geographic distribution of petrol stations in France.
D.5 Local Radio Reports of Petrol Prices
There are 381 radio stations in Germany broadcasting via short-wave out of which
83 are active in Bavaria. Among these, we identified 60 radio stations that could
potentially broadcast petrol prices, which we contacted. Among these stations, we
identified four local radio stations that broadcasted local petrol prices (e.g. the three
lowest price petrol stations in their reception area) more than once a day at some
point after the MTU introduction in 2013 and 2014 and know the exact period of
time of these broadcasts. We discard two of the radio stations because they already
broadcasted the lowest petrol prices amongst those called in by their listeners before
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Figure D.9: Radio reception areas and petrol stations in Bavaria
the MTU was introduced. The two remaining radio stations are Radio Arabella, which
started its broadcast on 25 April 2014 and Extra-Radio, which started its broadcasts on
2 February 2014. We merge this information with data on the geographic availability
of radio stations which we received from fmlist.org. Figure D.9 shows the reception
areas of Radio Arabella and Extra-Radio. For each petrol station we can therefore
say whether, on a particular day, it is within the reception area of a radio station
broadcasting prices or not.
D.6 Consumer Search and Information
The commuter data from the German Federal Employment Agency includes informa-
tion on how many workers live in one municipality and work in another municipality
for all municipality pairs for which there are more than 3 commuters as at the 30th
June 2013. There were 11,197 municipalities in Germany in 2013. These are the smal-
lest administrative unit in Germany, with a median size of 19km2. The centroid of
a municipality is therefore a particularly good approximation of the home and work
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address outside of the largest cities.52 In the following, we detail our methodology of
how to compute the share of perfectly informed potential customers of a petrol station.
This description broadly follows the methodology introduced by Pennerstorfer et al.
(2019).
To identify whether a particular commuter drives by a petrol station, we calculate
the shortest path via the road network between the centroid of the home and work
municipalities using the osrmtime package for Stata, written by Huber and Rust (2016).
We only keep commutes that are less than 200 kilometers, since commutes above this
threshold are unlikely to be daily commuters.
In a next step, we identify the set of petrol stations that could potentially lie on
a commuter route. This step is essential in order to make the problem computationally
tractable as we have 111, 520 centroid combinations with positive commuter streams
and around 14, 700 petrol stations.
Firstly, using the coordinates of the two centroids of a commuting route, we
identify the most Western and most Eastern longitude, as well as the most Southern and
most Northern latitude of the centroids. Then, we push these boundaries 55 kilometers
further out and draw a rectangle that contains both centroids. Using the coordinates
of the petrol stations, we identify which petrol stations lie within the rectangle of a
particular commuter route and could thus potentially be on the commuter route.
The set of potential petrol stations within the rectangle of a commuting route can
still be large. In a second step, we therefore want to reduce this set by identifying the
set of stations that are closer to the linear distance line between the two centroids than
the difference between the shortest path via the road network and the linear distance,
plus an additional buffer of 2 kilometers. This leaves us with a subset of petrol stations
within the rectangle, which could potentially lie on the commuting route.
Finally, for the subset of stations that could potentially lie on the commuting
route, we calculate the driving distance from the origin municipality to a petrol station
and from the petrol station to the destination municipality. If the sum of these two
routes is less than 250 meters longer than the shortest driving distance between origin
and destination municipality, we consider this petrol station to be on the commuting
route. We then consider that the number of commuters on this commuting route
therefore all drive past the respective petrol station.
We assume that out-of-municipality commuters are perfectly informed about
station prices in their home and work municipalities, as well as stations outside of these
municipalities, that are on their daily way to work. The number of informed consumers
of a petrol station i, denoted by Ii, are hence all out-of-municipality commuters residing
52Large cities, such as Berlin or Munich, are treated as only one municipality.
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Figure D.10: Distribution of ex ante informed consumer share across stations
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of petrol stations by the ex ante share of informed consumers.
This is measured as the share of out-of-municipality commuters on 30 June 2013 as a share of all po-
tential customers of a petrol station. We exclude petrol stations in municipalities with more than 1
million inhabitants in 2013 (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne).
or working in the municipality of the station, as well as all driving past the station
on their daily commute. The number of uninformed consumers, Ui, is proxied by
employed individuals who do not commute outside their municipality. The share of ex
ante informed consumers among potential customers of a petrol station is thus:
ζi =
Ii
Ii + Ui
. (4.33)
Figure D.10 shows the distribution of the ex ante share of informed consumers
among potential customers of a petrol station. The majority of petrol stations have a
share of ex ante informed consumers of between 20 percent and 60 percent.
D.7 Donut Regression
Figure D.11 illustrates the identification strategy for the Donut-DiD regression analysis
graphically. Petrol stations that are less than 20 kilometers away from the Franco-
German border are not considered, because these could be in direct competition to
each other and so spillovers of the treatment effect could occur. This would threaten
the stable unit treatment value assumption. Petrol stations more than 40 kilometers
away from the border could be subject to very different market conditions and are thus
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Figure D.11: Petrol stations 20 to 40 kilometers from the Franco-German border
France
Germany
Border
Stations
Notes: The thick, solid line represents the Franco-German border. Each point on the right of the bor-
der represents a petrol station in Germany, which is 20 to 40 kilometers away from the border. Each
point on the left side of the border represents a petrol station in France, which is 20 to 40 kilometers
away from the border. These are the petrol stations considered in our baseline Donut-DiD regression
analysis.
also not considered. Each point in Figure D.11 thus represents a petrol station, either
in France or in Germany, which is 20 to 40 kilometers away from the border.
In Table D.2, we re-estimate the Donut-DiD regression for the analysis period
12 April 2013 until 30 September 2014 using different distances to the Franco-German
border. We find that the results are robust to changing the distances and the average
effect of the MTU introduction is always around 1 Eurocent.
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Table D.2: The effect of the MTU on retail margins using alternative donuts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MTU introduction -1.25∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.94∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206,140 111,319 166,595 234,831 416,647 551,184
Adjusted R2 0.903 0.904 0.893 0.885 0.871 0.872
Mean retail margin 10.41 10.42 10.16 9.78 9.04 8.85
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30 November 2013) is dropped
in all specifications. The analysis period is the 12 April 2013 until 30 September 2014
in all specifications. Column (1) uses only data for stations 10 to 40 km away from the
Franco-German border. Column (2) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from the
Franco-German border. Column (3) uses only data for stations 20 to 50 km away from the
Franco-German border. Column (4) uses only data for stations 20 to 60 km away from the
Franco-German border. Column (5) uses only data for stations 20 to 80 km away from the
Franco-German border. Column (6) uses only data for stations 20 to 100 km away from the
Franco-German border.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
D.8 Austria as a Control Group
To test the robustness of our estimates of the average effect of the MTU on retail
margins in Germany, we use an alternative specification where we compare the indexed
evolution of retail margins in Germany and Austria. Since we only have daily average
prices and retail margins at the country level for Austria, we aggregate the German
data to the same level and analyze the evolution of margins descriptively. We begin
by estimating a daily average price for Germany, by taking the simple average of
prices at each petrol station at 9 am, 12 pm and 5 pm and then averaging across
petrol stations. Each observation is hence the daily simple average retail margin in the
respective country. Since for Germany we overweight times that are less treated by the
MTU, we underestimate the magnitude of the treatment effect. Figure D.12 shows the
development of retail margins in Germany and Austria between April 2013 and August
2014. Although retail margins follow a common trend before the introduction of the
MTU and are sometimes higher in Austria, sometimes higher in Germany, shortly after
the increase in transparency in Germany, we observe a divergence in margins between
the two groups and retail margins in Germany fall compared to Austria.
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Figure D.12: Control: Austria
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D.9 Local Monopolists as a Control Group
Driving to another petrol station is costly and hence retail petrol markets are usually
segmented geographically. We define local markets as driving distance catchment areas
around a focal station. We assume that stations that do not face competition from
another station in their catchment area act as local monopolists. Like in the analysis
of Albæk et al. (1997) for the cement industry, these local monopolists are unaffected
by increasing transparency and can therefore serve as a control group.
In Table D.3, we report the results of an estimation strategy in which we analyze
the effect of the MTU on retail margins of petrol stations in Germany. We compare
petrol stations in Germany, which have at least one competing petrol station in their
catchment area to petrol stations that are local monopolists. Only petrol stations
that are of a different brand are considered as competitors. Whereas we consider local
monopolists as untreated by the introduction of the MTU, because consumers have no
alternative in the vicinity and can thus not act upon the new information, stations that
have a competitor in their market are considered treated. In Column (1), we define
a local monopolist as not having any other station within a 1 kilometers radius. We
find a treatment effect of 0.1 Eurocent, however, according to this definition 64% of
petrol stations in Germany are local monopolists. We thus consider broader markets
in Columns (2) and (3). In Column (2), we define local monopolists as not having
a competing station within a 3 kilometers radius. We drop all petrol stations with a
competitor within a 3 kilometers radius, but without a competitor within a 1 kilometers
radius from the control group, as these are local monopolists according to the market
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Table D.3: The effect of the MTU on retail margins using local monopolies
(1) (2) (3)
MTU introduction -0.08∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,964,599 2,417,369 1,978,672
Share local monopolists 64.2% 42.2% 29.4%
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.558 0.557
Mean retail margin 6.85 6.91 6.88
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30
November 2013) is dropped in all specifications. The analysis period
is the 12 April 2013 until 30 September 2014 in all specifications.
Column (1) compares petrol stations without competition within
a 1 km radius to all other petrol stations. Column (2) compares
petrol stations without competition within a 3 km radius to petrol
stations with competition within a 1 km radius. Column (3) com-
pares petrol stations without competition within a 5 km radius to
petrol stations with competition within a 1 km radius. Only petrol
stations that are of another brand are treated as competitors.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in paren-
theses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
definition in Column (1). We find a treatment effect of 0.2 Eurocent per liter using 3
kilometers catchment areas. In Column (3), we repeat this analysis for 5 kilometers
catchment area and find a similar treatment effect to Column (2). Overall, our results
are consistent with Lemus and Luco (2019), who find that mandatory price disclosure
reduced the time to reach a new equilibrium for oligopoly markets, but not for local
monopolies.
Overall, the average effect of the MTU that we find using this specification is
consistent with our estimates for the average effect of the MTU using France as a
control group. We are likely to underestimate the treatment effect using the local
monopolist identification strategy, since consumers in monopoly markets are likely also
partially treated by the MTU. It therefore makes sense that the magnitude of the effect
that we find using local monopolists is smaller than when comparing retail margins in
Germany and France.
D.10 Triple Difference Analysis
The DiD design in which we compare retail margins at petrol stations in Germany and
France allows us to isolate the average treatment effect from shocks over time affecting
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retail margins of petrol stations in Germany and France equally, as well as from shocks
that are petrol station specific, but constant over time. However, there may still be
transitory shocks unrelated to the MTU which affect petrol stations in Germany and
France differently. Similarly, the DiD design in which we compare retail margins at
petrol stations in Germany that are subject to local competition and petrol stations in
Germany that are local monopolists allows us to isolate the average treatment effect
from shocks over time affecting retail margins of local monopolists and competitive
stations equally, as well as time-constant petrol station specific shocks. If there are
transitory shocks which are unrelated to the MTU, but affect local monopolists differ-
ently to competitive stations, then this biases the estimates of the DiD estimator.
To address these concerns, we estimate a “triple difference” (DDD) regression.
This compares the effect of the MTU on the difference in retail margins between local
monopolists and competitive petrol stations in Germany to the difference in retail mar-
gins between local monopolists and competitive petrol stations in France. Comparing
the DDD estimator to the DiD with France as a control group, the advantage is that we
can isolate the average treatment effect from transitory shocks that affect local mono-
polists differently to competitive petrol stations, but that are constant across countries
and thus unrelated to the MTU.
Specifically, we estimate the following fixed effects regression:
Yit =β0 + β1(Postt ×Germanyi × Competitivei) + β2(Postt × Competitivei) (4.34)
+β3(Postt ×Germanyi) + µi + γt + it
where Yit corresponds to the retail margin of station i at time t and Postt ×
Germanyi×Competitivei is a dummy equal to one, if an observation belongs to a petrol
station i located in Germany, the observation is made at a date t after the 1 October
2013 and is a competitive station (i.e. not a local monopolist). (Postt×Competitivei)
is an interaction term equal to one, if an observation is of a competitive station after
the introduction of the MTU. (Postt×Germanyi) is an interaction term equal to one,
if an observation is of a petrol station in Germany after the introduction of the MTU.
µi are petrol station fixed effects, and γt are date fixed effects.
The estimated treatment effects of the triple difference strategy are reported in
Table D.4. Columns (1) shows that the MTU led to a decrease in retail margins of
0.5 Eurocent if we include data until the 30 September 2014. Column (2) shows that
the treatment effect increases to 0.6 Eurocent if we include data until the 31 December
2014. The estimated treatment effects should be considered as a lower-bound of the true
effect of the MTU, since there are likely to be spillovers between local monopolists and
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Table D.4: The effect of the MTU on retail margins using a triple difference
strategy
(1) (2)
MTU ×competitive -0.50∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes
Station-hour fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 6,219,476 7,573,649
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.905
Mean retail margin 10.90 11.15
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 un-
til 30 November 2013) is dropped in all specifications. We
compare the difference between the change in retail margins
before and after the MTU of competitive petrol stations
and local monopolists in Germany to the difference between
the change in retail margins before and after the MTU of
competitive petrol stations and local monopolists in France.
Column (1) uses data until 30 September 2014. Column (2)
uses data until 31 December 2014.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
competitive petrol stations and thus local monopolists in Germany are also partially
affected by the MTU.
D.11 Sub-group Analysis
In Table D.5 we estimate the effect of the MTU on different sub-groups of petrol stations
in Germany. Each sub-group is compared to all petrol stations in France between 12
April 2013 and 30 September 2014.53 In Column (1), we estimate the effect of the
MTU on Aral stations, which is the largest brand in Germany. We find that retail
margins for Aral decreased by 0.33 Eurocent. In Column (2), we repeat the analysis
for Shell, which is the second largest brand and often the most expensive. We find that
retail margins decreased by 2.1 Eurocent. In Columns (3) and (4), we estimate the
effect of the MTU on integrated brands and non-integrated brands separately. We find
that the effect of the MTU is stronger on petrol stations of integrated brands than of
non-integrated brands. Finally, in Column (5) we estimate the effect of the MTU only
keeping petrol stations in Germany which are present in the sample for at least 100
53We do not observe brands in the French data and thus cannot construct brand-level control groups
in France.
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Table D.5: The effect of the MTU on retail margins by sub-group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MTU introduction -0.33∗∗∗ -2.10∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,999,649 2,827,722 4,647,714 3,826,639 5,697,926
Adjusted R2 0.936 0.935 0.929 0.942 0.924
Mean retail margin 15.46 15.95 12.45 13.22 11.29
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30 November 2013) is
dropped in all specifications. The analysis period is the 12 April 2013 until 30 September
2014 in all specifications. The control group in each specification are all petrol stations
in France. Column (1) only uses Aral petrol stations in Germany. Column (2) only uses
Shell petrol stations in Germany. Column (3) only uses integrated petrol stations in
Germany. Column (4) only uses non-integrated petrol stations in Germany. Column (5)
only uses petrol stations present for at least 100 days in our sample between 12 April
2013 and 12 September 2013 in Germany.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
days between 12 April 2013 and 12 September 2013. We find that the MTU decreased
retail margins by 0.90 Eurocent for this sub-group compared to 0.89 Eurocent for all
German stations in our sample found in Table 4.2. The average treatment effect in
our main estimation results is thus not driven by differences in the sample composition
before and after the MTU introduction.
D.12 Conley Spatial HAC Standard Errors
Correlation between retail margins of petrol stations across space could lead to incor-
rect estimates of the standard errors. We therefore re-estimate the effect of the MTU
on retail margins accounting for spatial dependence as proposed by Conley (1999).54
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cut-off of 5
kilometers, which is in line with our definition of local markets. Temporal autocorrel-
ation is assumed to decrease linearly in time up to a cut-off of 10 days.
Table D.6 shows that standard errors are smaller than in Table 4.2 and hence
our main results are robust to using Conley spatial HAC standard errors.
54We implement this using the reg2hdfespatial package proposed by Fetzer (2014), which is based on
an algorithm developed by Hsiang (2010).
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Table D.6: The effect of the MTU on retail margins using Conley spatial HAC
standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MTU introduction -0.89∗∗∗ -1.63∗∗∗ -1.18∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗ -0.97∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,219,476 7,573,649 111,319 136,561 5,196,002 6,323,512
Adjusted R2 0.921 0.904 0.904 0.886 0.919 0.902
Mean retail margin 10.90 11.15 10.42 10.71 10.56 10.80
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30 November 2013) is dropped in
all specifications. Column (1) uses data for all stations in Germany and France until 30 Septem-
ber 2014. Column (2) uses data for all stations in Germany and France until 31 December 2014.
Column (3) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from the Franco-German border until
30 September 2014. Column (4) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from the Franco-
German border until 31 December 2014. Column (5) uses data for all petrol stations except those
without a competitor within a 5 km catchement area in Germany and France until 30 September
2014. Column (6) uses data for all petrol stations except those without a competitor within a 5 km
catchement area in Germany and France until 31 December 2014.
Standard errors clustered are estimated using Conley spatial HAC standard errors with a spatial
cut-off of 5 km and a time cut-off of 10 days and are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
D.13 Dropping September 2013
To show that the estimated average treatment effect of the MTU is not driven by
the margin increase in Germany in the first half of September 2013, we re-estimate
all specifications presented in Table 4.2 dropping September 2013. The results are
presented in Table D.7 and show that the average treatment effect of the MTU is
robust to dropping September 2013.
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Table D.7: The effect of the MTU on retail margins omitting September 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MTU introduction -0.67∗∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ -0.95∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.23) (0.02) (0.03)
Date fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,050,265 7,404,438 108,371 133,613 5,053,680 6,181,190
Adjusted R2 0.925 0.907 0.908 0.889 0.923 0.905
Mean retail margin 10.88 11.14 10.39 10.69 10.53 10.79
Notes: The test phase of the MTU (12 September 2013 until 30 November 2013) and the margin
increase in September 2013 are dropped in all specifications. Column (1) uses data for all stations
in Germany and France until 30 September 2014. Column (2) uses data for all stations in Germany
and France until 31 December 2014. Column (3) uses only data for stations 20 to 40 km away from
the Franco-German border until 30 September 2014. Column (4) uses only data for stations 20 to
40 km away from the Franco-German border until 31 December 2014. Column (5) uses data for all
petrol stations except those without a competitor within a 5 km catchement area in Germany and
France until 30 September 2014. Column (6) uses data for all petrol stations except those without
a competitor within a 5 km catchement area in Germany and France until 31 December 2014.
Standard errors, clustered at the petrol station level, are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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